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I. Introduction
There is something wrong with a law that keeps out-for as long as eight
years-the small child of a mother or father who has settled in the United
States while a nonrelative or less close relative from another country can
come in immediately. 1
This Article examines the problems involved in reconciling the
United States' interest in controlling immigration with a citizen's or resi-
dent alien's right to be joined by members of his or her immediate fam-
ily. The United States selects immigrants under a preference system
placing annual ceilings on any one nation's entrants. If an applicant's
country of origin has a high demand for U.S. immigration, the applicant
often faces a long wait for a visa to become available. Thus, spouses and
minor children of resident aliens from some countries enter immedi-
1. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97th CONG., IST
SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 15 (Joint Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter SELECT COMMISSION].
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ately, while those from Mexico and the Philippines, for example, must
often wait eight years or longer. The recently passed Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 19862 exacerbates these inequities. 3 Under
the Act, relatives who entered the United States illegally may now, under
certain circumstances, become legal residents in preference to those
who, obeying the law, remained behind, waiting for a visa to become
available.
This Article argues that the right to family unification is a funda-
mental human right to which permanent resident aliens, as well as citi-
zens, are constitutionally entitled. When immigration legislation
interferes with the right to family unity, the customary judicial deference
to Congress in the immigration area becomes inappropriate. Even if the
federal courts continue to exercise this deference, however, Congress
should amend current immigration law to protect this right.
This Article compares the French treatment of family unification
with that of the United States. In a landmark decision in 1978, 4 the
Conseil d'Etat, the highest French administrative court, recognized the
right to a normal family life as a fundamental constitutional right, annul-
ling an administrative regulation that interfered with a resident alien's
right to bejoined by a spouse or minor child. The Conseil Constitution-
nel, the body that reviews proposed legislation for conformity to the
Constitution, also recognized the family's constitutionally protected sta-
tus in a 1986 immigration law decision. 5 The French courts have thus
relied upon the French Constitution to protect the right to family unity
in immigration law decisions.
6
Unlike France, no U.S. court has yet recognized a constitutional
right to family unification. A long line of decisions has established that
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment safeguards of liberty protect the
family and family integrity.7 Courts have not extended these decisions,
however, to the immigration area.
This Article is divided into five major parts. Parts III and IV com-
pare the principal developments in family unification policy in the
United States and France. Although both countries' legislative and
administrative frameworks seemingly make generous provisions for fam-
2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3359. The Act establishes penalties for
employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens and provides such aliens, resi-
dent in the country sinceJanuary 1, 1982, an opportunity to legalize their status and
eventually become permanent resident aliens. It also provides certain agricultural
workers the opportunity to obtain permanent resident status.
3. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
4. Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigres et Autres,
Conseil d'Etat, 1978 Recueil des decisions du Conseil d'Etat [Lebon] 493; see also M.
LONG, P. WEIL & G. BRAIBANT, LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE 587 (8th ed. 1984) [hereinafter M. LONG].
5. Judgment of Sept. 3, 1986, Con. const., No. 82-216 (LEXIS, French Public
library, Consti file).
6. See iqfra notes 553-86 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 355-78 and accompanying text.
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ily unification,8 France's current protections are stronger in several
respects: (1) France lacks numerical ceilings on entry of family mem-
bers; (2) it narrows grounds for exclusion and expulsion; and (3) it
essentially exempts immediate relatives of citizens from expulsion.9
Parts V and VI contrast the two countries' sources of constitutional
protection of the family and the extent of judicial review of immigration
law. Part V argues for constitutional protection of family unity for both
permanent residents and citizens, based on the principle that immigra-
tion law should protect these family relationships as much as possible
consistent with legitimate national objectives. Part V also argues for
according preference to the immediate family of resident aliens over the
distant relatives of citizens.
Part VII argues that, assuming the right to family unification is a
fundamental component of liberty deserving constitutional protection,
immigration law provisions interfering with that right may be justified
only by compelling national interests and should be narrowly tailored to
serve those interests in a manner that interferes as little as possible with
family unification. Congress, therefore, should annul or amend the cur-
rent ceilings. Part VII proposes amendments to eliminate these numeri-
cal ceilings (the full text of these amendments appears in the Appendix
to this Article). Part VII also assesses whether recognition of a constitu-
tional right to family unification should act to mitigate otherwise
enforceable grounds for exclusion or expulsion.
II. Statistical Overview
A brief description of immigration trends in France and the United
States places in perspective the discussion of family unification rights.
When comparing French and U.S. immigration, one must keep in mind
significant differences in scale:
1. The land mass of the United States is approximately seventeen times
that of France, a nation about four-fifths the size of the state of Texas. 10
2. The current population of the United States (241 million) is over four
times that of France (55 million). 11
3. The population density of France (262.3 per sq. mile) is approxi-
mately four times greater than that of the United States (68.1 per sq.
mile).1 2
4. Immigration to the United States in 1984 totaled 544,000 while that
to France was 68,000.13
The current level of U.S. immigration is high by recent standards,
though still only half the record levels at the turn of the century.
8. For instance, well over half of annual immigration to each country is based on
family ties. See infra note 29 and the accompanying table.
9. See infra notes 167, 171-76, 275-87 and accompanying text.
10. THE 1987 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 183, 275, 752 (40th ed. 1987).
11. Id. at 183, 275.
12. Id.
13. See infra note 29 and the accompanying table.
Vol. 21
1988 Family Unification
Approximately 8.8 million immigrants entered between 1901 and 1910,
with a peak of 1,285,349 in 1907.14 Immigration then declined drasti-
cally, hitting bottom in the 1930s, when only one-half million entered
the country.1 5 Since then, however, immigration has increased every
decade: approximately one million in the 1940s, 2.5 million in the
1950s, 3.3 million in the 1960s and 4.5 million in the 1970s.16 In 1978
immigration exceeded 600,000 in a single year for the first time since
1924.17
In contrast, French immigration has declined by more than 60 per-
cent in the last two decades. During the 1960s, the number of entrants
averaged nearly 200,000 per year.' 8 France took drastic measures in
1974, however, to limit the immigration of workers. As a result, immi-
gration to France averaged only about 90,000 from 1975 to 1982.' 9
The number continues to decline: 78,000 in 1983 and 68,000 in 1984
and 1985.20
The profile of immigration to France has also changed drastically
during the last two decades. While nearly 70% of immigrants in the
1960s and early 1970s entered as "workers," that figure declined to an
average of 35% of entrants from 1975 to 1982 and then to 17%o, where
it stands today.2 1 Moreover, over 60% (110,000) of the 172,000 work-
ers who entered from 1980 to 1985 were beneficiaries of the govern-
14. 1978 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 41
[hereinafter 1978 ANNUAL REPORT].
15. lI-
16. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1986, at 84.
17. 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 41.
18. B. GRANOTIER, LES TRAVAILLEURS IMMIGRES EN FRANCE 83 (5th ed. 1979).
19. MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES ET DE LA SOLIDARITE NATIONALE, 1981-
1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLrrIQUE DE L'IMMIGRATION 21, 27 (1986) [hereinafter 1981-
1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE].
20. Id. While annual immigration to the United States equaled 1.2% of the popu-
lation in the early 1900s, it is currently just .2% of the population. SELECT COMMIS-
SION, supra note 1, at 92. In France, current annual immigration equals .13% of the
population. 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE, supra note 19, at 27.
The United States has a lower percentage of foreign-born persons now than at any
point since the government began keeping such records in 1850. SELECT COMMIS-
SION, supra note 1, at 8. The 1900 census indicated that the foreign-born population
was 15.3%. The number declined to 9.4% in 1970 and to 6.2% in 1980. Half of the
foreign-born population (3.1% of the total population) were citizens in 1980. 1980
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 87.
France's foreign-born comprise a significantly greater percentage of the popula-
tion than does the U.S.'s (approximately half again as large). In 1982 it was esti-
mated at 9.4%, of which 2.6% had become French citizens and 6.8% remained
resident foreigners. 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE, supra note 19, at 21.
Despite the declining immigration to France over the past two decades, the percent-
age of foreign-born persons has been rising gradually since 1930, when it was
approximately 5%. This increase has slowed, however, since the 1974 halt to immi-
gration of workers from non-EEC nations and the subsequent reduced demand for
family unification. Id. at 12.
21. B. GRANOTIER, supra note 18, at 48, 54-55; 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POL1-
TIOUE, supra note 19, at 21-27.
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ment's 1981 amnesty program, which legalized the status of clandestine
immigrants living in the country beforeJanuary 1981.22 Another 33,000
of the 172,000 workers were nationals of member states of the European
Economic Community (EEC) and therefore entitled by EEC law to
unrestricted entry.23 Thus, between 1980 and 1985, actual entry of
workers from outside the EEC amounted to only 29,000, approximately
5,000 annually. In contrast, refugee entries into France, under 10,000
per year until recently, have increased significantly, reaching 24,000 in
1985.24 Refugees now account for one-third of total immigration. 25
As Table I illustrates below, family immigration in France and the
United States has remained relatively stable, though of course raw num-
bers have changed significantly. In France, family entrants have
declined from a high of 75,000 in 1972 to 32,500 in 1985.26 The United
States, in contrast, has in the same period seen family immigration rise
from 170,000 to 400,000, remaining at about three-fourths of
entrants.2 7 Percentages for workers and refugees have also stayed fairly
constant in the United States, at about 10% and 15% respectively.28




26. Id. Family entrants peaked at 75,000 in 1972. Compare this to the 1950s,
when the number was only about 2,000 annually. B. GRANOTIER, supra note 18, at 80-
82.
27. See 1984 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 11-14; 1982 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION SERVICE 11-14; 1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 36.
28. See infra note 29 and the accompanying table. Another revealing comparison
is in terms of absolute numbers of family entrants. United States immigration law
admits a far wider range of relatives than does French immigration law. Comparing
only citizens' and permanent residents' spouses and children, in the twelve-year
period from 1972 to 1984, the number of visas issued to U.S. citizens' spouses or
children doubled (from 86,332 to 177,783), and the number issued to resident aliens'
families tripled (from 36,484 to 112,309). 1984 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMI-
GRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 11; 1975 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 34. This total of 289,000 is approximately seven
to eight times the current number of family entrants in France and approximately
twice as large in terms of the two countries' relative populations. The higher rate of
close family immigration in the United States may be due to the composition of the
immigrant base. Over 80%o of foreigners in France have resided there for over ten
years. 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE, supra note 19, at 12. In the United
States, the foreign population is skewed in the other direction-many immigrants
have recently entered and thus are more likely to bring in additional relatives. The





IMMIGRATION BY CATEGORIES IN FRANCE
AND THE UNITED STATES 29
FRANCE UNITED STATES
Immigrant
Year Category Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
1975-1982 Workers 32,000 35% 36,000 7%
(average for Family 46,000 50% 310,000 62%
the period) Refugee 12,000 15% 77,000 15%
Other 81,000 16%
TOTAL 90,000 100% 504,000 100%
1983 Workers 18,000 23% 55,000 10%
Family 46,000 60% 395,000 71%
Refugee 14,000 17% 103,000 18%
Other 7,000 1%
TOTAL 78,000 100% 560,000 100%
1984 Workers 12,000 17% 50,000 9%
Family 40,000 60% 399,000 73%
Refugee 16,000 23% 92,000 17%
Other 3,000 1%
TOTAL 68,000 100% 544,000 100%
1985 Workers 11,000 17% 51,000 9%
Family 33,000 48% 410,000 73%
Refugee 24,000 35% 95,000 17%
Other 6,000 1%
TOTAL 68,000 100% 562,000 100%
M. Development of Family Unification Protections in United States
Immigration Law
A. Overview
This section briefly traces the evolution of family unification provisions
in U.S. immigration law. Judicial decisions during the late 19th century
identified the right of family unification as a "natural" right and strictly
construed immigration statutes restricting this right.30 Congress, how-
ever, becoming concerned with assimilability, and with protecting the
nation's work force, enacted increasingly restrictive immigration barri-
29. The figures of U.S. immigration from 1975 to 1977 were taken from the 1977
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE; for 1978, from
the 1985 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE;
and for 1979 to 1985, from the 1984 and 1986 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. The figures for French immigration
were taken from 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE PoLrIQuE, supra note 19, at 21, 27. All of
the figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand.
30. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
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ers.3 1 Supreme Court decisions then rejected challenges to the early
immigration acts, declaring that the executive and legislative branches
had very broad power to regulate immigration in pursuit of national
interests.3 2
Under the authority of these decisions, Congress regulated immi-
gration by drawing lines according to race, sex, and social status.3
3
These regulations inevitably lessened the potential for family unifica-
tion. Congress made gradual changes in these laws following the Sec-
ond World War.3 4 The 1952 amendments,3 5 in particular, were
designed to provide a "humanitarian" treatment of family unification. 36
From 1921 until 1965, however, the United States maintained a national
origins quota system, giving quotas as small as 100 to many countries,
while allowing large numbers of immigrants from other countries,
mainly those in northwestern Europe and the Western Hemisphere. 3 7
Congress eliminated the blatantly discriminatory system in 1965,38
replacing it with a system of preference based on factors other than
national origin. A ceiling was placed, however, on the number of prefer-
ence immigrants who could enter in one year from any particular coun-
try.3 9 A major inequity remains under this current system, namely, that
the right of resident aliens to be joined by family members depends
upon visa demand from their country of origin. A resident alien whose
spouse or child lives in a country of high immigration demand, there-
fore, must wait many years to obtain the visas necessary for family
unification.
B. Early Immigration Regulations and Family Unification-Race, Sex
and Social Class as Determinants
1. Race: The Chinese Exclusion Acts
The issue of family unification first arose in the context of the late 19th
century Chinese Exclusion Acts.40 The United States and China origi-
nally maintained a policy of free migration. The Burlingame Treaty of
1868, for instance, provided that:
The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recog-
nize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and
allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emi-
gration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from one country to
31. See infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 439-66 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 40-51 (race), 52-61 (social class), 62-78 (sex) and accompany-
ing text.
34. See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
36. See id.
37. See infra notes 79-81, 103 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
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the other, for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents. 41
Within a decade, however, California officials complained that the num-
bers of Chinese immigrants were becoming unmanageable, that Chinese
laborers unfairly competed with Americans for jobs, and that differences
of race made assimilation impossible.4 2 As a result, the treaty was modi-
fied in 1880 to allow the United States to take reasonable measures to
"regulate, limit, or suspend" the entry or residence of Chinese laborers
whenever their presence would affect or threaten the interests or "good
order" of the country.43 Two years later, Congress enacted the Chinese
Restriction and Exclusion Act of 1882,4 4 suspending the entry of all Chi-
nese laborers for a period of ten years. The Act, however, excepted
laborers who had entered prior to 1880 and wished to temporarily
depart the United States, by providing for the issuance of re-entry certif-
icates at the time of departure.
4 5
When, in 1888, Congress voided all re-entry certificates that had
been issued,4 6 Chinese laborers holding such certificates raised the first
major challenge to an immigration law.4 7 The U.S. Supreme Court, in
The Chinese Exclusion Case,4 8 rejected their claims that either the treaties
or the certificates established a vested right to re-entry, declaring that
[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sov-
ereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at
any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the
country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any
one.
49
Relying on the practice reported in other countries, including France,
the Court suggested that, even in the absence of any statute on the sub-
ject, the government possessed inherent power to exclude "paupers,
criminals, and persons afflicted with incurable disease" as well as other
classes "whose presence is deemed injurious or a source of danger to
41. Burlingame Treaty, July 28, 1868, United States-China, art. 5, 16 Stat. 739,
740, T.S. No. 48, at 235.
42. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889) (noting statements
from the California Constitutional Convention, Dec., 1878).
43. Treaty on Immigration, Nov. 17, 1880, United States-China, art. 1, 22 Stat.
826, T.S. No. 49, at 2.
44. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
45. Id. § 3, 22 Stat. at 59.
46. The Exclusion Act of Oct 1, 1888, ch. 1064, § 1, 25 Stat. 504. The Exclusion
Act provided that:
after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any Chinese laborer who
shall at any time heretofore have been, or who may now or hereafter be, a
resident within the United States, and who shall have departed, or shall
depart, therefrom, and shall not have returned before the passage of this act,
to return to, or remain in, the United States.
Id.
47. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
48. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
49. Id. at 609.
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the country." 50 Indeed, the Court asserted that the government had the
power "to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judg-
ment, the public interests require such exclusion." 5 1
2. Social Class
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, while barring immigration of Chi-
nese laborers, allowed free entry of members of the Chinese merchant
class. 5 2 The Act was silent, however, as to whether the merchants or
laborers already present might be joined by their immediate families.
In In re Chung Toy Ho,53 a federal court in 1890 interpreted the Chi-
nese Exclusion Act to allow the entry of the wife and child of a Chinese
merchant, reasoning that "[t]he company of the [spouse], and the care
and custody of the [child] are his [the Chinese merchant's] by natural
right; and he ought not to be deprived of either, unless the intention of
congress to do so is clear and unmistakable." 54 The Supreme Court
later approved the reasoning of Chung Toy Ho in a similar case.5 5
50. Id. at 608.
51. Id. at 606. Soon after this decision Congress tightened further the restric-
tions directed against the Chinese. The Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25,
provided that all Chinese laborers who failed to obtain a certificate of residence
within one year could be deported. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893), the Court rejected constitutional challenges to Congress's authority to
deport for mere failure to register, declaring that, "the right of a nation to expel or
deport foreigners, who have not become nationalized or taken any steps towards
becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute
and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country."
Id. at 707. Three dissenting opinions urged that resident aliens, as "persons" pro-
tected by the Fifth amendment and other provisions of the Constitution, could not be
summarily deported for failure to obtain a resident permit. Id. at 732, 744, 761.
52. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 6, 22 Stat. 58, 60.
53. 42 F. 398 (D. Or. 1890).
54. Id. at 400. The provisions of the Treaty of November 17, 1890, United
States-China, 22 Stat. 826, T.S. No. 49, allowed entry of Chinese who were certified
to be merchants, students, teachers, or travelers for pleasure. When Chinese immi-
grants arrived with certification that they were merchants, immigration officials had
turned back their wives and children for lack of certification. The court, however,
reasoned that the treaty provisions and the statute must be construed to allow entry
of family members, stating:
It is impossible to believe that the parties to this treaty, which permits the
servants of a merchant to enter the country with him, ever contemplated the
exclusion of his wife and children. And the reason why they are not expressly
mentioned, as entitled to such admission, is found in the fact that the domi-
cile of the wife and children is that of the husband and father, and that the
concession to the merchant of the right to enter the United States, and dwell
therein at pleasure, fairly construed, does include his wife and minor chil-
dren.
In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. at 399-400.
Other federal courts, however, upheld the exclusion of the spouses and children of
Chinese merchants. See, e.g., In re Ah Quan, 21 F. 182 (D. Cal. 1884).
55. United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459, (1900). The Court held that when
the person seeking entry "is in fact the wife or minor child of one of the members of
a class mentioned in the treaty as entitled to enter, then that person is entitled to
admission without the certificate." Id. at 468-69. The courts, however, interpreted
Vol. 21
1988 Family Unification
These decisions, while identifying family unity as a natural right,
suggested the right was not absolute and could be limited by Congress.
In United States v. Shu Chee,5 6 a federal court explicitly upheld Congress's
power to limit the right of family unification. Shu Chee also indicated the
importance of class status as a determinant. A Chinese laborer resident
in the United States brought over his two sons to enroll them in an
American school. Their proper status, however, was their father's and
they entered without properly fulfilling the entry requirements for
laborers. 57 The court rejected their claim that, as students, they never-
theless had a right to remain.58 The court held that "they cannot purge
themselves of their offense by assuming the occupation of members of
the privileged class (students and merchants), and establish their right
to remain by proof of that character." 59
The Supreme Court extended its recognition of Congress's power
to abridge this "natural right" to family unification in Yee Won v. White.
60
There it explicitly held that the intention of Congress would be defeated
by permitting entry of a laborer's wife and children, even though the
laborer had himself entered as the son of a resident merchant. 6 ' Family
unification rights, therefore, depended upon class privilege.
3. Sex
During this same period, naturalization laws also affected the opportu-
nity for family unification. An 1855 Act provided that "any woman who
might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be
married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to
be a citizen." 62 The Supreme Court interpreted the emphasized lan-
guage as limiting the law's application to "free white women." 6 3 Conse-
quently, until Congress amended the law in 1922,64 a "white" foreign
woman who married a U.S. citizen obtained citizenship status automati-
cally. Even where the marriage took place after an exclusion order or
during deportation proceedings, the courts generally held that, so long
as the marriage was not a sham, the wife's citizenship status acquired
this provision as continuing to exclude "non-white" wives of citizens. See infra notes
62-75 and accompanying text.
56. 93 F. 797 (9th Cir. 1899).
57. Id. at 797-98.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 804-05. Social class was fixed by that existing at time of entry rather
than at time of arrest. Id.
60. 256 U.S. 399 (1921).
61. The Court reasoned that the "well defined purpose of Congress would be
impeded rather than facilitated by permitting entry of the wives and minor children
of Chinamen who first came after the ratification of the treaty [Treaty of 1894 secur-
ing assent of China to the limitation on residence of Chinese laborers] as members of
an exempt class, and later assumed the status of laborers." Id. at 402.
62. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604 (emphasis added).
63. Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 496, 498 (1868).
64. Cable Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021.
Cornell International Law Journal
through marriage prevented her exclusion or deportation.6 5
This legislation did not give automatic citizenship status to non-
white women upon marriage to a U.S. citizen. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, did construe the law to at least protect such wives from deporta-
tion in Tsoi Sim v. United States.66 In that case, the appellant was a
Chinese woman who had entered the United States as a child before the
Chinese Exclusion Acts. 6 7 She failed to comply with a later law requir-
ing her to register within six months or be deported. 68 She had, how-
ever, married a U.S. citizen before her arrest. 69
The circuit court relied on In re Chung Toy Ho's70 holding that a
Chinese merchant's wife and children are permitted to accompany him
when he enters the United States.7 ' The court reasoned that a U.S. citi-
zen must certainly be entitled to the same privilege to live with his wife
65. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sejnensky v. Tod, 285 F. 523 (2d Cir. 1922), in
which a woman who had been excluded as feeble-minded at entry and who was
allowed to visit relatives in the United States after posting a bond, subsequently mar-
ried a U.S. citizen. Even though the marriage took place after the exclusion order,
the court held that "such an order is a mere administrative provision. . . . If the
circumstances change prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be exe-
cuted." Id. at 529; see also, e.g., Hopkins v. Fachant, 130 F. 839 (9th Cir. 1904), hold-
ing that the marriage of a woman to a U.S. citizen, even after an order of deportation
and pending application for release on habeas corpus, prevented deportation; Ex
parne Grayson, 215 F. 449 (W.D. Wash. 1914), aft'd, 219 F. 1022 (9th Cir. 1915),
holding that a prostitute, who was a native of France, and who married a citizen of
the United States during the course of deportation proceedings, was not subject to
deportation until her citizenship was revoked by law. The court held that the ques-
tion of whether or not her marriage was fraudulent had to be established in a court of
competent jurisdiction, rather than in an immigration proceeding; Leonard v. Grant,
5 F. 11 (D. Or. 1880), holding that admission to citizenship by marriage has the same
force and effect as if the woman had been naturalized by a judge of a competent
court. But see In re Rustigan, 165 F. 980 (D.R.I. 1908), holding that it was not the
intent of the naturalization law to annul or override the immigration law; Ex parte
Kaprelian, 188 F. 694 (D. Mass. 1910), holding that a marriage entered into after an
order of deportation could hardly be free from intent to avoid deportation whether
otherwise in good faith or not. See generally Annotation, Effect of marriage of alien woman
to one then an American citizen on right to enter or remain in this country, 26 A.L.R. 1324
(1923), supplemented by 71 A.L.R. 1213 (1931).
66. 116 F. 920 (9th Cir. 1902).
67. Id. at 921.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 42 F. 398, 400 (D. Or. 1890).
71. Tsoi Sim, 116 F. at 922-23. The court also referred to the existing law that the
domicile and the status of the wife is fixed by that of her husband:
The theoretic identity of person and of interest between husband and wife, as
established by law, and the presumption that from the nature of that relation,
the home of the one is that of the other, and intended to promote,
strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists,
where union and harmony prevail.
Id. at 923 (quoting Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181, 185, 25 Am. Dec. 372 (Mass.
1833)). Noting that the marriage was not fraudulent and was not designed to evade
the immigration law, the court found that her status was changed from that of a Chi-
nese laborer to that of a wife of a native-born American. Though the husband was
not a party to the action, the court noted that his rights as well as the rights of his
spouse were involved, thus incorporating natural rights language. Id. at 925.
1161 21
1988 Family Unification
as would be accorded a resident alien,7 2 and asserted that Congress
could never have intended the Chinese restrictions to apply to such a
case.
7 3
Significantly, the court used natural rights language to describe the
rights of the husband and wife:
The wife has the right to live with her husband; enjoy his society; receive
his support and maintenance and all the comforts and privileges of the
marriage relations. These are her, as well as his, natural rights. By virtue
of her marriage, her husband's domicile became her domicile, and there-
after she was entitled to live with her husband and remain in this
country.74
The court's reliance on rules of statutory construction, however, implied
a recognition that Congress could act to abridge this natural right if it
explicitly chose to do so.
75
Shortly after suffrage was extended to women by the nineteenth
amendment, Congress in 1922 amended the naturalization law. 76 Con-
gress did not grant women citizens the same rights to family unification
as men had enjoyed; rather, Congress eliminated the provision that a
woman acquired citizenship through marriage to a U.S. citizen.7 7 Mar-
riage no longer entitled a spouse to automatic entry; therefore all immi-
grant spouses of American citizens could be excluded or deported.
7 8
C. Quantitative Limits on Immigration
1. The Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924
Concerned that the source of immigration had shifted from Northern to
Southern Europe, Congress acted in 1921 to freeze the ethnic profile of
72. Id. at 925.
73. Id. at 926. The court said that, if appellant were to be deported for failing to
register, she would still be entitled to return and remain in the United States, on the
sole ground that she is the lawful wife of a U.S. citizen. Such a result would be
absurd, and thus, precluded according to the principle that courts should construe a
statute so it makes sense. Thus, the court held the appellant was not subject to
deportation because it refused to find that Congress intended such a result.
74. Id. at 925.
75. See, e.g., Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912) (upholding deporta-
tion of a U.S. citizen's wife under terms of a federal statute requiring the deportation
of any alien found to have been involved in prostitution within three years subse-
quent to entry to the United States).
76. Cable Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021.
77. The Cable Act provided in section 2 "[t]hat any woman who marries a citizen
of the United States after the passage of this act .... shall not become a citizen of the
United States by reason of such marriage." Id. § 2, 42 Stat. at 1022. The Act also
provided that it would not apply retroactively to terminate citizenship acquired under
the predecessor act. Id.
78. After passage of the Cable Act, alien wives of U.S. citizens could be denied
entry, United States ev rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1928), or
deported, Gomez v. Nagle, 6 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1925), under provisions of the immi-
gration law. See Smith v. United States ix rel. Grisius, 58 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1932) ("an
alien female unlawfully entering the United States after the Cable Act of 1922 is sub-ject to deportation if she enter this country unlawfully, notwithstanding her marriage
to a citizen of the United States").
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the United States. It limited the number of immigrants of each national-
ity to three percent of the foreign-born population of the same national
origin residing in the United States in 1910.79 Congress then in 1924
fixed a ceiling of 150,000 immigrants per year, setting quotas for each
nationality under the following formula:
The annual quota of any nationality ... shall be a number which bears the
same ratio to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in continental United
States in 1920 having that national origin .. .bears to the number of
inhabitants in continental United States in 1920, but the minimum quota
of any nationality shall be 100.80
These acts ended the era of massive world-wide immigration to the
United States while favoring immigration from Northern Europe, partic-
ularly England, Germany and Ireland.8 1
In enacting the quota system, Congress paid particular attention to
family unification. Minor children of citizens8 2 were exempted from the
quota limitation.8 3 The 1921 Act counted other relatives of citizens and
permanent resident aliens toward the quota ceilings, but provided that
preference be given to
the wives, parents, brothers, sisters, children under eighteen years of age,
and fiancees, (1) of citizens of the United States, (2) of aliens now in the
United States who have applied for citizenship in the manner provided by
law, or (3) of persons eligible to United States citizenship who served in
the military or naval forces of the United States ... "84
Significantly, the 1921 Act afforded preferential treatment to entering
wives of citizens, but not to entering husbands of citizens,8 5 reflecting the
discriminatory provisions of the naturalization law.8 6 Foreign wives
were perhaps considered less of a threat to the labor force. They may
also have been viewed as more easily assimilable.
The 1924 Act both broadened and narrowed family unification
opportunities. It broadened opportunities by adding wives to unmar-
ried minor children of citizens as persons exempted from the quota sys-
tem.8 7  Other relatives of citizens-parents, unmarried children
eighteen to twenty-one, and husbands-were entitled to preference
79. Quota Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, as amended May 11, 1922, ch. 187,
42 Stat. 540. The clear intent was to limit immigration primarily to western and
northern Europeans. See U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN
DOOR 9 (1980).
80. The Quota Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 155.
8 1. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82. Minors are those under the age of 18. The Quota Act of 1921, ch. 8,
§ 2(a)(8), 42 Stat. 5.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 2(d), 42 Stat. at 6.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
87. The Quota Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 4(a), 43 Stat. 153, 155. The
courts, however, interpreted this provision as continuing to exclude "non-white"
wives of citizens. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 94-
95 and accompanying text.
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within the quotas for each nationality.8 8 The 1924 Act narrowed family
unification opportunities by eliminating the 1921 Act's preference for
relatives of aliens who had applied for citizenship. 8 9 This distinction
between treatment of relatives of citizens and relatives of permanent
resident aliens remains fundamental to current immigration law.90
Two exceptions to the quota system should be noted. First, the
1924 Act exempted Western Hemisphere nations (Canada, Mexico, and
other independent countries of Central and South America) from the
quota provisions. 9 1 This exception continued until 1965 when an
annual quota of 120,000 was set for the Western Hemisphere.9 2 Con-
versely, the sentiment against Oriental immigration had resulted already
in the total exclusion of the inhabitants of the Asian continent and its
adjacent islands, an exclusion the 1924 Act did not ameliorate. 93
The general exemption of wives and children of U.S. citizens from
the immigration quotas raised the question of whether such relatives
from Asian countries could freely enter the United States. In 1925, in
Chang Chan v. Nagle,94 the Supreme Court held that a Chinese wife of a
U.S. citizen was barred from entry. The Court reasoned that the 1924
Act barred immigration of aliens "ineligible to citizenship" except under
specified conditions, and none of these conditions included the relation-
ship of an Asian relative to a U.S. citizen.95
88. The Act of 1924 provided: "In the issuance of immigration visas to quota
immigrants, preference shall be given-(1) to a quota immigrant who is the unmar-
ried child under 21 years of age, the father, the mother, the husband, or the wife of a
citizen of the United States who is 21 years of age or over .... The Quota Act of
May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 6(a), 43 Stat. 153, 155.
89. See id.
90. See infra notes 115-22, 128-31 and accompanying text.
91. The Quota Act of May 26, 1924, § 4(c), 43 Stat. 153, 155.
92. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 21(e), 79 Stat. 911, 921. The
annual quota of 120,000 took effect in 1968 and remained in place until 1978 when a
unified world quota was established. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412,
§ 201(a), 92 Stat. 907.
93. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-77, excluded immigra-
tion from a large portion of Asia and its adjacent islands (the "Asiatic Barred Zone").
Ministers, professors, merchants, travelers for pleasure, as well as immediate mem-
bers of their families, however, were excepted from the "Asiatic" bar. Id.
94. 268 U.S. 346 (1925).
95. The Quota Act of 1924 provided that:
No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States unless
such alien (1) is admissible as a non-quota immigrant under provisions of
subdivision (b), (d), or (e) of section 4, or (2) is the wife, or the unmarried
child under 18 years of age, of an immigrant admissible under such subdivi-
sion (d), and is accompanying or following to join him, or (3) is not an immi-
grant as defined in section 3.
The Quota Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 162.
The wife of a U.S. citizen did not qualify under any of the three subdivisions of
section 13(c) quoted above. Section 13(c)(I) referred to returning immigrants, min-
isters, professors and students. Section 13 (c)(2) concerned family members of minis-
ters and professors. Section 13(c)(3) referred to a definition of immigrant which
excepted only the family members of government officials. In Chung Fook v. White,
264 U.S. 443 (1924), the Court denied a writ of habeas corpus to a Chinese woman
seeking to enter to join her husband. The husband was a native-born U.S. citizen.
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Several unsuccessful attempts were made in the late 1920s on
behalf of Chinese-Americans to amend the 1924 Act to permit entry of
Asian relatives of citizens and to ease the quota restrictions for other
categories of relatives. 96 National sentiment, however, was not hospita-
ble to easing immigration restrictions. For example, the following com-
mentary appeared in a legal journal in response to legislative proposals
to relax entry restrictions for family members:
The alien who comes here leaving a family in Europe is by that fact identi-
fied as an economic failure .... Such a man should never be allowed to
enter the country, but since many such are now here, the best we can do is
see that their families who are presumably at the same low level, should
be given no assistance in an effort to join them, particularly since the
reunion usually leads to the birth on our soil of more defectives to fill our
prisons and asylums. 97
Thus, although the 1924 Act was concerned about family unification, it
restricted the right to "white" wives and children of citizens. Not until
after the Second World War did significant amendments to the law grad-
ually expand both the range of citizens and residents entitled to family
unification and the circle of relatives who might enter to join them.98
2. The Move Toward Equality of Treatment Under the Quota System
The original quota system's treatment of family unification contained
numerous inconsistencies. The quota's applicability varied, depending
upon whether one's country of origin was within the Western Hemi-
sphere, the Asiatic-barred zone, or a country subject to the general
regime of quota limits. For those from countries subject to the quotas,
entering wives were treated more favorably than entering husbands.
Had he instead been a naturalized citizen, the law would have permitted his wife's
entry. The Court justified this result by concluding that:
The words of the statute being clear, if it unjustly discriminates against the
native-born citizen, or is cruel and inhuman in its results, as forcefully con-
tended, the remedy lies with Congress and not with the courts. Their duty is
simply to enforce the law as it is written, unless clearly unconstitutional.
Id. at 446. Surprisingly, in another decision handed down the same day, the Court
interpreted the 1924 Act as permitting the entry of a Chinese merchant's family.
Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336 (1925). In Cheung Sum Shee, the Court
construed the same Act as in Chung Fook, but read it as preserving treaty rights
afforded Chinese merchants since 1880. The Court rejected arguments challenging
the rationality of an immigration law that permits relatives of Chinese merchants to
immigrate while barring those of U.S. citizens. The Court therefore concluded that
wives and children of resident alien Chinese merchants could enter the United States
as non-quota immigrants so long as the resident alien was lawfully domiciled in the
United States prior to the passage of the 1924 Act. Id. at 345.
96. See, e.g., Admission of Relatives, Soldiers, etc.: Hearings on H.R. 7089 Before the
House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926) (propos-
ing non-quota status for husbands, children and parents of all U.S. citizens); see also
Wives of American Citizens of Oriental Race: Hearings on H.R. 5654, H.R. 10524 Before the
House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 541 (1930).
97. Note, Wives of Naturalized Immigrants, 31 LAw NOTES 222 (1928).
98. See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, neither illegitimate nor adopted children were included in
the quota exemptions and preferences for children.
Congress has been removing these inequities since the early 1940s.
For example, discrimination in the quota system based on race, sex, or
legitimacy is now forbidden.9 9 Similarly, the quota system based on the
1920 ethnic composition of the United States has been replaced by a
uniform ceiling for each country.10 0
Elimination of some of the major disparities began with the repeal
in 1943 of the Chinese Exclusion Act.10 1 Although the repeal removed
the absolute bar to Chinese immigration, and lifted the ban on eligibility
to citizenship, it set a token quota of 105 immigrants per year.' 0 2 In
1952, the Asian ban was lifted and replaced by an overall ceiling of
2,000 immigrants per year for the area, with ceilings of 100 for each
Asian nation.1 0 3 Finally, in 1965 Congress afforded Asian nations
annual ceilings equal to those of other nations.1 0 4 Congress further
equalized treatment of national origin at that time by limiting immigra-
tion from the Western Hemisphere to 120,000 annually,' 0 5 and in 1978,
by setting a unified annual world quota at 290,000 with ceilings of
20,000 for each nation.10 6 In 1980, the world quota was reduced to
270,000, with an independent quota of 50,000 added for refugees.' 0 7
Congress also eliminated distinctions based on sex and legiti-
99. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. See generally notes 101-14 and
accompanying text.
100. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
101. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
102. Before the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, China had a quota of 100
immigrants per year. This quota, however, applied only for non-Chinese persons
born in China and eligible for naturalization (Chinese were not eligible for immigra-
tion and naturalization because of the Chinese Exclusion Act). The Quota Act of
May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, provided the original quota system. Quotas for
national origin were based on a number bearing the same ratio to 150,000 as the
number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920 having that national
origin to the number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920 (minus,
of course, persons from the Asiatic Barred Zone). Id. § 11, 43 Stat. at 155. After
determinations of the quotas by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Commerce, and
the Secretary of Labor, President Hoover issued the original quota figures in a Presi-
dential Proclamation. Proclamation of March 22, 1929, reprinted in 46 Stat. at 2984.
Similarly, when the Chinese Exclusion Acts were repealed in 1943, the officials
responsible for issuing quotas were given the power to then determine the approp-
priate quota figure for persons of Chinese ancestry. See Proclamation No. 2603, I-X
C.F.R. 13 (1944 Supp.), reprinted in 58 Stat. at 1125 (1944). The token figure of 105
Chinese was in addition to the 100 figure for non-Chinese born in China. See F.
AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1955).
103. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, §§ 201(a), 202(b)-(e), 66 Stat. 163,
175-78 (1952).
104. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911.
105. Id. §§ 2, 21(e), 79 Stat. at 911, 921. In addition to the annual quota of
120,000, Western Hemisphere immigrants were required to meet qualitative require-
ments and obtain labor certification. U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 79, at
14.
106. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 1, 92 Stat. 907.
107. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 201, 203, 94 Stat. 102, 103, 106-
07.
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macy. 0 8 Sex distinctions were removed by the 1952 amendments
exempting all entering spouses of U.S. citizens (i.e., both wives and hus-
bands) from quotas and granting preference status within the quotas for
spouses of permanent resident aliens.' 0 9 Illegitimate and adopted chil-
dren received equal treatment beginning in 1957 when Congress
expanded the definition of child under the Immigration Act." l0 That
reform included an illegitimate child only if the benefit sought was by
virtue of the child's relationship to the mother."' The Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, in contrast, extends preferential treat-
ment to natural fathers of illegitimate children who demonstrate a bona
fide parent-child relationship. 12
Since 1965, immigration law has specifically prohibited certain
forms of discrimination, stating, "[n]o person shall receive any prefer-
ence or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immi-
grant visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of
108. The distinctions previously based on sex can be seen, for example, in sections
4(a) and 6(a)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1924, which defined non-quota immi-
grants as including "the unmarried child under 18 years of age, or the wife, of a
citizen of the United States," but providing mere preference status within the quotas
to husbands of U.S. citizens. The Quota Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, §§ 4(a),
6(a)(1), 43 Stat. 153, 155. For a discussion of the elimination of legitimacy distinc-
tions, see infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
109. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, §§ 101(a)(27)(A), 205(b), 66 Stat.
163, 169, 180 (1952).
110. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 2, 71 Stat. 639. Current law
defines a "child" as
an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is:
(A) a legitimate child;
(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock ...
(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or
under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the
United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age
of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating par-
ent or parents at the time of such legitimation.
(D) an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status,
privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its
natural mother or to its natural father if the father has had a bona fide parent-child
relationship with the person.
(E) [certain adopted children]; or
(F) [certain orphan children].
8 U.S.C.A. § 1 101(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
Emphasized language was not part of the 1957 reform but was added by the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 3359.
111. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 2(d), 71 Stat. 639. In Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), the Supreme Court rejected equal protection claims that
the statute impermissibly discriminated on the grounds of legitimacy and gender.
Acknowledging only "limited judicial review" of legislative distinctions in the immi-
gration area, the Court noted that either a presumption of absence of close family
ties or concerns with problems of proof of paternity could justify the less favorable
treatment of the father-illegitimate child relationship. Id. at 799.
112. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(a),
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3359, 3439.
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residence .... ,1 1 3 The text immediately qualifies this broad statement,
however, by adding, "except as specifically provided in [three sec-
tions]," which give preference in allocating visas based on relationship
to a citizen, place of birth, or residence. 114
Today, no serious consideration would be given to a proposal to
return to racial or sexual distinctions in family unification. This Article
argues that the expanded recognition of individual rights in matters con-
cerning the family similarly limits Congressional line-drawing that might
cause or prolong separation of immediate family members because of
national origin. The current visa allocation system's adverse impact on
some families of permanent resident aliens is discussed in the following
sections.
3. The Preference System for Allocating Visas
Under current immigration law, certain "immediate relatives" of U.S.
citizens may obtain immigration visas without regard to numerical limi-
tations. These are, "the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of
the United States, Provided, That in the case of parents, such citizen must
be at least twenty-one years of age." 1 15 All other relatives of citizens
and all relatives of resident aliens must enter subject to the annual
numerical limits: 270,000 visas worldwide and 20,000 visas per
nation.1 16 The law allocates these 270,000 visas within the framework
of a six-tiered preference system.11 7 Four of the six tiers allocate 80%
of the total available visas on the basis of relationship to a family mem-
ber in the United States." 18 The other two tiers allocate the remaining
20 percent according to labor needs. 119
The chart below illustrates the allocation of visas under the six pref-
erence categories:
113. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911 (amending Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 202(a), 66 Stat. 163, 176 (1952) (current version
at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1982)).
114. Id. Section 101(a)(27), which defines "special immigrants," section 201(b),
which defines "immediate relatives," and section 203, which allocates immigrant
visas according to preference categories, are specifically excepted from the anti-dis-
crimination provisions.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982). "Children" includes only unmarried persons
under twenty-one years of age. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b) (West Supp. 1987).
116. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), 1152(a) (1982).
117. Id. § 1153.
118. Id. § 1153(a)(1), (2), (4), (5).
119. Id. § 1153(a)(3), (6).
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Preference Category' 20  Visas Reserved Annually
1. Unmarried Sons or Daughters (over 54,000 20%
21 years of age) of Citizens
2. Spouses and Unmarried Sons or 70,200 26%
Daughters of Permanent Residents
3. (certain workers) 27,000 10%0
4. Married Sons or Daughters of 27,000 10%0
Citizens
5. Brothers or Sisters of Adult 64,800 24%
Citizens
6. (certain workers) 27,000 10%
270,000 100%
Within the six preference groups, visas are issued to eligible aliens
in the order in which their visa petitions are filed. 12 1 Since a citizen's
child who is unmarried and under twenty-one years of age is an "imme-
diate family member" exempt from numerical limits on entry, the first
preference group includes only unmarried sons and daughters of citi-
zens twenty-one years of age or older. The number of visas reserved for
this preference category is substantially greater than the demand. 12 2
Unused first-preference visas are added to those available for the second
preference group. 123  The allocation process continues similarly
through the remaining four preference groups, except that unused visas
from the second preference group pass to the fourth preference group
rather than to the third. 124 Table II, at the end of this section, compares
the number of visas reserved per group to the number per group actu-
ally issued.
The maximum number of preference visas available in a fiscal year
to any one country's citizens is 20,000.125 No restriction, however, lim-
its the number of those 20,000 visas that can be allocated to any one
preference group. 126 As a result, in countries such as Mexico where the
demand is heavy in the higher preference groups, often no visas remain
for applicants in the lower groups. To remedy this inequity, the Act
provides that, if the maximum number of visas (20,000) is issued to a
country during one fiscal year, in the following fiscal year the country's
allotment of 20,000 visas is to be distributed by percentage allocation
among the six preference groups in the same proportions as for the
270,000 visas available worldwide. 12 7 This provision assures visa availa-
120. Id. § 1153(a).
121. Id.
122. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
123. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
124. Id. § 1153(a)(4).
125. See Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 1, 92 Stat. 907 and text accom-
panying note 106.
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1982).
127. Id. § 1152(e). Thus, when a country has used its total allocation of 20,000
visas, in the following year only 20% (4,000) of the visas allotted to that country may
be issued to first-preference category applicants from that country, 26% (5,200) to
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bility to lower preference-group applicants, but prolongs the delay for
those in higher preference groups.
The only preference category including families of permanent resi-
dent aliens is the second, which limits the preference to spouses and
unmarried sons or daughters. This difference creates serious disparities
between residents and citizens, especially resident aliens from countries
of high immigration demand. The wait for second-preference visas for
Mexican applicants, for instance, has been estimated at approximately
eight years. 128 While these spouses and children wait, the law reserves
24% of the total visas for the siblings of citizens. 1 2 9 As the Select Com-
mission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) concluded in its
Final Report in 1981: "There is something wrong with a law that keeps
out-for as long as eight years-the small child of a mother or father
who has settled in the United States while a nonrelative or less close
relative from another country can come in immediately."' 130 To remedy
this inequity, the SCIRP report suggested eliminating the per-nation
ceilings for spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens
while retaining a world limit to be filled on a first-come, first-served
basis.'13
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides an
amnesty program for illegal aliens who have resided in the country con-
tinuously since January 1, 1982.132 The Act's impact on the backlog of
Mexicans and Central Americans waiting for second-preference visas is
uncertain. The waiting list will be shorter to the extent that some aliens
on the waiting list have been living in the United States already and will
qualify for amnesty.' 3 3 The backlog will increase to the extent that clan-
second-preference category applicants, 10% (2,000) to third, fourth and sixth-prefer-
ence applicants, respectively, and 24% (4,800) to fifth-preference applicants.
128. In November, 1986, second category preference visas became available to
those from Mexico who applied prior to August, 1977, those from Hong Kong who
applied prior to July, 1979, and those from the Philippines who applied prior to
October, 1980. 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 903 (Oct. 10, 1986).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(5) (1982). The fifth-preference category, which currently
accounts for an immigration backlog of 1.5 million visa applications, has been criti-
cized for taking family reunification too far and for leading to a potential mushroom-
ing of preference eligibility. On the other hand, the admission of siblings has been
defended as an integral part of the family unification concept for Italians and other
ethnic groups. See The Preference System, 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
lion and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 169
(1981) (statement of Rev. Joseph Coga, Nat'l Executive Secretary, Am. Comm. of
Italian Migration).
130. SELECT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 15.
131. Id. at 14-15. The SCIRP Report also recommended eliminating the backlog
by raising the number of preference visas from 270,000 to 350,000 with an additional
100,000 visas for each of the next five years. Id. at 106. In 1981 nearly 70% of the
one million persons waiting for preference visas were relatives of U.S. citizens or of
permanent resident aliens. Id. at 14-15.
132. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3359, 3394.
133. Senator Simpson of Wyoming, the sponsor of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, explained that the categories of those who may qualify for
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destine aliens, having obtained permanent resident status through the
amnesty program, will then petition for entry of their immediate family
members. 13 4
TABLE II
1984-UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION BY CATEGORY
EXEMPT STATUS: ' 3
5




PREFERENCE STATUS: PREFERENCE VISAS
ISSUED RESERVED
1st Unmarried Sons or Daughters 7,569 54,000
of U.S. Citizens (3%) (20%)
2nd Spouses and Unmarried 112,309 70,200
Children of Resident Aliens (42%) (26%)
3rd Professional or Highly 24,852 27,000
Skilled Workers (9%) (10%)
4th Married Sons or Daughters of 14,681 27,000
U.S. Citizens (6%) (10%)
5th Brothers or Sisters of U.S. 77,765 64,800
Citizens (30%) (24%)





D. Qualitative Grounds for Exclusion and Deportation
Congress can, in its discretion, exclude or deport different classes of
immigrants. For example, Congress excluded convicts and prostitutes
amnesty may overlap with those whose names are on the visa-preference waiting list:
"85percent are already here. When their number is called, they go back to Mexico to get
it and come back up into the United States." 132 CONG. REC. S16889 (daily ed. Oct.
17, 1986) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Simpson). No one really knows how
many aliens may be eligible under the amnesty program for eventual permanent resi-
dent status. Estimates are in the millions.
134. The potential impact of the 1986 amendments is discussed further in Part
VII.
135. 1984 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER-
VICE 11-14. The figure of 262,016 for the preference status immigrants reflects, in
addition to the six preference categories, 171 immigrants from other incidental cate-
gories. Of the 171 immigrants in the "other" categories, 161 came from the suspen-
sion of deportation proceedings, 4 came as a result of private congressional bills, and
6 were other incidentals.
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in 1875,136 and paupers, lunatics and idiots in 1882.137 By 1917, the
number of excluded classes had increased to thirteen. 138 Today the list
of reasons for exclusion has expanded to thirty-three paragraphs of the
immigration law. 13 9 Congress has also expanded the grounds for
deportation so that the law now includes nineteen paragraphs.' 40
In enacting grounds for exclusion or deportation, Congress created
exceptions protecting immediate relatives of citizens or permanent resi-
dent aliens in certain circumstances. 14 1 The following section describes
these exceptions, which, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the immedi-
ate family: spouse, parent, or minor unmarried child of a citizen or per-
manent resident alien.
1. Waiver of Exclusion to Preserve Family Unity
The immigration law grants the Attorney General discretion to waive
exclusion for several classes of excluded aliens to preserve family
unity. 142 These include exclusion for:
1. mental retardation, mental illness, or tuberculosis;
2. certain past criminal activity; and
3. fraud, misrepresentation, or perjury in connection with attempts to
enter the United States. 143
Few statutory guidelines govern the Attorney General's discretion. 144 If
an alien has a history of mental illness, the Attorney General must
obtain a certificate from the Surgeon General indicating a finding of
recovery. 14 5 For those with serious criminal records or a history of
prostitution, the Attorney General may waive exclusion if convinced that
relatives in the United States would suffer "extreme hardship" as a
result of the exclusion and that admission "would not be contrary to the
national welfare, safety, or security of the United States." 146
2. Waiver of Deportability and Suspension of Deportation
Aliens still remain vulnerable to deportation provisions after obtaining
permanent resident status. 147 The Attorney General has discretion to
136. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 3, 5, 18 Stat. 477.
137. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
138. Immigration Acts, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). The 1917 Act also specifically
provided that the marriage of a "sexually immoral" woman to a U.S. citizen would
not invest such a woman with citizenship "if solemnized after her arrest or after the
commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under the Act." Id. § 19, 39
Stat. at 889.
139. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982).
140. See id. § 1251.
141. See infra notes 142-59 and accompanying text.
142. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g), (h), (i) (1982).
143. Id.
144. Only six of the thirty-three exclusion provisions afford special protections to
immediate family members seeking entry. See id.
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) (1982).
146. See id. § 1182(h).
147. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) and text accompanying note 140.
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waive deportation in two situations: when the resident alien has been
convicted of possession of small amounts of marijuana, 148 or for fraud
or misrepresentation in obtaining entry.' 49 For possession of 30 grams
or less of marijuana, the waiver standard is equivalent to that for aliens
seeking entry with a serious criminal record or a history of prostitu-
tion,' 50 namely: "that the alien's deportation would result in extreme
hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent,
or child of such alien and that such waiver would not be contrary to the
national welfare, safety, or security of the United States."' 15 For those
who procured visas through fraud or misrepresentation, the only stan-
dard governing the Attorney General's discretion is that they be the
immediate relative of a citizen or permanent resident and that they were
otherwise admissible to the United States at time of entry. 152
The Attorney General also may suspend deportation for other
deportable aliens in what are called section 244 suspensions of deporta-
tion. 15 3 Section 244 suspensions fall into two groups. The first group
includes, for example, aliens who are deportable for irregular entries or
for overstaying a temporary admission. 154 The Attorney General may
suspend deportation for this group if the alien meets the following mini-
mum requirements:
1. proof of physical presence in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of
such application; and
2. proof that during all of such period he was and is a person of good
moral character; and
3. proof that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien
or to his spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen of the United States or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.1 5 5
The second group of section 244 suspensions includes aliens who are
involved in aggravated violations, including involvement after entry in
criminal acts, narcotics, subversive activity, or prostitution. 15 6 In these
aggravated cases, the alien must fulfill stricter requirements: ten rather
than seven years' residence and a finding that the U.S. relative will suffer
"exceptional and unusually extreme hardship" rather than "extreme
hardship."1 57
In determining the existence of "extreme hardship" under section
244, courts have required the Attorney General to consider not only
148. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(0(2) (1982).
149. Id. § 1251(0(1).
150. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1982) and text accompanying note 146.
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1251() (1982).
152. Id.
153. See generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 2 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCE-
DURE ch. 7.9b, at 7-135 (1986).
154. Id. at 7-135-36.
155. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982) (regulating suspension of deportation).
156. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 153, at 7-137-40.
157. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1982).
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economic hardship but also the emotional hardship resulting from the
separation of family members.' 58 In Bastidas v. INS, 159 the Third Circuit
reversed an administrative finding of no hardship, reasoning as follows:
The family and relationship between family members occupy a place of
central importance in our nation's history and are a fundamental part of
the values which underlie our society [citation omitted]. Accordingly, we
view the separation of family members from one another as a serious mat-
ter requiring close and careful scrutiny. Although we do not go so far as
to hold that the separation of a father from his child is, as a matter of law,
extreme hardship for purposes of § 244(a)(1), we do hold that where a
father expresses deep affection for his child and where the record demon-
strates that his actions are consistent with and supportive of his expres-
sion of affection, a finding of no extreme hardship will not be affirmed by
this court unless the reasons for such a finding are made clear.160
The Third Circuit requires courts to apply careful scrutiny in family
unification cases and also requires them to consider the importance of
the family to society. This contrasts with the early Chinese Exclusion
decisions, which emphasized the protection of the individual's "natural
rights" to a family life. In these cases, however, the natural right of the
individual to family life, and the importance of the family to society,
were merely principles aiding statutory interpretation. Neither
approach addresses the more fundamental issue of whether the Consti-
tution provides protection to family members from exclusion or
deportation.
Family unification has been an issue in U.S. immigration law for
over a century. Though inequities remain, the law in recent decades has
greatly advanced in the direction of more favorable and more uniform
treatment of family members. Some disparities remain. "Immediate"
family members of citizens enter without regard to numerical limits but
those of resident aliens must await visas through the preference system.
Consequently, resident aliens from countries of high immigration
demand may face long delays before their spouses or children may join
them.
IV. Development of Family Unification Provisions
in French Immigration Law
Family unification has emerged in France, as well as in the United States,
as a major criterion of immigration policy. This part discusses the
framework of French law governing family unification. The first section
compares the French approach to immigration control with that of the
158. See, e.g., Zamora-Garcia v. INS, 737 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1984); Majia-Carillo v.
INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that for extreme hardship "the most
important single factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the
United States" and that "separation from family alone may establish extreme hard-
ship"); Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101 (3rd Cir. 1979).
159. Bastidas, 609 F.2d at 101.
160. Id. at 105.
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United States. Subsequent sections describe the administrative and leg-
islative evolution of French immigration law and the right of family uni-
fication. The part concludes by summarizing the major similarities and
differences between French and U.S. law.
A. Major Differences in U.S. and French Immigration Law
After giving a brief history, this section explores three major features of
French law not found in U.S. law: 1) the absence of quotas and detailed
qualitative restrictions for either entry or expulsion; 2) greater adminis-
trative discretion to expel aliens; and 3) the diversity of French regimes
which control immigration.
1. Early History
Nineteenth century mining and steel-producing companies established
the pattern of early immigration to France-recruitment of foreign
workers on a temporary basis. 16 1 These workers were normally single
men recruited collectively in their countries of origin by an employer for
a specified period of time. French employers even created a private
organization, the Societe General d'Immigration, to recruit foreign work-
ers. 16 2 The sparse accommodations afforded by employers, however,
usually prevented workers from living with their families.16 3
Not until after the Second World War, under the Ordonnance of
November 2, 1945,164 did the state assume responsibility for the recruit-
ment of foreign workers. Regulations implementing the 1945 Ordon-
nance required a prospective employer to demonstrate that no French
workers were available to fill the position before hiring foreign work-
ers. 16 5  The employer was also required to provide adequate
housing. 16 6
2. Absence of Quotas
The 1945 Ordonnance continues to provide the basic framework for
French immigration law. Its 36 articles form an astonishingly compact
document, partly because immigration to France is not limited by quo-
tas, ceilings, or preferences. Aliens who obtain the necessary work
authorizations, who have certain family ties, or who have refugee status
may enter without regard to numercal limits. 16 7 From the end of the
Second World War to the late 1960s, many immigrants obtained entry
161. A. CORDEIRO, L'IMMIGRATION 14-17 (1984).
162. Id. at 23-26.
163. Id.; see also B. GRANOTIER, LEs TRAVAILLEURS IMMIGRES EN FRANCE 31 (5th ed.
1979).
164. Ordonnance No. 45-2658 of Nov. 2, 1945, 1945Journal Officiel de la Repub-
lique Francaise U.O.] 7225; see A. CORDEIRO, supra note 161, at 27-3 1.
165. Circular of April 18, 1956, reprinted in A. ROMEU-POBLOT, LE REGIME
JURIDIQUE DES ETRANGERS EN FRANCE 56 (1961).
166. Id.
167. See generally Ordonnance No. 45-2658 of Nov. 2, 1945, 1945 J.O. 7225.
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on the basis of work authorization 16 8 or entered without work authoriza-
tion and later regularized their status after obtaining employment.1
69
With the economic downturn of the early 1970s, however, possibilities
for worker entry dwindled, ending altogether in 1974.170
3. Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens on the Basis of Ordre Public
Although French law does not contain the numerous and detailed
grounds for exclusion or deportation present in U.S. law, it does require
that the foreigner not pose a danger to the ordre public.' 7 1 The term ordre
public, as used in French administrative law, connotes the minimum con-
ditions necessary for a society to function properly.' 7 2 These minimum
conditions, which necessarily vary according to social beliefs and expec-
tations, include conditions preserving the security of persons and prop-
erty and the maintenance of health and tranquility.17
3
Notably, the focus of ordre public is preventive. It does not require
harm to have occurred, only that a danger to ordre public might occur. In
practice, the ordre public concept affords the administration broad discre-
tion to exclude or expel foreigners.' 74
In France, the reasons for exclusion and expulsion are first deter-
mined at the administrative level. Because the concept of ordre public is
so amorphous, French administrators necessarily exercise more discre-
tion than their American counterparts who are governed by complex
statutory guidelines. Of course, U.S. immigration officials also exercise
a great deal of discretion. Several of the 33 specified grounds for exclu-
sion from the United States are as indeterminate as the French notion of
ordre public.175 Generally, however, the United States Congress has a
more commanding role in shaping the details of immigration law than
its French counterpart. Only within the last decade have the French Par-
168. A. CORDEIRO, supra note 161, at 27-48.
169. Id. at 38-48. In 1968, for example, 82% of those awarded work contracts
obtained them after entry into France rather than through the channels of the Office
National d'Immigration. Id. at 38.
170. The circular ofJuly 5, 1974, 1974J.O. 7275, barred entry of all workers from
nations outside the European Economic Community. See A. CORDEIRO, supra note
161, at 88; see also infra note 210 and accompanying text.
171. Law of Oct. 29, 1981, art. 5, 1981 J.O. 2970. For a discussion of ordre public,
see G. VEDEL & P. DELVOLVE, DRorr ADMINISTRATIF 59, 1063 (1984) [hereinafter G.
VEDEL].
172. See P. BERNARD, LA NOTION D'ORDRE PUBLIC EN DRorr ADMINISTRATIVE 246
(1962). See generally Evans, Ordre Public in French Immigration Law, 1980 PUB. L. 132,
133-34.
173. G. VEDEL, supra note 171, at 61.
174. See infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text. The Interior Minister might
presume from rumor or from mere suspicion that ordre public would be disrupted if a
particular individual remained in France. G.I.S.T.I., Les expulsions, No. 5 DRorr
SOCIAL 73, 74 (1976) [hereinafter Les Expulsions].
175. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982) (excluding "[a]liens who the consular
officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to enter the
United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would
be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the
United States").
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liament and judiciary assumed more active roles in defining the contours
of ordre public. 176
4. Status of Aliens: Greater French Discretion to Expel
United States immigration law provides more security from expulsion
than does French law because: 1) once immigration status is granted,
the U.S. immigrant has fewer hurdles to clear to become a citizen; and 2)
U.S. policy is to encourage permanent settlement and integration of
immigrants.
The United States classifies entrants as either immigrants or non-
immigrants. 177 The latter term implies a temporary visit; the former, by
definition, confers permanent resident status and the opportunity to
apply for citizenship after five years of residence.' 17
In France, the immigrant normally does not obtain permanent resi-
dent status at the time of entry. The 1945 Ordonnance provides that an
alien intending to stay longer than three months is classified as one of
the following: 1) temporary resident, 2) ordinary resident, or 3) privi-
leged resident. 179 Temporary residents include tourists, students, or
seasonal workers intending to stay between three months and one
year.' 8 0 Temporary residents must obtain a carte de seour (residence
card) from the local prefecture, renewable after one year.' 18 Ordinary
residents are entrants authorized to work or who prove sufficient
resources. Ordinary residents can obtain a carte de sdour, valid for up to
three years and renewable. 182 Privileged residents are those residents
who have resided in France for at least three years. The privileged resi-
dent can obtain a carte de seour valid for ten years, renewable automat-
ically.' 8 3 Because France retains the power of refusing to renew the
immigrant's carte de seour for at least three years, the status of the French
immigrant is less secure than that of the U.S. immigrant.
The United States bases its approach to granting permanent resi-
dent status to immigrants on the deliberate policy of encouraging immi-
grants to settle permanently in the United States.' 8 4 Permanent
176. See infra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
177. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15) (West Supp. 1987) (immigrant is "every alien
except an alien who is within one of the ... classes of nonimmigrant aliens").
178. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1427 (1982).
179. Ordonnance No. 45-2658 of Nov. 2, 1945, arts. 9-18, 1945J.O. 7225, 7225-
26.
180. Id. art. 10.
181. Id. art. 11.
182. Id. arts. 14, 15.
183. Id. art. 16. The 1984 amendments increase the security for certain family
members of immigrants and some long-term residents by providing that entry to
France can only be refused under particular, specified circumstances. Decret No.
1080 of Dec. 4, 1984, 1984J.O. 3734.
184. D. LOCHAK, ETRANrERS: DE OUEL DROiT? 146 (1985).
The unique character of immigration in the American context confers upon
foreign residents a status different from that given foreigners in Europe.
Neither socially nor psychologically can the situation of American immigrants
be compared to that of European foreign workers; as to the legal aspects,
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resident status encourages immigrants to establish connections with the
new country and break ties with the old. 18 5 France, however, has
wavered between the policy of promoting the integration of its foreign
population and the policy of encouraging foreign laborers to return to
their countries of origin after providing temporary labor. 18 6 Currently,
the Mitterrand regime' 8 7 is committed to integrating the foreign
population already settled in France and to discouraging further
immigration. 88
The illegal aliens in the French immigrant population have had sev-
eral opportunities to legalize their status.18 9 As a result, these immi-
grants enjoy a much greater level of security and protection from
exploitation than enjoyed by illegal aliens in the United States. After
regularization of over 120,000 immigrants in 1981,190 the number
remaining in irregular situations in France is estimated at a few hundred
thousand in contrast to the projections between four to eight million in
the United States. t 9 1 The recent tightening of immigration controls in
France, however, suggests that future amnesty measures are unlikely.
5. Diversity of Regimes
Whereas U.S. immigration legislation applies uniformly to entrants from
most countries,1 9 2 France regulates immigration in part through bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements with other countries. The most signifi-
cant agreement is the Treaty of Rome,19 3 which provides that nationals
of the twelve member states of the European Economic Community
(EEC) are entitled to free access to member states in seeking employ-
likewise, the fact that American immigrants normally have the desire to
become citizens reduces the barrier which, everywhere else, separates citizens
and aliens. If that which matters in determining the right to which the alien is
entitled is the intensity of the contacts which he has developed in the commu-
nity (his participation and degree of identification with the society, more than
nationality), as the Supreme Court seems to have indicated in its more recent
decisions, the line of demarcation will be drawn most often between resident
and non-resident rather than between citizen and alien.
Id. (translation by author).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 152-53. As Lochak says: "There has never been in France a coherent
and deliberate policy regarding population of the country, or particularly repopula-
tion, like the American model. Periodically, however, the politicians and the analysts
have seen in immigration the means to remedy the demographic problems of the
French population. Id. at 155-58.
187. After his election as president in May, 1981, Francois Mitterand dissolved the
National Assembly, where his Socialist party swept in with an absolute majority with a
minority to his communist allies. A shift in the legislative majority to the center-right
in 1986, however, slowed his socialist agenda.
188. See 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLMQUE, supra note 19, at 12, 15, 45, 75.
189. A. CORDEIRO, supra note 161, at 107-09.
190. Id. at 109.
191. Id. at 113; D. LocHAK, supra note 184, at 147.
192. See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
193. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
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ment.' 9 4 French immigration law, therefore, applies to EEC nationals
only to the extent provided by the provisions of the Treaty of Rome.'
9 5
The problems of family unification among EEC nations are governed by
regulations promulgated under the Treaty.19 6
Special agreements also govern immigration from many former
French colonies. Algeria was long viewed as an integral part of
France,' 9 7 and independence accords provided for free movement of
Algerians between Algeria and France.' 9 8 These accords were later
modified.' 9 9 Agreements were made with Tunisia and Morocco in 1963
to fill the need for workers in France.200 Several other African states,
including Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, are also subject to a regime of
originally generous, but increasingly restrictive bilateral accords. 20 '
The following chart provides the share of total immigration in 1982
for which each regime was responsible. 20 2
General Regime 60%
Algerian Accords 18%




Although Spain and Portugal joined the EEC in 1986, their nationals
will not benefit from the EEC freedom of movement provisions until at
194. Id. art 48. The twelve member states of the EEC are Belgium, Denmark,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See generally H. SMIT & P.
HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1980); Plender, La Libre
Circulation des Personnes, GAZET=E DU PALAIS 379 (Aug. 26, 1984).
195. See G. VEDEL, supra note 171, at 169, 381-83.
196. See, e.g., Council Reg. No. 1612/68, Oct. 15, 1968, 1968 Journal Officiel Des
Communautes Europeennes [O.J.] No. L 257. For a further discussion of this regula-
tion and its impact on family unification in France, see infra notes 540-44 and accom-
panying text.
197. See France, XIX ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 521 (15th ed. 1983).
198. The accords of Evian, March 19, 1962, 1962J.O. 3019, provided for freedom
of movement for all Algerians between France and Algeria.
199. On April 10, 1964, an accord provided for fixing of the numbers of migrants
to be admitted according to the availability of workers in Algeria and the market
demand in France. The Algerian government temporarily halted emigration to
France in September of 1973 in protest of racist aggression toward Algerians in
France. See B. GRANOTIER, supra note 163, at 62. See generally L'accord franco-alger-
ien of December 27, circulars 69-49 of January 31, 1969 and 70-126 of March 5,
1970, 1970 J.O. 3054 of the Minister of the Interior in regard to family unification
and circular 81-50 ofJuly 10, 1981, 1981J.O. 8716; G.I.S.T.I., LE NOUVEAU DOSSIER
DE L'IMMIGRATION FAMILIALE 21-25 (Jan. 1984).
200. B. GRANOTIER, supra note 163, at 62.
201. Id. at 63. Since January 1, 1975, the nationals of most African states must
obtain a carte de sejour in order to reside and work in France. This necessitates
obtaining a work contract prior to entry. Id.




least 1991.203 If the 1982 proportional figures remain constant, the
change will be significant, reducing to about 30% the immigration sub-
ject to the general regime, and increasing that subject to the Treaty of
Rome to 45%.204
B. French Immigration Policy: Exclusion and Expulsion
1. "Laissez-Faire" Regulation: 1945-1970
After 1945, and until the late 1960s, France's economy needed and
could absorb new entrants.2 0 5 As a result, the regulation of immigration
remained lax.20 6 Eighty to ninety percent of immigrants in the late
1960s entered clandestinely and then regularized their status. 20 7 This
laissez-faire approach to enforcement made the right to family unifica-
tion essentially an academic issue until the late 1960s, when social dis-
turbances and an economic downturn raised concerns about
immigration controls. 20 8
Beginning in the early 1970s, the government implemented a series
of severe measures to control immigration. In 1972, circulars prohib-
ited foreign workers who entered without authorization from regular-
izing their status.20 9 In 1974, the government responded to the political
pressures resulting from an increasingly severe recession and high
unemployment by barring the further entry of foreign workers.2 10 The
203. Spain and Portugal joined the EEC by virtue of the Treaty Concerning the
Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European
Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, June 12,
1985, reprinted in BII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw B9315 (1986).
The conditions of accession are set out in the Act Concerning the Conditions of
Accession and the Adjustment to the Treaties, reprinted in id. at B9320. Articles 55
through 60 govern the application of the freedom of worker provisions to Spain and
Portugal. Id. at B9338 to B9340.
204. For a breakdown of the principal nationalities of the foreign population in
France, see 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLrrIQUE, supra note 19, at 24 (25% Portu-
guese and 8.8% Spanish in 1982).
205. From 1900 to 1939 France experienced only a 3% increase in its population.
After the Second World War, the need for rebuilding and repopulating led to provi-
sions encouraging worker and family immigration. In 1966, M.Jeanneney, the Minis-
ter of Social Affairs, declared that "[cilandestine immigration is not 'inutile' because
if it were strictly dealt with according to the letter of the law we could well experience
a labor shortage." Id. at 10.
206. Many workers, for example, entered without work authorization and later reg-
ularized their status. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
207. B. GRANOTIER, supra note 163, at 65.
208. L. RICHER, LEs DRorrs DE L'HoMME ET DU CITOYEN 138-39 (1982). France
expelled many foreigners in the aftermath of the disturbances of May 1968, and lim-
ited the number of Algerian immigrants to 1,000 per month. Id.
209. The circulars Marcellin-Fontanet of February 23 and September 5, 1972 had
made continued residence in France contingent upon employment. Perotti, supra
note 202, at 39. Loss of ajob precluded renewal of a carte desejour. A circular of Sept.
26, 1973, then excluded all possibility of regularization of status. Id. The Conseil
d'Etat, however, abrogated these circulars in June of 1974 for reasons of form. Sieur
da Silva et C.F.D.T., Conseil d'Etat, 1975 Lebon 16.
210. On Nov. 26, 1974, the Minister of the Interior ordered prefets to deny
extended stay requests for foreigners who entered as tourists and then attempted to
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government also encouraged foreigners to return to their countries of
origin. 2 1 1
2. The Crackdown of the 1970s: Attempts to Expand Use of Ordre Public
In the early 1970s, the State used the ordre public standard to remove
foreigners deemed undesirable.2 12 It ordered expulsions for such
minor offenses as petty theft, public intoxication, and failure to remain
"politically neutral. ' 2 13
The administrative courts, 2 14 however, began to review actively
expulsion orders and to define the contours of ordre public.2 15 In 1975,
the Conseil d'Etat held that indigence, unemployment, and conviction
for minor offenses were insufficient reasons to support an order of
expulsion.2 16 A 1979 law required the administrator to explain the
motivation for all administrative decisions, including expulsion
change or regularize their status. In a circular of July 5, 1974, 1974 J.O. 7275, the
Labor Minister terminated the introduction of all new foreign workers. The Conseil
annulled both of the above circulars for "exces de pouvoir" in a decision of Novem-
ber 24, 1978, Confederation generale du travail et autres, req. No. 98.340, 98.698 and
98.700. The Conseil determined that the administrative officials had imposed restric-
tions beyond those established in the law and decrets.
211. See generally A. CORDEIRO, supra note 161, at 87-88; L. RICHER, supra note 208,
at 139.
212. Evans, supra note 172, at 136. The Administration could bar entry of any
foreigner who might present a danger to ordre public. The Administration used its
broad discretion to exclude politically undesirable aliens such as the pro-IRA polit-
ical figure, Bernadette Devlin, British trade unionists protesting British entry to the
European Community in 1972, and West German Amnesty International officials in
1975. Others were admitted on condition that they refrain from political activity. Id.
213. For instance, the administration used the ordre public standard to expel a Tuni-
sian activist for working with a group defending rights of immigrants, and a worker
who participated in an information network benefitting U.S. deserters from the Viet-
nam war. Additionally, the vagueness of the "political neutrality" standard left aliens
vulnerable to intimidation through threats of expulsion. See Les Expulsions, supra note
174, at 75.
214. For a discussion of the French judicial system, see infra notes 489-504 and
accompanying text.
215. G. VEDEL, supra note 171, at 772; Bermann, The Scope of Judicial Review in
French Administrative Law, 16 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 230-32 (1977).
Traditionally, the administrative court exercised only a minimum level of review.
It could examine the materiality of the facts underlying administrative decisions, but
did not review the sufficiency of facts in supporting its legal conclusions. Develop-
ment of the concept of erreur manifest during the last thirty years has resulted, how-
ever, in some court reversals of administrative findings of danger to ordre public. G.
VEDEL, supra note 171, at 799.
216. Ministre de l'Interieur v. Pardov, Conseil d'Etat, 1975 Lebon 83 (Pardov, a
Bulgarian refugee, was ordered deported on the grounds that he had neither regular
activity nor resources and that he had entered and remained in France illegally; the
Conseil d'Etat's decision annulled the deportation order for erreur manifest); see also
Ministre de l'Interieur v. Benouaret, Conseil d'Etat, 1978 Lebon 502 (annulling
order of expulsion based on the use of false documents to enter the country because
entering with false documents is not, in itself, a danger to ordre public); Ministre de
l'Interieur v. Dridi, Conseil d'Etat, 1977 Lebon 38 (in deciding that there was no
erreur manifest in an expulsion order, the Conseil noted "the penal infractions of an
alien do not in themselves legally justify a measure of expulsion").
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orders. 21 7 In 1981, a major amendment to the 1945 Ordonnance con-
siderably lessened the danger of arbitrary expulsion. It required the
administration to find, before ordering expulsion, both a "grave" dan-
ger to ordre public and that the alien had served at least one year in
prison.2 18 The same amendment exempted from expulsion several cat-
egories of persons with established ties to France.2 19
3. Multiplying the Grounds for Expulsion
Concurrent with these judicial and legislative protections from arbitrary
expulsion, the executive and legislature moved to find new ways of more
effectively controlling immigration. In 1980, at the end of the seven-
year term of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the Parliament amended the
immigration law.2 20 The amendments expanded the grounds for exclu-
sion and expulsion and vested the administration with greater authority
to expel aliens. 22 1 The 1980 amendments sought to remove the barri-
ers to expulsion of foreigners remaining in France without proper docu-
mentation erected by the 1945 Ordonnance and the decisions of the
Conseil d'Etat.
2 22
The 1980 amendments permitted the Minister of the Interior to
expel most aliens residing illegally in France. 22 3 These amendments led
217. Law No. 79-587 ofJuly 11, 1979, 1979 J.O. 1711.
218. Law No. 81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981, arts. 23, 25, 1981 J.O. 2970, 2970-71.
219. Id. art. 25.
220. Law No. 80-9 ofJan. 10, 1980, 1980 J.O. 71.
221. Id.
222. The 1945 law limited the grounds for expulsion to situations in which an alien
presented a danger to ordre public. The Conseil d'Etat established, however, that
improper documentation or mere clandestine status was not a violation of ordre public.
See cases cited supra note 216. Administrative authorities, therefore, could not expel
illegal aliens for these reasons. Rather, the authorities had to afford aliens an oppor-
tunity to depart voluntarily or go through the criminal courts process for violations
of the immigration law. Voluntary departure or "administrative refoulement" left no
judicial record and no prohibition on returning to France or on eventually obtaining
French citizenship. Expulsion through the administrative process, however, left a
record and interfered with opportunities for citizenship and reentry. See generally Vin-
cent, Le nouveau regime de l'entree et du seour des etrangers en France, 33 REVUE ADMINIS-
TRATiVE 363, 372 (1980).
If the request to leave the country voluntarily was ignored, then judicial refoule-
ment after criminal conviction for the violation of immigration law could be imposed.
Only in cases of urgency could the administration itself force the removal of a person
from the country. Id. If convicted, the illegal could be expelled. Article 19 of the
Ordonnance of 1945 provided for a fine or imprisonment for those who entered
irregularly or remained in France for three months without obtaining the proper carte
de sejour. Ordonnance of Nov. 2, 1945, art. 19, 1945 J.O. 7225, 7226. The 1981
amendments clarified that the criminal sentence for conviction for lack of documen-
tation could include a judicial order of expulsion. Law No. 81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981,
art. 1, 1981 J.O. 2970. The criminal process is, of course, much slower, more costly
and more uncertain than administrative expulsion.
223. The five new grounds for expulsion under the 1980 amendments were:
1. counterfeiting, falsifying or altering a carte de sejour (paragraph 2);
2. lack of proper documentation (undocumented) (paragraph 3);
3. failure to obtain a carte de sejour after three months in France (para-
graph 4);
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to a three-to-four-fold increase in the expulsion rate.2 24 The threat of
massive expulsions caused considerable insecurity among the foreign
population and may have prompted the voluntary departure of some
aliens. 225
4. Post-1980: The Impact of Shifting Political Power
Immigration policy in France is tied to political ideology, ranging from
the far right views of Jean Marie le Pen,22 6 who uses immigrants as
scapegoats for all the nation's problems, to the more humanitarian
emphasis of the socialists and communists. 2 2 7 This spectrum is never-
theless a relatively narrow one-no political group argues for more
open borders. The focus of debate centers primarily on how to treat
immigrants already residing in France.
One purpose of the recent restrictive amendments2 28 was to limit
the Arab immigrant population. 2 29 In the 1970s the source of immigra-
tion to France shifted from European countries to the former colonies in
North Africa.2 3 0 Growing pockets of Arabs in France have retained
their language, culture, and religion and have been the targets of a
marked xenophobic reaction.2 3 1 The tension between the native French
and the Arab immigrants is particularly acute because of religious and
cultural differences and because of the ill-feeling generated by the war
of liberation in Algeria.23 2
Thus, at least one commentator characterized the debate as con-
cerning the extent to which France should permit itself to become either
a pluralistic society or a "melting pot."' 23 3 In addressing these issues in
1981, the newly elected socialist regime of Francois Mitterrand prom-
ised to implement a humanitarian immigration policy that would dis-
courage clandestine entry while protecting the rights of foreigners
already in France.23 4 The socialist-controlled coalition in Parliament
promptly repealed the restrictive 1980 legislation and reinstated ordre
4. failure to renew a carte de sejour (paragraph 5); and
5. failure to depart after refusal of renewal request (paragraph 6).
Law No. 80-9 ofJan. 10, 1980, art. 6, 1980J.O. 71, 71-72. The new grounds were
much criticized because the administration could put the foreigner in the irregular
situation by, for example, refusing to renew a carte de sejour. Vincent, supra note 222,
at 372-77.
224. A. CORDEIRO, supra note 161, at 95.
225. Id.
226. Founder and Head of the National Front party. See J. PETrrFILS, L'EXTREME
DROrrE EN FRANCE (1983).
227. Les expulsions n'epargnerontpas lesplusjeunes, Le Monde, July 18, 1986, at 8, col.
1.
228. See supra notes 220-23 and infra notes 240-45.
229. B. STAsi, L'IMMIGRATION: UNE CHANCE POUR LA FRANCE 137-51 (1984).
230. 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLrrQUE, supra note 19, at 22-24.
231. F. GASPARD & C. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, LA FIN DES IMMIGRES 56-90 (1985).
232. See generally Nouschi, Esquisse d'Une Histoire de lIrnnigration Maghrebine, in LES
NORD-AFRICAINS EN FRANCE, 39, 47 et seq. (1984).
233. F. GASPARD & C. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, supra note 231, at 56-90.
234. See generally 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE, supra note 19, at 12-15.
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public as the sole ground for expulsion.235 In addition, the 1981 amend-
ments required that, before expulsion could occur, the violation of ordre
public must be "grave" and that the person facing expulsion must have
served a prison term of at least one year for a criminal offense. 23 6
By 1986 political power had shifted to the right.23 7 During the
1986 campaign for seats in the National Assembly, the victorious coali-
tion of center-right parties (RPR and UDF) blamed the socialists for lax
enforcment of the immigration law.238 The extreme right, Jean Marie
Le Pen's National Front, asserted that immigration threatened national
security and campaigned for measures to safeguard French culture and
French workers from aliens. 239 In elections that year, the socialists lost
their majority in the National Assembly to a coalition of center-right par-
ties.240 The new conservative government promptly obtained legislative
approval to amend the immigration law, reinstating the broader 1980
grounds for expulsion 24 1 and imposing stricter requirements for
obtaining long-term resident status.242
The socialist deputies, however, sought review of the new amend-
ments by the Conseil Constitutionnel. 243 They challenged both the
constitutionality of the new grounds for administrative expulsion, and
the withdrawal from family members of certain protections from expul-
sion afforded under the prior 1981 law. 244 The Conseil Constitutionnel
rejected the challenges to the 1986 amendments, holding that under the
conditions specified by the amendments, the legislature could constitu-
tionally authorize the executive branch to expel foreigners, including
family members, who were living irregularly in France.245
235. Law No. 81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981, 1981 J.O. 2970.
236. Id art. 25(7). Article 26 makes an exception to the usual requirements for
extraordinary situations, allowing expulsion when there is an "imperious necessity
for the surety of the state or public security." Id. art. 26.
237. Le RPR et L'UDF sont en mesure deformer le gouvernement: 44.897 des voix et 288
deputes pour la droite, 31.4875 et 215 pour le PS, Le Monde, March 18,1986, at 1.
238. Bataille de chiffres sur l'immigration, Le Monde, Nov. 13, 1985, at 48, col. 1.
239. L'immigration, theme electoral du Front National, Le Figaro, Sept. 23, 1985, at 7,
col. 1.
240. The RPR (Rassemblement pour la Republique) and the UDF (Union pour la
Democratie Francaise) garnered nearly half of the seats in the National Assembly in
the March, 1986 elections.
241. Les expulsions n'epargneront pas les plusjeunes, Le Monde, July 18, 1986, at 8, col.
1.
242. Id.; see also Les textes 'securitaires' ont ete adoucis par le Senat, Le Monde, Aug. 9,
1986, at 5, col. 1.
243. Decision of Sept. 3, 1986, Con. const., No. 86-126 (LEXIS, French Public
library, Consti file).
244. Id.
245. Id. Two relatively minor provisions, one involving the treaty power and
another involving the extension of the time for administrative detention during the
process of deportation, were declared invalid. Id.
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C. Family Unification
1. 1945: The Principle Established
Family unification was not a pressing issue in France prior to the Ordon-
nance of 1945.246 Family unification became a part of French policy
when, under the Ordonnance of 1945, circulars of the Ministry of Public
Health and Population established categories of family members enti-
tled to join workers in France:
1. wives
2. sons under 18 years of age
3. daughters under 21 years of age
4. ascendants over 50 years of age
5. collaterals or in-laws, if over 50 years of age or under 18 for males or
under 21 for females. 24 7
The Minister also retained discretion to waive conditions of age and
relationship. 24 8
The early circulars established one condition to family unification-
adequate lodging.2 49 Before a resident worker could request entry for
family members, he needed to have accommodations suitable for their
needs. 2 50 The Office National d'Immigration would then help the family
move and would reimburse the travel and adjustment costs. 25 1 The
worker who wanted to enter with his family needed to have adequate
246. French law did, however, address the problem of fraudulent marriages. The
French Civil Code provided that a woman marrying a French citizen automatically
obtained French citizenship, reportedly even in cases where the sole purpose of the
marriage was to circumvent an order of expulsion. See A. MARTINI, L'ExPuLSION DES
ETRANCERS: ETUDES DE DRorr COMPARE 200-01 (1909). The prevalence of marriages
designed to avoid immigration restrictions prompted the government in 1938 to
amend the automatic citizenship provision for foreign wives to allow the government
to challenge the marriage's validity. See Herchenroder, The Alien Regulations in France,
21 COMP. LEGwS. & INT'L L. 220, 227 (1939). A decret-loi of Nov. 12, 1938, provided
that foreigners must be authorized to reside for more than one year in France in
order to marry there. It also provided that an alien woman marrying a French man
could not automatically become a French citizen but must specifically apply in writ-
ing. Though naturalization was possible six months after the marriage, the applica-
tion could be disapproved during that interval. Id. Until 1973, a foreign woman
marrying a French citizen could thereby obtain access to French citizenship. 1981-
1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE, supra note 19, at 34. The 1973 Amendments equal-
ized the sexes, allowing all spouses to obtain French citizenship by declaration. After
such a declaration for citizenship, the government now has one year in which to chal-
lenge the validity of the marriage. Law No. 73-42 ofJan. 9, 1973, 1973 J.O. 467; see
also MINISTERE DE LAJUSTICE, LA NATIONALITE FRANCAISE 25-26 (1984). In 1981, the
government repealed article 13 of the Ordonnance of Nov. 2, 1945, which had
required that all foreigners residing in France seek the permission of the administra-
tion prior to marriage. Law No. 81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981, art. 9, 1981 J.O. 2970,
2972.
247. See Circular of April 18, 1956, reprinted in A. RoMEU-POBLOT, supra note 165, at
57-58.
248. A. ROMEU-POBLOT, supra note 165, at 58.
249. Id. at 60.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 59.
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advance lodging. 252 Nevertheless, family members often joined a resi-
dent worker as tourists or clandestines and then regularized their status
once settled in the country. 25 3
2. 1974: Restrictions on Family Unification Rights
The Giscard administration 2 54 issued a series of circulars in 1974 con-
tinuing the ban on entry of foreign workers and, in addition, barring the
entry of family members of legal residents. 2 55 The administration, how-
ever, later lifted the prohibition on family unification. 25 6 In 1976, the
administration even issued a decret recognizing a right to family
unification. 25 7
The abrupt change of position by the Giscard regime was doubly
motivated.2 58 First, it was materially impossible (because of insufficient
police forces) to prevent family members from entering. They could not
be stopped from entering as tourists, and once they had joined their
families, forcing separation violated the most elementary principles of
humanity.2 59 Second, allowing family members to join the worker could
stabilize the worker's personal life and thereby ease the social integra-
tion process. 260 Indeed, former Secretary of State for Foreign Workers
Paul Dijoud suggested that the government should allow family mem-
bers to determine when they wanted to join the worker, limiting its role
to providing assistance and support to arriving family members. 26 1 The
early Giscard regime thus relaxed barriers to entry but encouraged for-
eigners to return to their countries of origin by offering significant lump
sum payments-aide au retour.2 62
3. Policy Swings of the Mid-1970s
Under Dijoud's leadership, the administration issued a decret on April
29, 1976, which provides the current framework for regulating entry of
family members. 26 3 For the first time the decret made the rules official,
252. Id.
253. B. GRANOTIER, supra note 163, at 65-73.
254. Valery Giscard d'Estaing was elected president in March, 1974, and served
until May, 1981.
255. A circular ofJuly 9, 1974, No. 11.74, specified that the introduction of family
members would be refused in all cases where the dossier had not been presented to
the Office National d'Immigration prior to July 4, 1974. Two other circulars issued
on Aug. 8, 1974, 1974J.O. 11091, and on Dec. 27, 1974 made some exceptions, but
the general bar remained in place for nearly a year. See G.I.S.T.I., LImmigration
Familiale, No. 5 DRorr SOCIAL 101, 105 (1976).
256. The circular of June 18, 1975, 1975 J.O. 6093, reopened the possibility of
family unification for those subject to the general regime of law.
257. P. DijOUD, LA NOUVELLE PoLrrIQUE DE L'IMMIGRATION 71 et seq. (1977).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 77.
261. Id. at 71.
262. See A. CORDEIRO, supra note 161, at 90; 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLITIQUE,
supra note 19, at 87.
263. Decret No. 76-383 of Apr. 29, 1976, 1976J.O. 2628.
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public, and free from arbitrary amendment without notice by adminis-
trative officials. 264 Most significantly, the decret established a right to
family unification if specified conditions were met. The state could
exclude or deport eligible relatives of a foreigner only for one of the
following reasons:
1. The foreigner seeking family unification has not resided in France in
a regular situation for at least one year;
2. He lacks sufficient resources to support the arriving family members;
3. The conditions of lodging which he proposes for the family are
inadequate;
4. The results of medical examinations of the family members seeking
entry indicate a danger to public health, order or security;
5. Presence of the family members in France could conflict with consid-
erations related to ordre public;
6. The motive for seeking entry is other than for family unification. 2 65
Although the decret recognized only spouses and minor children as eli-
gible relatives, the Office National d'lmmigration had discretion to allow
other family members to enter.2 66 Family members already present in
France were entitled to legalization of their status if the above condi-
tions had been met at the time of the request.26 7
This humanistic policy was short-lived. Secretary Stoleru replaced
Dijoud in 1977.268 Confronted with increasing economic difficulties
and political pressures, Stoleru sought new means to limit immigration,
including family immigration. 26 9 In June, 1977, therefore, Secretary
Stoleru reinitiated a strategy aimed at discouraging the entry of foreign
workers. A November 10, 1977 decret added a new "no work" condi-
tion to the six conditions contained in the 1976 decret. 2 70 The effect of
this decret was essentially symbolic. In reality, entering family members
affect French employment only marginally, if at all.2 7 1 Total family
immigration to France in the late 1970s represented only about 50,000
persons per year, one fifth of whom might be expected to seek employ-
ment.2 7 2 Furthermore, the decret did not apply to families of residents
264. Id.
265. Id. art. 1.
266. Id. art. 2.
267. See Circular No. 81-50 of July 10, 1981, 1981 J.O. 8716, clarifying that the
head of a family could demand legalization of status of the spouse and children who
had entered and joined him or her in France. Thus, adjustment of status could be
accomplished in France.
268. A CORDEIRO, supra note 161, at 88.
269. Id.; G.I.S.T.I., supra note 199, at 3-4.
270. Decret No. 77-1239, 1977 J.O. 5397 (suspending temporarily provisions of
decret No. 76-383 of Apr. 29, 1976).
271. It is somewhat ironic that such an important decision as GISTI (see infra notes
274-76, and accompanying text), was taken in regard to a decret which had largely
symbolic value. The decret was actually a formal declaration of the government's
policy to discourage foreign workers from settling and encouraging their return to
their country of origin.
272. Dondoux, Le Droit a Une Vie Familiale Normale, No. 1 DROIT SOCIAL 57 (1979)
(conclusion of Commissaire du Gouvernement Philippe Dondoux).
Vol. 21
1988 Family Unification
of the EEC, Algeria, or other nations with which France maintained a
bilateral accord on the issue.2 73 The 1977 decret's main effect was pro-
duction of a counterreaction. It led to litigation, resulting in a decision
by the Conseil d'Etat significantly protecting family unification rights in
France.
4. The GISTI Decision: Judicial Establishment of a Right to Family Unity
The Conseil d'Etat's review of the 1977 decret's "no-work" condition
resulted in a landmark decision, Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des
Travailleurs Immigres et Autres (GISTI).274 In GISTI, the Conseil d'Etat
held that the right to live a normal family life was a general principle of
constitutional law applicable not only to citizens, but also to foreigners
regularly residing in France.27 5 In the succinct fashion of French court
decisions, the reasoning in GISTI proceeded as follows:
1. "General principles of law, especially those of the Preamble of the
1946 Constitution, provide foreigners residing in France, as well as citi-
zens, the right to lead a normal family life."
2. "The right to a normal family life includes, in particular, the option of
a foreigner to be joined by a spouse and minor children."
3. "Although the government may define the conditions for exercising
the right to be joined by the spouse and children in reconciling this prin-
ciple with the necessities of ordre public and the social protection of for-
eigners and their families, it may not forbid by a general measure the
employment of family members of foreign residents."
4. "Thus, the challenged decret is illegal and must be annulled."'276
The GISTI decision's recognition of a right to a normal family life
raises three questions. First, if instead of an executive decret, Parlia-
ment enacted the same measure into law, would it survive constitutional
review? A different court would review a parliamentary measure; while
the Conseil d'Etat reviews decrets, the Conseil Constitutionnel resolves
the constitutionality of a parliamentary enactment.2 77 The GISTI deci-
sion would therefore not control the Conseil Constitutionnel's determi-
nation.278 One can speculate, however, that even with the heightened
273. Id.
274. Conseil d'Etat, 1978 Lebon 493; see also M. LONG, supra note 4, at 587 (1984).
275. M. LONG, supra note 4, at 588.
276. Id. at 587-88 (translation by author).
277. The Conseil d'Etat is restricted to determination of the constitutionality of
texts issued at the administrative level. See G. VEDEL, supra note 171, at 379.
278. Id. at 88. Although the Conseil d'Etat and the Conseil Constitutionnel may
take contradictory positions on the same issue, at times the Conseil Constitutionnel
may closely follow the lead of the Conseil d'Etat. Id. at 296. In some domains the
legislature possesses greater authority to balance competing governmental concerns
than does the executive. See Constitution of 1958, arts. 21, 34, 37, reprinted in FRENCH
LAw, infra note 490, at 2-14, 2-17 to 2-19 (establishing separate domains of legislative
and executive control). For an example of the Conseil Constitutionnel tracking the
Conseil d'Etat, see Decision ofJuly 25, 1979, Con. const., 1980 Dalloz-SireyJurispru-
dence [D.S.Jur.] 201 (1979), in which the Conseil Constitutionnel recognized a right
to strike in language tracking nearly word for word the Conseil d'Etat's decision in
Dehaene, Conseil d'Etat, 1950 Lebon 426.
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legitimacy of clear legislative intent, the Conseil Constitutionnel would
apply reasoning similar to that in GISTI. The Conseil Constitutionnel
recently held, in a decision concerning the 1986 immigration law, that
the "family" provision in the 1946 preamble to the Constitution has
constitutional value.2 79
Second, which relatives are covered by the right to a normal family
life? In GISTI, the Conseil d'Etat mentioned only the right to be united
with the spouse and minor children. 28 0 It is unclear whether this right
extends to other relatives who have established close family ties.
Third, what restrictions may be imposed on the right to family unifi-
cation? The Conseil d'Etat in GISTI held that the government may
restrict the right to family unification to protect either ordre public or the
welfare of foreigners and their families. 28 ' The Conseil d'Etat has
already upheld one such restriction, a 1984 decret requiring that appli-
cations for family unification be approved while family members are still
in the country of origin.28 2
5. Family Unification After GISTI: Shifting Policies
The Mitterrand regime premised its immigration policy upon the belief
that improvement of the foreign resident's sense of security would lead
to a stable and integrated foreign population. 28 3 To implement its
immigration policy, the government amended the 1945 Ordonnance in
1981, 1984 and 1986.284
The 1981 amendments completely exempted the following catego-
ries of foreigners in France from the threat of expulsion:
1. Minors under 18 years of age;
2. Habitual residents of France since the age of 10;
3. Habitual residents of France for over 15 years;
4. Spouses married to a French citizen for over 6 months;
5. Parents of a French child who resides in France;
6. Certain injured workers. 2 85
Notably, these protections are afforded to relatives of French citizens-
spouses, parents, and children-in greater measure than to resident
foreigners.
In 1984 the Mitterrand administration took two major steps, both
expanding and restricting the right to family unity: although it provided
new protection for foreigners wanting to renew resident permits, it
ended the practice of regularizing the situation of family members who
279. Decision of Sept. 3, 1986, Con. const., No. 86-216 (available on LEXIS,




282. Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigres, Conseil
d'Etat, Sept. 26, 1986 (LEXIS, French Public library, Conset file).
283. See Le Regroupement Familial, Le Monde, Oct. 11, 1984, at 12.
284. See infra notes 286, 297-302.
285. Law No. 81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981, art. 25, 1981 J.O. 2970, 2971.
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entered without authorization. The end to regularizing the status of
unauthorized family entrants came in a December 4, 1984 decret. 28 6 As
implemented by a Circular of January 4, 1985, family members will no
longer be able to enter as "false tourists" and obtain long-term visas
after establishing themselves in France.2 87 The determination that the
foreign worker has sufficient resources, medical certification, and
arrangements for lodging must now occur before the relatives leave the
country of origin.2 88 This requirement is a significant barrier to family
unification. In the past, a family could live in small quarters until the
income of the additional family members enabled them to afford more
comfortable accommodations. 289 Now workers with a single income
face a scarcity of adequate housing units. When coupled with existing
discrimination against foreigners, it will now be more difficult for the
worker to obtain advance approval for family unification.
Many criticized this new restriction upon family unification as a
repudiation of the promise by leftist politicians to accord immigrants the
same respect and dignity accorded French citizens. 290 In the 1985 cir-
cular implementing the decret, however, the government declared that
it intended to continue to guarantee the exercise of the right to family
unification under conditions which permit orderly insertion. 29 1 The
Conseil d'Etat also held that this restriction did not violate the right to a
normal family life, noting that the restriction helped maintain the ordre
public and protected entering family members. 29 2
6. Legislative Protection for Family Unification
New protections for family members also came from the 1984 Amend-
ments to the 1945 Ordonnance. 293 Before 1984, all foreigners remain-
ing in France for more than three months needed to obtain a resident
permit [carte de sejour], normally renewable after one year.29 4 The local
prefet had discretion to renew the permit.29 5 In the 1970s, during the
campaign to reduce the number of foreign workers, the local prefet often
refused renewal. 2 96
The 1984 amendments conferred the equivalent of permanent resi-
dent status at time of entry to several categories of relatives of French
286. Decret No. 84-1080 of Dec. 4, 1984, 1984 J.O. 3733, modifying Decret No.
76-383 of April 29, 1976, 1976J.O. 2628, relative to conditions of entry and stay of
family members of foreigners authorized to reside in France.
287. Circular ofJan. 4, 1985, 1985 J.O. 438, abrogating circulars No. 7-76 ofJuly
9, 1976 and No. 81-50 ofJuly 10, 1981; see G.I.S.T.I., supra note 199, at 29-30.
288. Circular ofJan. 4, 1985, 1985 J.O. 438.
289. G.I.S.T.I., supra note 199, at 29-30.
290. L'Immigration Sous Control, Le Monde, Oct. 11, 1984, at 12.
291. Circular ofJan. 4, 1985, 1985 J.O. 438.
292. Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigres, Conseil
d'Etat, Sept. 26, 1986 (LEXIS, French Public library, Conset file).
293. Law No. 84-622 ofJuly 17, 1984, 1984J.O. 2324.
294. D. LocHAK, supra note 191, at 166-68.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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citizens and residents. 297 Protected relatives included:
1. Alien spouses of French citizens residing in France;
2. Alien minor children (under 21) of French citizens in France;
3. Alien parents of French children in France;
4. Alien spouses and minor children (under 18) of resident aliens with a
carte de resident.2
98
Because these relatives no longer needed to renew their resident cards
[caries de seours] after entry, their position in France was significantly
more secure than previously.
The 1986 amendments to the immigration law indicate some
retrenchment from the 1984 protections. 29 9 Although the amendments
retain the 1984 provisions exempting certain close family members from
expulsion, as well as the provisions expediting access to permanent resi-
dent status,30 0 they require that such exempt relatives meet certain new
conditions, thereby reducing the number of relatives exempt from
expulsion. 0 1 This retrenchment is only partial, however. The post-
1986 law still provides more protection for family unity than the pre-
1981 law.30
2
D. Features Common to Both United States and French Family
Unification Law
Though French family unification policy developed more recently and
under different circumstances than U.S. policy, the broad contours of
the two systems are similar. Current immigration to both countries is
primarily family immigration.3 0 3 Both systems also share several basic
principles. These include:
297. Ordonnance of Nov. 2, 1945, arts. 14, 15, 1945 J.O. 7225, 7225-26; see also
1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLrrIQUE, supra note 19, at 52.
298. Law No. 84-622 ofJuly 17, 1984, 1984 J.O. 2334.
299. Law No. 86-1025 of Sept. 9, 1986, 1986J.O. 11035.
300. Id. art. 2.
301. See id. art. 2 (amending article 15 of the 1945 Ordonnance), and art. 9
(amending article 25 of the 1945 Ordonnance). The new conditions are as follows:
1. A foreigner married for at least one year to a French citizen on condition that
the relationship between the two spouses remains viable;
2. The foreign father or mother of a French child residing in France on con-
dition that he or she exercises at least partial parental responsibility for the child or that he
or she has provided adequately for the support of the child;
3. A foreign child under the age of eighteen years except if the persons who
provide for the child are themselves the object of a measure of expulsion and there is no
other person residing in France who is able to care for the child.
Id. art. 9 (emphasis added) (translation by author).
302. For a discussion of the pre-1981 law, see supra notes 246-73 and accompany-
ing text.
303. 1981-1986 UNE NOUVELLE POLMQUE, supra note 19, at 21, 46. Each year,
over 100,000 spouses and children of U.S. citizens enter the United States; 216,000,
or 80% of the total allocated preference visas are reserved for family members. See
supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text. France has admitted nearly 500,000 fam-
ily members over the last ten years.
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a) Distinctions between citizens and permanent resident aliens in treat-
ment of their relatives, with particularly favorable provisions for the
spouse and minor children of citizens.
b) For resident aliens, limitation of family unification to the spouse and
unmarried children.
c) Exemption from the normal regime of exclusion and expulsion for
immediate relatives.
d) Conditions on entry limiting the flow of family immigration.
United States law exempts the spouse and minor children of citizens
from the quota system.30 4 Also, the preference categories allow entry of
more distant relatives of citizens. 30 5 France accords relatives of citizens
special status at the time of entry, and such relatives are essentially
secure from the threat of expulsion.
30 6
Under both U.S. and French law, permanent resident aliens have a
family unification preference only for the spouse and children. 30 7 The
United States, despite according these relatives preference, restricts
their entry through numerical ceilings and qualitative limits. 30 8 France
is more liberal and has no numerical limits. 30 9 Both countries, however,
require the resident alien to demonstrate his ability to support the
entering relative.
3 10
A close relative facing exclusion or expulsion may find relief in both
the U.S. and French regimes. In the United States the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, under the authority of the Attorney General, exercises
discretion to exempt the closest relatives of both citizens and permanent
resident aliens.3 1 1 France is again somewhat more liberal. The French
government specifically exempts from expulsion the closest relatives of
citizens and aliens who have resided in France for over three years.
3 1 2
The U.S. quotas and the French lodging requirement both have an
arbitrary impact on the opportunity for family unification. The U.S.
quota system may delay for years the entry of immigrants from countries
of high immigration demand.3 13 In France, the immigrant's economic
304. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text. In France, relatives of citi-
zens are afforded the more favorable protections of the provisions of the European
Economic Community law which, for example, provide a broader definition of rela-
tives entitled to family unification than does the French law. Under the rules of the
EEC, the spouse, dependent children under 21 years of age, and ascendants who are
dependent or under the care of the receiving family, are entitled to enter along with
those who were dependent or who lived in the same household in the country of
origin. See infra notes 540-44 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 115-29, 298 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 270.
311. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1982) (providing that a citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted as a permanent resident may petition the Attorney General for admission of
relatives under exempt or preference status).
312. See generally supra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
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situation determines whether he will be able to provide adequate hous-
ing in advance, and thus, whether his relatives will be admitted.a1 4
Overall, however, the French system provides greater protection of
family unification in three respects. Two of these emerge from the
above discussion: the lack of quota restrictions, and the greater protec-
tion from expulsion in France. The third aspect, judicial enforcement of
constitutional protections of family unification, will be explored in Part
VI.
V. Protection of the Family under the United States Constitution
Two conflicting tendencies meet when courts analyze the constitutional
limits of family unification in the immigration context. On the one
hand, although the Constitution never mentions "the family", the
Supreme Court has over the years afforded the family unit considerable
constitutional protection. On the other hand, the Court normally
exhibits extreme deference to legislative and executive regulation of
immigration.
This part first identifies the grounds for claiming a constitutional
right to family unification, and the circle of family members to whom
such constitutional protection would extend. It then examines the tradi-
tionally deferential approach of the federal courts in their review of
immigration law. Finally, it considers the judicial response to the asser-
tion of a constitutional right to family unification in immigration cases.
A. The Sources of Constitutional Protection of Family Rights
In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized a right to
privacy.3 15 A number of these decisions relate to privacy regarding the
family: the right to marry (Loving v. Virginia);3 16 procreation (Skinner v.
Oklahoma);3 17 contraception (Eisenstadt v. Baird3 18 and Griswold v. Con-
necticut);3 19 abortion (Roe v. Wade);3 20 and child rearing and education
(Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 2 1 and Meyer v. Nebraska).3 22 In these cases, the
Court, or individual justices, have identified various sources for the right
to privacy, including the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,3 23 the ninth
amendment,3 24 the liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment,3 2 5 and
314. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
315. For general discussions of the cases involving a right to privacy, see Fried,
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Gevety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 233 (1977).
316. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
317. 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (invalidated statute providing for sterilization of
habitual criminals).
318. 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
319. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
320. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
321. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
322. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
323. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (Douglas, J.).
324. Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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the equal protection clause.3 2 6 Despite this variance, the Court has
asserted that these decisions "make it clear that only personal rights that
can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty', are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."
32 7
These family privacy cases can be organized under three categories:
(1) those involving parental authority over the raising and educating of
children; 3 28 (2) those involving freedom of choice in marriage and pro-
creation;3 29 and (3) those relating to the integrity of the family unit.3 30
1. The Scope of Parental Authority
The Court recognized parents' right to control the upbringing of their
children as against the state in Meyer v. Nebraska 33 1 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters.33 2 In both cases the Court grounded this right in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 33 Meyer concerned a statute
prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in school before the
eighth grade.33 4 In striking down the law, the Court acknowledged that,
although a state has broad discretion in regulating its citizens, it must
respect certain fundamental rights. 33 5 These rights included:
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happinesss by free
men.
336
Pierce struck down a state law requiring attendance at public rather than
parochial schools.3 3 7 Relying on Meyer, the Court determined that there
were "no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies" justifying the
state's interference with the parents' right to direct the upbringing and
325. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
326. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
327. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1972) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
328. See infra notes 332-42 and accompanying text.
329. See infra notes 343-54 and accompanying text.
330. See infra notes 355-78 and accompanying text.
331. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
332. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
333. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
334. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
335. Id. at 399.
336. Id. (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the statute as applied was
arbitrary and unreasonable, "[n]o emergency having arisen which renders knowledge
by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its
inhibition." Id. at 403.
337. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530. The Court reasoned that the state law unreasonably
interfered with the parents' liberty interest, noting that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
IE at 535.
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education of their children.3 3 8
Although the Court has never defined the scope of this parental
right, subsequent cases indicate the right is not absolute. In Prince v.
Massachusetts,33 9 for example, the Court upheld the conviction of a
guardian who violated the state's child labor law by allowing her minor
ward to assist her in selling religious literature.3 40 Although the Court
affirmed the holdings of Meyer and Pierce,3 41 it determined that the
state's "wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority
in things affecting the child's welfare" justified the limited regulation of
the family and of matters of conscience and religious conviction.3 4 2
Consequently, the Court has recognized both a right of parental author-
ity and the right of the state to regulate matters affecting the child's wel-
fare. Just how the Court would balance these competing interests in
specific situations is as yet unclear.
2. Freedom of Choice With Respect to Marriage and Procreation
The decisions involving the freedom to marry are also grounded in the
fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty. In determining that mis-
cegenation statutes violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion and due process clauses, the Court has referred to the freedom to
marry as "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men" and "one of the 'basic civil rights of man',
fundamental to our very existence and survival."
343
338. Id. at 534.
339. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
340. Id. at 161-63.
341. The Court noted that:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.... And it is in recogni-
tion of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.
Id. at 166; see also Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), in which the Court
referred to the right of parents to assume the primary role in decisions concerning
the rearing of their children as "basic in the structure of our society." Id. at 639; see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which the Court struck down a state law,
challenged by Amish parents, that required school attendance of their children after
the eighth grade, noting that "[tihe history and culture of Western civilization reflect
a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their chil-
dren. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Id. at 232. Though
the decision was based primarily on the first amendment free exercise clause, the
Court relied partly on the constitutional right of parents to assume the primary role
in decision-making concerning their children.
342. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. The child believed "it was her religious duty to per-
form this work and failure would bring condemnation 'to everlasting destruction at
Armageddon.'" Id. at 163. The Court rejected claims that the state law impermissi-
bly infringed upon freedom of religion under the first amendment or upon parental
rights under the fourteenth amendment.
343. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Though neither marriage nor the
family are specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the Supreme Court, as early as
1888, referred to marriage as "the most important relation in life .. " Maynard v.
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The Court has struck down other marital restrictions, including one
banning marriage for persons who fail to pay child support.3 44 Never-
theless, the Court has upheld a statute with a less direct impact on the
decision to marry, finding that restricting eligibility for dependent child
benefits upon remarriage does not violate the Constitution.3 4 5
Griswold v. Connecticut,346 the landmark procreative case, recognized
procreative freedom not as a personal right, but as part of the "privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship" and the "right of marital pri-
vacy." '34 7 Identifying the Constitutional source of this privacy right has
been the source of disagreement. Justice Douglas, after characterizing
Meyer and Pierce as First Amendment cases, 34 8 found that "the First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from govern-
mental intrusion."3 4 9 Justice Goldberg, writing for three members of
the Court, located the right in both the fourteenth amendment's con-
cept of liberty, which protects fundamental rights, and in the ninth
amendment. 350 Justice Harlan, concurring, emphasized more exclu-
sively the Fourteenth Amendment protection of "basic values 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty' that are protected from state interfer-
ence by heightened judicial scrutiny." 3 5 1 By the time of Roe v. Wade, 35 2
the Court had adopted Harlan's approach in matters involving procrea-
tion 353 and had expanded the procreative privacy rights to include indi-
vidual privacy rights, as well as marital and family privacy.3 54
3. The Family Integrity Decisions
A series of decisions beginning in the early 1970's afforded procedural
due process protection to the integrity of the family unit.355 These deci-
sions can be characterized as finding "a constitutionally protected right
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). The Court also referred to marriage as "the founda-
tion of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress." Id. at 211.
344. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978), in which the Court sub-
jected a regulation which "directly and substantially interfered with the right to
marry" to rigorous scrutiny. The regulation at issue did not merely establish a classi-
fication based on marital status but directly affected the right to marry by prohibiting
marriage in the event of failure to fulfill support obligations of minor children.
345. See Califano v.Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) in which the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a statute calling for termination of disabled dependent child benefits
upon marriage as only indirectly affecting the right to marry. The classification was
upheld as a rational means of determining who was in need of benefits.
346. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
347. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1972).
348. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
349. Id at 483.
350. Id. at 486-87.
351. Id. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
352. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
353. Id. at 152.
354. Id. at 154. Procreative rights were first recognized as personal privacy rights
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1971).
355. See infra notes 356-78 and accompanying text.
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to family association." 3 5 6
Stanley v. Illinois,3 5 7 for instance, held that the due process clause
protects an unwed father's right to retain custody of his illegitimate chil-
dren. An Illinois statute made illegitimate children wards of the state
upon their mother's death. 3 58 The Court struck down the statute
because it failed to provide unwed fathers an opportunity to prove their
competence as parents.3 5 9 The language the Court used in reaching
this decision plainly recognized the importance of the right to family
association: "the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, cus-
tody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.' ",360
The Court also held that even a provisionally dissolved family unit
(i.e., a family separated when the state temporarily removes a child from
his home pending a final judicial determination that the child is perma-
nently neglected),3 6 ' retains its vital interest in the continuation of the
family relationship. Therefore, the state must prove that the child suf-
fers from permanent neglect by "dear and convincing evidence" before
the state may, in effect, permanently dissolve the family. 36 2 Again, the
Court used strong language in finding a fundamental fourteenth amend-
ment liberty interest meriting due process protection:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child
to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a
vital interest in preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life.3 63
In 1976, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,364 the Supreme Court
issued its strongest decision yet regarding the constitutional protection
of family rights. The Court invalidated a zoning regulation that inter-
fered with the integrity of an established family unit. The city of East
Cleveland had applied a zoning provision, which restricted occupancy of
single family dwellings to the immediate nuclear family, to prohibit a
grandmother from living with her two grandsons.3 6 5 Since the city zon-
356. Myres v. Rask, 602 F. Supp. 210, 213 (D. Colo. 1985).
357. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
358. Id. at 646.
359. Id. at 646, 658.
360. Id. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
361. "Nor can the State refuse to provide natural parents adequate procedural
safeguards on the ground that the family unit has already broken down; that is the
very issue the permanent neglect proceeding is meant to decide." Id. at 754 n.7.
362. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, 765 (1982).
363. Id. at 753.
364. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
365. The grandmother lived with her son, her son's son, and another grandson
who was a cousin to the other. The zoning ordinance restricted "family" by defini-
tion to a married couple, the couple's childless unmarried children, and one depen-
dent child with children. For violating the ordinance, the grandmother was
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ing ordinance did not force a dissolution of the family unit, the Court
could have characterized the burden on the family as indirect. As Justice
White argued in his dissent, the family could have remained together by
moving to a location where the zoning law would permit their living
arrangement. 366 Similar reasoning had been used in response to argu-
ments presented in immigration cases that deportation of a family mem-
ber would destroy the family unit.367 The Court's plurality opinion,
however, took a different approach, emphasizing the substantive liber-
ties protected by the due process clause,368 and noting that,
"[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing
arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of his-
tory [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our soci-
ety.' "369 In concluding that the sanctity of the family was in fact one of
these values, the plurality opinion noted that the family institution was
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. 370 Because of the
regulation's impact on the family, the Court applied heightened judicial
scrutiny, examining both "the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged reg-
ulation." 371 East Cleveland's ordinance could not withstand this
scrutiny.
Since East Cleveland, a new kind of action has arisen with regard to
the right to association with family members. These are section 1983
actions3 72 seeking redress for deprivations resulting from state interfer-
ence with family relationships.3 73 Myres v. Rask,3 74 for example, dealt
with parents who sued police officers under the civil rights statute for
violation of the constitutional right to family association because of their
eighteen-year-old son's wrongful death at the hands of the police. The
defendants argued that the parents could not assert civil rights claims
criminally prosecuted, assessed a fine, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Id
at 496-97.
366. Id. at 1962 (White, J., dissenting).
367. See infra notes 422-23 and accompanying text.
368. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 502.
369. Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(Harlan, J. concurring)).
370. Id at 504.
371. Id. at 499.
372. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
373. See generally Note, Section 1983 Actions by Family Members Based on Deprivation of
the Constitutional Right to "Family Association" Resulting from Wrongful Death: Who has
Standing?, 14 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 441 (1985-86). Most courts considering this issue
have relied upon cases such as East Cleveland in recognizing a constitutional right to
association of close family members. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d
1205, 1245 (7th Cir. 1984), (holding that parents have a constitutionally-protected
liberty interest in their relationship with their children for purposes of a § 1983 claim
for damages for wrongful death).
374. 602 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1985); see also Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767
F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985), which quotes the Myres language. In Kelson, the court also
recognized that parents possess a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the
companionship and society of their children.
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based on the death of their son.3 75 The court disagreed, holding that:
It would be ironic indeed to recognize, on the one hand, the constitu-
tional rights to marry [Loving v. Virginia], to procreate [Skinner v.
Oklahoma], to supervise the upbringing of children [Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, Prince v. Mass], to retain custody of one's illegitimate children [Stanley
v. Illinois], and to live in the same residence with one's "family" [Moore v.
City of East Cleveland], but on the other hand, to deny parents constitu-
tional protection for the continued life of their child. State action that
wrongfully kills one's child certainly interferes with fruition and fulfill-
ment of the fundamental right to procreate. A parent cannot benefit from
his constitutionally protected rights to supervise the upbringing, retain
custody, or live in the same residence with a child if state action unlaw-
fully takes the child's life. To constitutionally protect families from lesser
intrusions into family life, yet allow the state to destroy the family rela-
tionship altogether, would drastically distort the concept of ordered lib-
erty protected by the Due Process Clause.3
76
A few cases have gone further, holding that actionable state action
resulted from the mere separation of relatives. In Morrison v. Jones,3 77
for example, the Ninth Circuit recognized that constitutional protection
of "substantive familial rights" in the parent-child relationship gives rise
to a section 1983 action for damages by a parent against county officials
who transported her mentally-ill alien son to Germany after determining
that she was incapable of providing the care that he required.3 78
B. Defining "Family" for Purposes of Constitutional Protection of
Family Unification
The decisions in East Cleveland3 79 and the recent section 1983 cases3 80
indicate that a constitutional right to integrity of the family unit or to
association of family members may extend beyond the bounds of the
nuclear family. 3 8 ' Although the Supreme Court has never defined those
family relationships to which the Constitution affords protection, an
analysis of the Court's decisions does allow one to map some of the
parameters.
The Supreme Court's decisions extending substantive due process
protection to family relationships emphasize traditional concepts of the
"family", defined essentially as persons bound together by marriage and
kinship ties. Besides the nuclear family, this concept has included an
375. Myres, 602 F. Supp. at 210.
376. Id. at 213.
377. 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
378. Id. at 1273-74; see also Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1226-27 (7th Cir.
1977) (deprivation of grandfather's relationship with his grandchild actionable under
§ 1983); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing "the
right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the awe-
some power of the state").
379. See supra notes 364-71 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 372-78 and accompanying text.
381. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir.
1985), recognizing a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in sibling relationship
for purposes of § 1983 actions.
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extended family member who is a defacto parent or a dependent in the
household.3 82
The decisions indicate, however, that some "family" relationships
are outside the zone of protection. These include homosexual partners,
polygamous marriages, and households of individuals unrelated by
blood or marriage.3 83 The treatment of ascendants or collaterals, 3 84 as
well as unmarried couples and their children, present more difficult
problems.
1. Traditional Concepts of Family-The Necessity of Formal Marriage or
Kinship Ties
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,385 the Court provided its most expan-
sive discussion of the family concept. There, the Court examined the
reasons why the fourteenth amendment's due process clause protects
certain rights associated with the family.
3 86
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing
arbitrary lines but rather from careful "respect for the teachings of history
[and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."
[citations omitted]. Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects
the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the fam-
ily that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural.
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds unit-
ing the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts,
cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with par-
ents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition.
38 7
This discussion defined the family in formalistic terms, i.e., through kin-
ship ties. A more recent case, Lehr v. Robertson,388 adopted instead a
functional approach.3 89 Lehr involved a natural father's procedural due
process rights to notification of adoption proceedings for his child. The
Court held that, where the putative father had never established a sub-
stantial relationship with his child, the state's failure to notify him of
adoption proceedings did not deny the putative father due process or
382. See supra notes 364-71 and accompanying text.
383. See infra notes 405-17 and accompanying text.
384. Ascendants are "[p]ersons with whom one is related in the ascending line;
one's parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 104
(5th ed. 1979). Collaterals are "[t]hose who descend from one and the same com-
mon ancestor, but not from one another." Id. at 237. It is sometimes used to desig-
nate uncles and aunts. Id.
385. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
386. Id. at 499.
387. Id. at 503-04.
388. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
389. The Court quoted approvingly Justice Stewart's observation that " 'Parental
rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They
require relationships more enduring. " Id. at 260 (emphasis added by Court) (quoting
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)).
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equal protection.3 90
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved
and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in
"promot[ing] a way of life" through the instruction of children... as well
as from the fact of blood relationship. 39 '
A functional approach to defining constitutionally-protected family rela-
tionships, therefore, may include defacto parent-child ties.
The functional approach is expansive in some ways and restrictive
in others. On the one hand, it encompasses some ties that a formalistic
kinship approach would exclude. On the other hand, it may exclude
some biological parent-child relationships which lack emotional bonds.
Lehr suggests that, at least when contrasting competing rights, the
Court prefers the functional approach to the formalistic. 39 2 This does
not necessarily mean that it has adopted a functional approach, how-
ever. Factoring East Cleveland into the equation suggests that, in many
situations, the Court will not find it necessary to look beyond formal
blood ties.
Constitutional protection of family ties other than the parent-child
relationship is more problematic. The Seventh Circuit rejected a section
1983 claim by several siblings for damages for loss of society and com-
panionship resulting from their brother's fatal shooting by the police. 39 3
The court distinguished the parent-child from sibling relationships as
follows:
[W]here the right to raise, educate and associate with one's own child may
rise to constitutional dimensions, the right of siblings to have their
brother or sister continue living does not. The relationship between a
parent and its offspring and the relationship between brother and sibling
is not a difference in degree; it is a difference in kind. Though one has a
constitutional right to have or not to have a child, one does not have a
constitutional right to have or not have a brother.39 4
390. Id. at 264-67.
391. Id. at 261 (quoting from Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
392. The functional approach, however, raises one unanswered policy question.
Lehr, for example, held that the extent of constitutional protection of the parent-child
relationship depends upon the degree to which the parent "accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future." Id. at 261. Arguably, only parents who actually
assume the responsibilities of parenthood should benefit from the constitutional pro-
tection of family unification. The problem remains as to whether the parent-child
relationship thus loses constitutional significance as the child matures, and, if so,
where to draw the line. If the child-rearing function is what distinguishes the parent-
child relationship from all others, the dependent status of the child should establish
constitutional protection. Thus, the line would be drawn at the age of majority.
393. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). But see Trujillo v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985) (recognizing constitu-
tionally protected interest of sister in her brother who died while incarcerated in
county jail).




The court noted that constitutional protection of family ties other than
the parent-child relationship would preclude any "principled way
of limiting" the range of family relationships protected by the
Constitution. 39
5
2. Functionally Defining the Family: Impact on Exclusion and Deportation
The functional test, though perhaps most consistent with the reasons for
affording constitutional protection to family relationships, presents sev-
eral difficulties in the immigration context. Judging the quality of the
parent-child relationship is necessarily so subjective that even-handed
administration of the immigration laws would be a problem.39 6 As a
result, such a test could add significant administrative burdens to the
INS workload.
In exclusion cases, the immigration laws themselves may bar devel-
opment of the functional parent-child bond. In exclusion situations,
therefore, if a parent has not lost custody of his or her child, the biologi-
cal relationship should be preferred over a functional analysis in estab-
lishing constitutional protection. This approach will promote the
development of the emotional attachment that derives only from the
intimacy of living together as a family unit.3 9 7
When the issue concerns deportation of a family member, however,
the constitutional significance of the relationship may depend upon
whether or not close family ties exist. The current immigration law
takes such an approach by requiring a showing of "extreme hardship" to
family members who would be left behind before granting relief from a
deportation order.39 8 In determining whether "extreme hardship"
exists for purposes of suspending deportation, some recent decisions
have used a functional approach.3 99 These decisions suggest that kin-
ship is not necessary so long as a functional family relationship exists.
395. Id. at 1247.
396. Such a problem has been recognized in regard to the marital relationship. See
Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975), cautioning that
any attempt to regulate... [married persons'] life styles, such as prescribing
the amount of time they must spend together, or designating the manner in
which either partner elects to spend his or her time, in the guise of specifying
the requirements of a bona fide marriage would raise serious constitutional
questions.
Id. at 1201.
397. Under current law, once a petition for immediate relative status is filed, it
must be approved provided the Attorney General determines "that the facts stated in
the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is an
immediate relative specified in section 201(b)." 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b)(1982).
398. Id. § 1254(a). The exclusion context lacks the same opportunities for devel-
oping the parent-child relationship. In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977), how-
ever, the Court suggested that the natural father's failure to legitimize his child could
indicate an absence of close family ties. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 grants immigration benefits to father-natural child relationships when there has
been "a bona fide parent-child relationship." See supra text accompanying notes 110-
12.
399. See supra notes 388-92 and accompanying text.
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The First Circuit, for example, recently concluded that a servant who
had lived with a family and who "had been treated as and considered
herself to be a member of the family for the past thirty years" clearly
established a family relationship. 40 0 A recent Supreme Court ruling,
however, refused to substitute a functional approach for legislative
intent.40 1
East Cleveland, and the functional decisions, indicate that the family
relationships meriting constitutional protection include, in addition to
the nuclear family, those in which grandparents or others fulfill an
essential role in caring for and raising children. Sibling relationships,
however, do not merit constitutional protection. Siblings are protected
only by the parent-child bond. Future rulings will no doubt depend on
specific fact situations. Certainly, the traditional family has served as a
haven for close relatives who, because of old age, are unable to live inde-
pendently. Ideally, persons who function as defacto parents in these situ-
ations should be afforded the same constitutional protections as natural
parents.
The above profile of family relationships to which at least some U.S.
decisions grant constitutional protection matches closely the definitions
of family formulated in France and the European Economic Community.
In France, the original decret governing family unification, enacted in
1976, allowed entry of spouses and children as a matter of right.40 2
Though collaterals and ascendants were excluded in principle, a 1976
circular allowed entry of (1) ascendants who were elderly and who had
no other children to care for them in their country of origin, (2) a third
person to care for the children in the absence or sickness of the mother,
and (3) orphaned collateral relatives who would be cared for in the
household.40 3 Similarly, European Economic Community regulations
protect not only the spouse and dependent children, but also ascendants
and collaterals who are under the care of the family. 40 4
3. Relationships Excluded from the Definition of Family
The Court's functional approach to defining "family" is limited.
Although it protects family relationships which "by their nature involve
deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individ-
uals with whom one shares .. .a community of thoughts, experiences,
400. Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS, 703 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Zamora Gar-
cia v. INS, 737 F.2d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Board of Immigration
Appeals must consider an alien's hardship resulting from separation from unrelated
family with whom the alien had lived as housekeeper for 14 years); Contreras Buenfil
v. INS, 712 F.2d 401,403-04 (9th Cir. 1983) (advocating consideration ofhardship to
alien on separation from his stepson); Vergel v. INS, 536 F.2d 755, 757 (8th Cir.
1976) (noting possible hardship if nurse, upon whom a mentally retarded child was
totally dependent, was deported).
401. INS v. Hector, 107 S. Ct. 379 (1986) (refusing to consider hardship in an
aunt-niece relationship in § 244 suspension of deportation).
402. See supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
403. Circular No. 7-76 ofJuly 9, 1976; see GISTI, supra note 199, at 105.
404. Council Reg. No. 1612/68, Oct. 15, 1968, art. 10, 1968 O.J. No. L257, at 5.
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and beliefs [and] distinctively personal aspects of one's life," 40 5 the pro-
tected relationships must also be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition." 4 06 Thus, neither same-sex relationships, nor polyga-
mous marriages (even if child-rearing is involved) lie within constitu-
tional protections. Neither do unmarried heterosexual couples forming
one household, even though, in functional terms, some unmarried
couples meet the "deep attachment and commitment" standard as well
as or better than married couples.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,40 7
upholding Georgia's criminal sodomy statute, confirms that the immi-
gration law's exclusion of homosexuals from entry408 does not violate
their rights to family unification.4 09 In reviewing its "family" cases, the
Hardwick Court could see "no connection between family, marriage, and
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other."'4 10
Thus, Hardwick explicitly places homosexual relationships outside the
zone of constitutional protection 4 1 1 afforded to families.
405. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). The Court identified
protection of the family as the common thread in the line of decisions from Meyer and
Pierce through Griswold and Moore. Id. at 619.
406. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
407. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
408. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982) (excluding aliens with a "psychopathic per-
sonality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect" from admission into the United
States). The predecessor of this section, which excluded aliens afflicted with psycho-
pathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect, was interpreted to include homosex-
uals in Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
409. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
410. Id. This statement, however, does not resolve the problem of a person
excluded because of homosexuality who is entering to reunify a protected family rela-
tionship, such as a minor homosexual entering to join his or her parents.
411. These relationships were also explicitly excluded by Adams v. Howerton, 673
F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). In Howerton, a male U.S. citi-
zen and a male alien were married by a minister and brought suit after they were
denied their petition to reclassify the alien as a U.S. citizen. The court held that a
statute denying spouses of homosexual marriages the benefits provided other
spouses under the immigration law was constitutional:
Congress has determined that preferential status is not warranted for the
spouses of homosexual marriages. Perhaps that is because homosexual mar-
riages never produce offspring, because they are not recognized in most, if in
any, of the states, or because they violate traditional and often prevailing
societal mores. In any event, having found that Congress rationally intended
to deny preferential status to the spouses of such marriages, we need not
further "probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision."
Id. at 1042-43 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977). But see Lesbian/Gay
Freedom Day Committee, Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub
nom., Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
In Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Committee, the district court ruled that the Immigration
and Naturalization Service must obtain a Public Health Service medical certificate
before excluding self-declared homosexuals from the United States on the ground of
affliction with a psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or mental defect. The
district court also granted a preliminary injunction forbidding the INS from interfer-
ing with the entry of aliens solely on the ground that the aliens were, or were
believed to be, homosexual. In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court
held that the INS' policy of per se exclusion of homosexual aliens violated the first
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Courts have also refused to extend the protection afforded family
relationships to polygamous marriages even though they meet the asso-
ciational requirements and fulfill child-rearing functions.412 More
recently, the Tenth Circuit rejected the challenges of a police officer ter-
minated for polygamy. 41 3 In doing so, the court identified monoga-
mous marriage as a fundamental value "inextricably woven into the
fabric of our society.., the bedrock upon which our culture is built" 4 14
giving the state a compelling interest in enforcing the ban on plural mar-
riages.4 15 The Supreme Court has not decided a case involving unmar-
ried couples. If it adopted the Tenth Circuit's reasoning on polygamy,
however, this would almost certainly preclude protecting unmarried
couples separated by immigration law,4 16 despite the Court's recogni-
tion that such individuals have constitutional privacy rights. 4 17
The reasons for excluding homosexual relationships and polyga-
mous marriage from constitutional protection reflect a culture-bound
approach. In contrast, the French courts do not automatically apply the
French understanding of "family." French courts have considered the
amendment rights of American homosexuals to communicate and associate with
homosexual aliens.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed that part of the district court's decision requiring the
INS to obtain medical certification of psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or
mental defect before excluding a self-declared homosexual. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, vacated that part of the judgment declaring the per se exclusion of homosexual
aliens as contrary to congressional intent. Because the Public Health Service will not
issue a medical certificate on the basis of homosexuality per se, and because the INS
cannot exclude a homosexual alien without such a certificate, "it is completely specu-
lative that any aliens will be excluded in the future on the basis of their homosexual-
ity per se." Hill, 714 F.2d at 1481.
Despite the Ninth Circuit's refusal to reach the issue, the above language suggests
that any future exclusion of homosexuals per se will not be upheld.
412. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), upholding a Mormon's
criminal conviction for polygamy, despite the defendant's religious beliefs. The
Court found it "impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature
of social life [monogamy]." Id. at 165.
413. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 145
(1985).
414. Id. at 1070.
415. Id.
416. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy--Bal-
ancing the Individual and Social Interest, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983), arguing that the
Constitution's protection of family relationships does not extend to unmarried
couples because the traditional importance of family to society depends upon long
term commitment and a "justifiable expectation . . .that the relationship will con-
tinue indefinitely." Id. at 486 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 860 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Because it
is the willingness to marry which permits "important legal and personal assumptions
about one's intentions" and expresses a meaningful commitment toward perma-
nence, Hafen argues that the extension of special constitutional protections to infor-
mal families would undermine the family's ability to perform the very functions for
which it is afforded special constitutional protections in the first place. Id.
417. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), (extending the marital
right to privacy to individuals, married or not); see also Developments, The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1289 et. seq. (1980).
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resident alien's situation, the customs and law of his home country, and
his religious beliefs in protecting the right to family unification. In two
recent decisions,41 8 for example, the Conseil d'Etat determined that
where polygamous marriage is legally valid in the resident citizen's
country of origin, the second spouse was entitled to remain in France for
purposes of family unification. In regard to unmarried couples, French
law protects them in some instances. The government will allow family
unification for unmarried couples who meet two conditions, one of them
being that legal obstacles prevent formal marriage.4 19 It would be diffi-
cult to argue, however, that French or U.S. law is responsible for sepa-
rating a "family" when the only barrier is the formality of the marriage
ceremony.
4. The Problem of Sham Marriages
Because marriage produces significant immigration benefits for individ-
uals,42 0 a strong incentive exists to commit fraud. Recognizing a right to
family unification, therefore, requires effective controls against marriage
fraud.
When a spousal visa petition is filed, the Attorney General, through
the INS, examines the marriage certificate's validity42 ' and the legiti-
macy of the marriage relationship, i.e., that it was not entered into solely
for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.4 2 2 Investigations
involving personal interviews of the resident petitioner and the alien
spouse are conducted on a case-by-case basis to detect sham relation-
ships.4 23 These interviews sometimes involve questioning partners sep-
arately to assess the consistency of their answers concerning the
relationship. 4 24 If the Service determines that a couple married for
fraudulent purposes, it may deny the alien spouse admission as an
418. Ministre de l'Interieur c. Montcho, Conseil d'Etat, 1980 Lebon 315; Ministre
de l'Interieur c. Bennacer, Conseil d'Etat, 1980 Lebon 226. In the Montcho decision,
a woman who had lived for several years with her husband in France, along with their
children and the husband's other wife, sought to regularize her status. After the local
prefet denied her request and ordered her to leave the territory on ordre public
grounds, she obtained a stay order from the Tribunal Administratif. The Ministre de
l'Interieur appealed to the Conseil d'Etat, which found both sufficient prejudice to
the interested resident family and a sufficiently strong argument that the polygamous
relationship did not harm ordre public to justify staying execution of the prefet's order.
The Conseil d'Etat recognized that the right to a normal family life requires consider-
ation of the resident foreigner's personal situation, customs, law, and religious
beliefs rather than an automatic application of the French understanding of 'family'.
419. Under the Circular No. 7-76 ofJuly 9, 1976, France allowed family unification
of unmarried couples under two conditions: (1) a stable household which could be
indicated by the sharing of responsibility in raising their common children; and (2)
legal obstacles which prevent the formal marriage of the couple. See G.I.S.T.I., supra
note 199, at 105.
420. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
421. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a) (West Supp. 1987).
422. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982).
423. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1987); see also Note, The Constitution-
ality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1236, 1241 (1986).
424. See Note, supra note 423, at 1242.
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immediate relative. 4 25 Disincentives to immigration fraud include crimi-
nal penalties4 26 as well as deportation. 4 2 7 Additionally, the law
presumes fraud if a marriage occurring within two years before the
immigrant spouse's entry is judicially terminated within two years after
entry.42
8
Despite these safeguards against sham marriages, the INS recently
estimated that nearly 30% of spousal petitions may involve fraud.4 29
When marriage fraud began to attract media attention in 1985,430 Con-
gress reacted by proposing tighter controls. 4 3 1 On November 10, 1986,
the President signed into law the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments.43 2 The Amendments are patterned after the approach used by
France and other European nations.4 3 3 Instead of being granted imme-
diate permanent resident alien status, entering spouses will now obtain a
two-year conditional resident status dependent upon the continuation of
the marital relationship. 434 This provides the immigration authorities
the opportunity to better detect and control sham marriages.43 5
425. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982).
426. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1546 (1982).
427. 8 U.S.C.A. § 182(a)(19) (West Supp. 1987).
428. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1982).
429. Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements to Obtain Permanent Resident and
Immigration Status, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 26, 1985).
Estimates of the numbers of sham marriages vary greatly. The Commissioner of
the INS has suggested that 30% of marriage visas may be fraudulent. Id. at 35 (state-
ment of Alan C. Nelson). Another witness suggested that the number is below 5%o
and that the incidence of sham marriages has not increased significantly over the last
decade. Id. at 88 (statement of Jules E. Coven, President, American Immigration
Lawyers Association).
430. Nightline: Marriage Fraud (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 26, 1985); 60 Min-
utes: Do You Take This Alien? (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 22, 1985); N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1985, at A15, col. 1 (breakup of sham marriage ring in Miami).
431. See, e.g., S. 2270, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986); H. REP. No. 4823, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H. REP. No. 907, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
432. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3537.
433. See IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE FRAUD: CONTROLS IN MOST COUNTRIES SURVEYED
STRONGER THAN IN U.S., S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986).
434. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186(a) (West Supp. 1987), provides that "an alien spouse...
and an alien son or daughter ... shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to have obtained such
status on a conditional basis .. "
435. Under the current law, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1982), the Attorney General is
authorized to deport an alien who obtains an immigrant visa
on the basis of a marriage entered into less than two years prior to ... entry
... and which, within two years subsequent to... entry.., shall be judicially
annulled or terminated, unless such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of
the Attorney General that such marriage was not contracted for the purposes
of evading any provisions of the immigration laws.
Id. The addition of § 1186a places the burden upon each alien to demonstrate that
the marriage continues for two years. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(c)(2)(B) (West Supp.
1987). Under the prior law the INS would have had to discover that the marriage had
terminated and then initiate deportation proceedings.
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In order for an alien to then obtain permanent resident status, the
couple must file a petition during the ninety days prior to the end of the
alien's conditional resident period and prove: (1) that the marriage was
entered into in accordance with the laws of the place where the marriage
took place, (2) that it has not been judicially annulled or terminated, (3)
that no fee was given for filing a visa, and (4) that the couple has main-
tained a bona fide marital relationship. 43 6 If the couple demonstrates
compliance with these requirements, the conditional resident alien's sta-
tus is changed to permanent resident status, and the alien is credited
with two years toward the time necessary for naturalization. 4 3
7
The immigration laws recognize that innocent parties may suffer
extreme hardship in situations where the marriage ends prior to two
years and deportation results. The Attorney General, therefore, may
waive the two-year requirement and grant permanent-resident status
when necessary. 43 8
C. Court Deference to the Political Branches
in the Immigration Area
The Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the federal govern-
ment's political branches over immigration, finding it implicit in the sov-
ereign powers of government, as well as implicit in the commerce and
naturalization clauses of the Constitution. 43 9 In its first decisions recog-
nizing governmental authority to exclude aliens, the Court equated con-
trol of immigration with the necessity of national security and
independence from foreign encroachment. 4 40 The Court's recognition
of governmental authority, however, did not preclude judicial review of
436. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
437. Id. § 1186a(c)(3)(B).
438. Id. § 1 186a(c)(4) (West Supp. 1987). "The Attorney General... may remove
the conditional basis of the permanent resident status for an alien who fails to meet
the requirements of [this section] if the alien demonstrates that... extreme hardship
would result if such alien is deported." Id.
439. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, authorizes the Congress to establish a uniform
rule of naturalization. Another constitutional source of the federal government's
power to regulate aliens is Congress' power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889), stating:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sover-
eign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any
time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country
require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.
Id. at 609.
The source and nature of the power have been confirmed in recent decisions. See
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("Our cases 'have long recognized the power
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Gov-
ernment's political departments largely immune from judicial control' ") (quoting
Shaughnessy v. United States cc rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); see also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), where the Court referred to the "plenary authority of
Congress over aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4." Id. at 940.
440. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
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immigration legislation. The Court specifically noted that all sovereign
authority, including that over immigration, is restricted in its exercise
"by the Constitution itself and [by] considerations of public policy and
justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized
nations." 4 4 1 The Court has also recognized that maxims of interna-
tional law limit governmental control of immigration.4 42
In decisions reviewing immigration laws, the Court's analysis typi-
cally begins with the observation that "over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete. '44 3 The Court has relied
on two separate grounds for refusing to review certain immigration leg-
islation. It has refused to extend constitutional protections to those
aliens who have not "entered" the United States, and has applied a
right/privilege distinction.4 44
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this
country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and
security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no
actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects.
Id.
Four years later, the Court used similar reasoning in recognizing governmental
authority to deport foreigners based on race. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893), the Court stated: "The right of a nation to expel or deport foreign-
ers, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps toward becoming citizens of
the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the
right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country." Id. at 707.
441. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604. Though at one point in the opinion the
Court referred to legislative determinations in the immigration area as "conclusive
on the judiciary," it was likely speaking of the "necessity" of the law, while reserving
for judicial scrutiny its constitutionality. Id. at 606.
442. See generally Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens under International Law, 77
AM.J. INT'L L. 804, 828 (1983) (noting that the Court in Chae Chan Ping and in Fong
Yue Ting "qualified the excludability of aliens by citing international legal authority to
the effect that a state can exclude aliens only when they present a danger to the peace and
security of the country.") (emphasis in original). The Fong Yue Ting Court stated, quoting
Vattel's Law of Nations:
Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the country,
when he cannot enter without putting the nation in evident danger, or doing
it a manifest injury. What it owes to itself, the care of its own safety, gives it
this right; and in virtue of its natural liberty, it belongs to the nation to judge
whether its circumstances will or will not justify the admission of the for-
eigner.
149 U.S. at 707.
443. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 766 (1972) (citing Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320,
339 (1909)).
444. These rationale were first identified in Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to
Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 975-83 (1982). They are further discussed in
Developments, Immigration Policy and the Rights ofAliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1314-
22 (1983). An extreme example of this refusal to review occurred in Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In that case, an alien who had
resided in the United States for 25 years was, after a trip abroad, imprisoned by
immigration authorities for two years on Ellis Island, without a hearing and for undis-
closed reasons. The Court rejected Mezei's claims that his detention was unlawful,




The Court has employed the right/privilege analysis since Justice
Holmes, while still sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, "drew a sharp distinction between constitutionally protected
rights on the one hand, and privileges supplied by the government with-
out obligation on the other." 4 45 In its first and most enduring applica-
tion of the right/privilege analysis to immigration matters, the Court in
United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy4 4 6 stated:
[A]n alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any
claim of right. Admission of aliens to the United States is a privilege
granted by the sovereign United States Government. Such privilege is
granted to an alien only upon such terms as the United States shall
prescribe.4 47
Indeed, since Knauff, the Court has primarily applied the right/privilege
distinction to the immigration area. 448 The Court has relied on the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions to soften the right/privilege distinc-
tion's narrowness. 449 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does
not reject Holmes' right/privilege distinction; rather, "[i]t mute[d] its
force . . . by holding that the government may not do indirectly that
which it is constitutionally prohibited from doing directly. If a condition
placed on the receipt of government largess prohibits or inhibits the
exercise of a constitutional right, it may be invalidated."' 450 Through
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and other limiting doctrines,
the Court has virtually ceased to apply the right/privilege distinction in
non-immigration cases; the Court should not cling to this doctrine in the
immigration area alone.45
1
The Court's deference extends even to immigration laws affecting
constitutional rights. The political nature of immigration legislation
provides the most convincing explanation for judicial deference in this
area. The Court has stated:
[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with the
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations,
It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards
of fairness encompassed in due process of law. But an alien on the threshold
of initial entry stands on a different footing: "Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned."
Id. at 212 (citations omitted).
445. Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957,
975 (1982).
446. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). For an analysis of the Court's application of the
right/privilege distinction to other matters, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1440-42 (1968).
447. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
448. Note, supra note 445, at 976.
449. Id.
450. Id at 976-77 (footnotes omitted).
451. Id. at 977. For a discussion of the other limiting doctrines, see Note, supra
note 445, at 977.
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the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.
Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of gov-
ernment as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.4 5 2
Even this justification for extreme deference, however, is flawed. The
Court has invalidated the very kinds of legislation it asserts are exclu-
sively entrusted to the political branches, including legislation regarding
denial of passports, the war power, and other matters involving foreign
relations or national security.45 3 For example, in United States v.
Robel,45 4 the Court invalidated a statute making it a criminal offense for
employees in defense facilities to be members of the Communist Party.
The Court stated: "When Congress' exercise of one of its enumerated
powers clashes with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of
Rights, it is our 'delicate and difficult task' to determine whether the
resulting restriction on freedom can be tolerated." 4 55 Thus, the Court
has refused to defer blindly to the executive and legislative branches,
especially when "individual freedoms of Americans are at stake."'4 56
When a law's focus shifts to immigration, however, the Court's level
of scrutiny becomes minimal. A good example of this minimal scrutiny
is Fiallo v. Bell,4 5 7 where the Court considered a challenge to an immi-
gration law provision exempting illegitimate alien children from the
numerical limitations if they were coming to join their citizen-mothers,
but not if they were joining their citizen-fathers. The plaintiffs claimed,
among other things, that the statute violated equal protection by imper-
missibly discriminating on the grounds of legitimacy and gender, and
that it interfered with the right to raise one's natural children. 458 The
452. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). The case upheld
deportation of a resident alien for membership in the Communist Party, even though
he had terminated his membership before the statute making such membership
deportable had been enacted. The alien unsuccessfully claimed such deportation was
a deprivation of liberty without due process of law under the fifth amendment and
violated the prohibition of ex post facto laws in art. I, § 9 of the U.S. Constitution.
453. For a summary of several of these cases, see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 782-83 n.5 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
454. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
455. Id. at 264.
456. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
457. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
458. Id. at 791. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the statutory provisions:
(i) denied them equal protection by discrimination against natural fathers
and their illegitimate children "on the basis of the father's marital status, the
illegitimacy of the child and the sex of the parent without either compelling
or rational justification";
(ii) denied them due process of law to the extent that there was established
"an unwarranted conclusive presumption of the absence of strong psycholog-
ical and economic ties between natural fathers and their children born out of
wedlock and not legitimated"; and
(iii) "seriously burden[ed] and infringe[d] upon the rights of natural fathers
and their children, born out of wedlock and not legitimated, to mutual associ-
ation, to privacy, to establish a home, to raise natural children and to be
raised by the natural father."
Id. Responding to the dissent's argument that fundamental rights of citizens were at
stake, the Court noted:
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Court rejected both these claims. After acknowledging "limited judicial
responsibility.., even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate
the admission and exclusion of aliens,"' 459 the Court stated that deci-
sions regarding preferential status were "solely for the responsibility of
the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control."
460
Recent lower federal court decisions, however, may indicate a ten-
dency toward more active review of immigration law. One decision
invalidated an exclusion provision barring homosexual aliens.46' Rely-
ing on first amendment grounds of right to association, the court noted
that the government had been unable to assert a "facially legitimate and
bona fide reason" for the exclusion. 462 Another recent federal court
decision relied on principles of international law in a case involving the
rights of an alien seeking freedom from arbitrary detention.
463
The assumption is facially plausible in that the families of putative immi-
grants certainly have an interest in their admission. But the fallacy of the
assumption is rooted deeply in fundamental principles of sovereignty.
We are dealing here with an exercise of the Nation's sovereign power to
admit or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived national interests.
Although few, if any, countries have been as generous as the United States in
extending the privilege to immigrate, or in providing sanctuary to the
oppressed, limits and classifications as to who shall be admitted are tradi-
tional and necessary elements of legislation in this area.... In the inevitable
process of 'line drawing,' Congress has determined that certain classes of
aliens are more likely than others to satisfy national objectives without undue
cost, and it has granted preferential status only to those classes.
Id. at 795 n.6.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted that this case "directly involves the rights of
citizens .... [that] [t]he essential fact here is that Congress did choose to extend such
privileges to American citizens but then denied them to a small class of citizens." Id.
at 806. The statute therefore, classified not only on the basis of gender and legiti-
macy, but also impinged upon the "fundamental freedom of personal choice in mat-
ters of marriage and family life" recognized in a long line of Supreme Court
decisions. Id at 810.
459. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5.
460. Id. at 799 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Court noted that either a presumptive absence of
close family ties, or concerns with the difficulty of proving paternity, might justify the
less-favorable treatment of the father-illegitimate child relationship. Id.
461. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal.
1982), modified, Hill v. INS., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Georgia statute's
criminalization of consensual homosexual sodomy).
462. Lesbian/Gay Comm., 541 F. Supp. at 586.
463. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d
1382 (10th Cir. 1981). In response to a habeas corpus petition, filed by a Cuban
refugee who was being held indefinitely in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth,
the court relied on established principles of international law in granting the writ and
ordering immediate release. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, noting:
[I]n upholding the plenary power of Congress over exclusion and deporta-
tion of aliens, the Supreme Court has sought support in international law
principles .... (citation omitted) It seems proper then to consider interna-
tional law principles for notions of fairness as to propriety of holding aliens
in detention. No principle of international law is more fundamental than the
concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment. See
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arts. 3 and 9, U.N. Doc. A/801
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The recent Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe4 64 may also have
implications for future review of immigration legislation affecting family
integrity. In Plyler, the Court invalidated state legislation denying a free
public education to undocumented alien schoolchildren. The Court
reasoned that many of the children would remain in the United States
indefinitely; some would eventually become citizens. 4 65 In light of the
problems of "unemployment, welfare, and crime" created by an illiter-
ate subclass, the Court found that the savings achieved by denying the
children an education were insubstantial when weighed against the costs
to the children, the state, and the nation. 46 6 The Court's attention to
the legislation's impact on society may prove to be a significant factor in
future review of immigration law affecting the family.
D. Family Unification Claims in the Context of Immigration Law:
The Tilt Towards Judicial Deference
As noted at the beginning of this Part, two judicial doctrines conflict
when family unification claims are made in the immigration context.
One is the substantive due process consideration given the family, focus-
ing on the nature of the family interest, and the extent to which a law
affects that liberty interest. The other doctrine is that of extreme defer-
ence to the other branches in the immigration area. So far, the Court
has refused to balance these considerations; judicial deference, there-
fore, trumps the constitutional interests at stake.
Constitutional claims to family unity in the immigration context
were not squarely presented to the federal courts until the 1950s. In
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,4 67 the Court held that immigra-
tion authorities could exclude, without a hearing, the spouse of a U.S.
citizen. The Court stated, "whatever the rule may be concerning depor-
tation of persons who have gained entry into the United States, it is not
within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to
review the determination of the political branch of the Government to
exclude a given alien." 4 6 8 This reasoning, ignoring the rights of the
alien's U.S.-citizen spouse, has been described as "patently preposter-
ous" by one commentator.4 6 9
(1948); The American Convention on Human Rights, Part I, ch. II, Art. 7, 77
Dept. of State Bull. 28 (July 4, 1977).
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d at 1388. But seeJean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964 n.5 (1 th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (rejecting the notion that current international
practice regards the detention of uninvited aliens seeking admission as a violation of
customary international law).
464. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
465. Id. at 230.
466. Id.
467. 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
468. Id. at 543.
469. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1392 (1953).
Vol. 21
1988 Family Unification 65
Two years later, in 1952, the Court considered the case of a perma-
nent resident alien whose wife and two children were U.S. citizens and
who, after living in the country for over thirty years, was ordered
deported on grounds that he had been a member of the Communist
Party twenty-five years previously.4 7 0 The Court rejected first and fifth
amendment challenges to the constitutionality of the Alien Registration
Act of 1940.471 It reasoned instead that Congress has essentially unlim-
ited discretion in deportation questions involving national security.
[m1he due process clause does not shield the citizen from conscription
and the consequent calamity of being separated from family, friends,
home and business while he is transported to foreign lands to stem the
tide of Communism. If Communist aggression creates such hardships for
loyal citizens, it is hard to find justification for holding that the Constitu-
tion requires that its hardships must be spared the Communist alien.4
72
Notably, the Court in this case again focused on the alien's lack of rights
rather than on the rights of the citizen family members affected by the
separation.
In 1958, the D.C. Circuit in Swartz v. Rogers4 73 addressed for the
first time a claim that the fifth amendment due process clause provides
protection from deportation that would destroy a marriage relationship.
Rejecting that argument, the court reasoned that, while deportation
might burden a marriage, it "would not in any way destroy the legal
union which the marriage created." 4 74 For the court, it was sufficient
that the wife could accompany her deported husband.
In Noel v. Chapman,4 75 the Second Circuit rejected an equal protec-
tion challenge to a distinction in the preference system's treatment of
aliens married to citizens and aliens married to permanent resident
aliens.4 76 The court rejected a family-integrity theory and held that resi-
dent aliens have no constitutional right for their alien spouses to enter
the United States while awaiting visas. 47 7 The Court distinguished
actions by the INS in an area in which the federal government has broad
powers from other family protection cases involving state action. 4 78
Additionally, the court found that the greater liberality accorded the
spouses of citizens was a matter of the INS's plenary discretion.4 79 The
statute at hand also had a rational and substantial relationship to its pur-
470. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
471. Id. at 584-92.
472. Id. at 591.
473. 254 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
474. Id. at 339; see also Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). In the context of the requirement that J-1 foreign
exchange visitors return to their country of origin, the Silverman Court followed the
reasoning in Swartz v. Rogers and rejected constitutional claims regarding the deporta-
tion of the alien wife of a U.S. citizen.
475. 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975).
476. Id. at 1029.
477. Id. at 1027.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 1029.
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pose of protecting the U.S. economy by discouraging the arrival of
aliens who were coming "in large numbers and remaining illegally in the
expectation of a marriage which would assure their continuing residence
here."4 80
These decisions, along with the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in
Fiallo v. Bell,4 8 l are the major cases analyzing the family unity issue. The
Court has rejected these family unification claims with little analysis of
the two substantive due process factors at issue: the nature of the liberty
interest, and the extent to which a regulation affects the family's interest
in unity. Although a long line of non-immigration cases has established
the importance of the liberty interest, the Court has not weighed this
interest, or examined whether the offending regulation is narrowly tai-
lored to promote a significant government interest without impinging
more than necessary on the right to family unity. The second factor, the
extent to which a regulation affects the family's interest in unity, has also
received glib attention. It is true that the affected family members can
relocate to another country to avoid disruption. It appears inconsistent,
however, for the Supreme Court to say in East Cleveland that the city is
asking too much if the family must move to another suburb to preserve
its unity, but to imply that if the family is an immigrant family, it can
move to another country.
VI. The Right to Family Unification Under the French
Constitution of 1958
Understanding French constitutional review, and comparing it to the
U.S. system, requires understanding the separation of the French civil
and administrative court systems, and the traditionally more restrained
role of the French judiciary. The reader must also keep in mind that the
reasoning underlying French court decisions is less accessible because
the concise nature of their decisions avoids the more elaborate analysis
present in opinions by U.S. courts.
France has had sixteen constitutions; of the four since 1940, the
current Constitution has been in effect only since 1958.482 Judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislation implicating individual rights
has occurred only within the last fifteen years.4 83 The contours ofjudi-
cial review, therefore, are only beginning to take shape. Nevertheless,
judicial review has, in the last decade, produced three major immigra-
tion decisions.4 84 The Conseil Constitutionnel has invalidated legisla-
tive provisions authorizing extended detention of aliens awaiting
expulsion, 4 85 and has acknowledged a right to family unification in the
480. Id.
481. 430 U.S. 787 (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 457-60.
482. M. PRELOT, INSTITUTIONS POLITIOUES ET DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 295-96
(9th ed. 1984).
483. See infra note 492 and accompanying text.
484. See infra notes 553-73 and accompanying text.
485. See infra notes 566-69 and accompanying text.
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Constitution. 48 6 The Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court,
has also recognized a constitutional right to family unification in an
opinion invalidating an administrative decret. 48 7 These decisions, and
others involving constitutionally protected rights,4 8 8 suggest that,
despite its more hesitant approach to judicial review in general, the
French judiciary is more willing than the U.S. judiciary to recognize and
protect a right to family unification in the context of immigration.
This part first examines the evolution and treatment of the right to
family unification under French case law. The following sections discuss
the powers of the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Conseil d'Etat, the
provisions used by the courts to establish a right to family unification,
the influence of international law on the development of the right, and
the major decisions recognizing the right to family unity.
A. The Scope of Judicial Power to Annul Legislation and
Administrative Acts
1. The Conseil Constitutional
The Conseil Constitutionnel is a specialized court,48 9 with power to
review legislation to determine: 1) whether the legislature has
486. See infra note 570 and accompanying text.
487. Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigres et Autres,
Conseil d'Etat, 1978 Lebon 493.
488. See infra notes 574-83 and accompanying text.
489. The establishment of the Conseil Constitutionnel under the 1958 Constitu-
tion broke a long tradition of non-review of parliamentary acts. See generally F.
LUCHAIRE, LE CONSEIL CONSTrrlTONNEL 1-32 (1980). Prior to 1958, the French Par-
liament had exclusive power to determine the constitutionality of legislation. Under
the 1946 Constitution, the "Comite Constitutionnel," a predecessor of the Conseil
Constitutionnel, could review proposed legislation only to ensure the Parliament did
not usurp the powers of other state organs. It could not review legislation implicat-
ing individual rights and liberties. Id. at 12-14. Whether the Conseil Constitutionnel
is a "true court" or a political institution has been a source of great controversy. See
generally Davis, The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and the U.S.
Supreme Court, 34 AM.J. COMP. L. 45 (1986). Davis discusses several reasons why the
Conseil may be considered other than a "true court":
(1) its membership is political and unprotected by life tenure;
(2) its subject matter is . . . limited to proposed rather than existing
legislation;
(3) the matters decided are not presented in an adversary setting and no
parties or concrete factual situations are involved;
(4) its procedures are secret and non-public;
(5) its jurisdiction is ambiguous; and
(6) its textual constitutional source (or authority) arises from a part of the
constitution different from the part dealing with the judiciary.
Id. at 45-46, 57-65.
Davis notes, however, that the controversy may be essentially academic: "The con-
cept of a court and a legal constraint as opposed to, and fundamentally distinct from,
power in the form of executive discretion or legislative politics is philosophically and
epistemologically suspect." Id. at 89. But see F. LUcHAIRE, supra, at 33, 34, 41-56 (con-
cluding that the Conseil performs a judicial function).
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encroached upon the domain of the administration;490 and 2) whether
the legislature has impermissibly infringed upon an individual's consti-
tutional rights.4 9 1 The Conseil Constitutionnel, however, did not take
an active role in reviewing legislation for conformity with individual
rights until 1971.492
The Conseil Constitutionnel is the only forum for constitutional
review of legislation.4 93 Its jurisdiction to render decisions does not
depend upon the existence of an actual controversy.4 94 In fact, only
certain governmental officials and legislative groups may request review.
These are-the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Presi-
dent of the Senate, and the President of the National Assembly4 9 5 -and,
in addition, either a group of 60 senators or 60 deputies of the National
Assembly.4 9 6 The parliamentary opposition's power to challenge the
constitutionality of legislation sponsored by the majority was created in
1974 by constitutional amendment.4 9 7 Since that amendment, the
number of requests to review legislation impinging on fundamental
rights has greatly increased.498
The Conseil Constitutionnel may hear a challenge only if brought in
the period after a law is voted and before its promulgation. 4 99 Once
promulgated, therefore, French legislation cannot be constitutionally
challenged.
2. The Conseil d'Etat
A separate court system determines the constitutionality of decrets or
490. Article 34 specifies those domains reserved for Parliament. Constitution of
Oct. 4, 1958, art 34, reprinted in H. DE VRIES, N. GALSTON & R. LOENING, FRENCH LAW:
CoNsTrrurTioN AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION, at 2-17 (1987) [hereinafter FRENCH LAW].
Article 37 provides that all other domains are of a regulatory character reserved to
the government. Id. at 2-19. Article 61 provides the procedure for invoking the
jurisdiction of the Conseil Constitutionnel. Id. at 2-24.
491. Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958, art. 61, id. at 2-24.
492. See Decision ofJuly 16, 1971, Con. const., 1972 D.S. Jur. 685 (1971), invali-
dating proposed legislation which would have subjected certain associations to the a
priori control ofjudicial authorities. The decision was a landmark in several respects.
First, it declared the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution to be positive law. It then
relied upon a reference in the 1958 Preamble to the Preamble of the 1946 Constitu-
tion, which in turn referred to "fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the
Republic." Finally, it identified a law of 1901, under the Third Republic, as the
source of the constitutionally protected right to liberty of association. See infra note
507.
493. Davis, supra note 489, at 52.
494. Id.
495. Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958, art. 61, reprinted in FRENCH LAW, supra note 490,
at 2-24.
496. Id. (added by Constitutional Law No. 74-904 of Oct. 29, 1974, J.O. Oct. 30,
1974).
497. F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 29-30.
498. Id.




other administrative actions. 500 The tribunaux administratifs, or trial
courts, render the initial decisions, which are then reviewed by the Con-
seil d'Etat, the highest administrative court.50 1 The administrative
courts decide cases arising from actual controversies.50 2 As do U.S.
courts when reviewing administrative action, the Conseil d'Etat consid-
ers only such issues as competency, abuse of discretion, improper moti-
vation, or violation of a higher law such as the Constitution. 50 3 In no
event may the administrative courts determine the constitutionality of a
legislative provision.50 4
B. Constitutional Authority for the Right to Family Unification
1. The Constitution of 1958
Although the 1958 Constitution primarily delimits the areas of compe-
tence of the branches of government, it does contain provisions protect-
ing individual liberty comparable to those in the U.S. Bill of Rights. 50 5
The Preamble has been the most fruitful constitutional source of the
right to family unification. The Preamble does not refer to any specific
rights, but rather affirms the rights contained in prior sources of law,
namely the Declaration of 1789 and the Preamble of the 1946 Constitu-
tion.50 6 In 1971, the Conseil Constitutionnel held that the 1958 Pream-
ble limited the power of the legislature.5 0 7  Perhaps the French
500. See generally G. VEDEL, supra note 171, at 375. The French principle of separa-
tion ofjudicial and administrative authorities resulted in the development of separate
civil and administrative court systems and an autonomous body of law in each. Id.
501. Id. at 664.
502. Id. at 656-57.
503. Id. at 654-63.
504. The Conseil d'Etat has authority to review administrative action for adher-
ence to the requirements of the Constitution and for conformity to general principles
of law. The extent of review, however, is complicated by the separate domains of
authority for the legislative and executive branches under articles 34 and 37 of the
Constitution. The Conseil d'Etat may not question the validity of acts of the legisla-
ture. Prior to the 1958 Constitution, if an administrative act merely carried out activ-
ity clearly authorized by the legislature, the Conseil d'Etat could not strike the
administrative act since doing so would implicate the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive provision. The same remains true after the 1958 Constitution in the areas
reserved to the legislature under article 37. Administrative actions which merely
implement legislation passed in the domain of article 34 are not subject to judicial
review by the Conseil d'Etat for constitutionality. Administrative regulations passed
in the domain of article 37, however, are subject to constitutional review by the Con-
seil d'Etat. Id. at 379-80.
505. Article 2, for example, assures "equality of all citizens before the law, without
regard to origin, race, or religion." Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958, art. 2 reprinted in
FRENCH LAw, supra note 490, at 2-9.
506. The Preamble to the Constitution of 1958 provides in part:
The French people hereby solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights
of Man and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declara-
tion of 1789, reaffirmed and completed by the Preamble of the Constitution
of 1946.
Id.
507. Decision ofJuly 16, 1971, Con. const., 1972 D.S.Jur. 685 (1971). The Con-
seil Constitutionnel stated in its decision:
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equivalent of Marbury v. Madison, the decision signalled a significant shift
in the balance of powers, with the Conseil Constitutionnel taking a
major role in assuring the protection of individual rights and liber-
ties. 50 8 Since 1971, the Conseil Constitutionnel has relied on provisions
of the 1789 Declaration of Rights and the 1946 Preamble, as incorpo-
rated by the 1958 Preamble, to invalidate several legislative
provisions.509
2. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, 5 10 like
the Bill of Rights, reflects an individualistic conception of rights derived
from the ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. 511 Emphasizing
the protection of the individual from governmental interference, its 17
articles identify four rights-liberty, property, security, and resistance to
oppression-as natural and inalienable. 512 The right of liberty is
defined broadly as consisting "in being able to do anything which does
not injure another."5 13 French commentators have written that the
right of liberty has a scope at least as broad as the corresponding liberty
protections of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 5 14 The French right to liberty protects individual privacy, free-
The liberty of association ranks among the fundamental principles recog-
nized by the laws of the Republic and solemnly reaffirmed by the Preamble of
the Constitution, and is at the core of the general provisions of the law ofJuly
1, 1901 concerning associations; under this principle associations may be
freely formed and be public under the sole requirement of a declaration;
thus, with the exception of measures which might be taken in regard to cer-
tain categories of associations, the formation of associations, even if they may
appear to be illegal or to have an illicit goal, may not be submitted for a
determination of validity to either administrative or judicial authorities.
Id.; see also L. FAvOREAU & L. PHILIP, LES GRANDES DECISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITU-
TIONNEL 224 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter L. FAvOREAU].
The Conseil Constitutionnel has also recognized that the Preamble of the 1958
Constitution is positive law. Decision ofJune 19, 1970, Con. const. (LEXIS, French
Public library, Conset file); see also L. FAvOREAU, supra, at 237.
508. L. FAvOREAU, supra note 507, at 237.
509. The Conseil invalidated proposed legislation which would have violated the
right to equal treatment under the law guaranteed by articles 1 and 6 of the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man of 1789. Decision of Dec. 27, 1973, Con. const., reprinted in
L. FAVOREAU, supra note 507, at 276. The Conseil has also invalidated proposed leg-
islation on the basis that it interfered with the right to strike guaranteed by the Pre-
amble of 1946. Decision ofJuly 25, 1979, Con. const., 1980 D.S.Jur. 201 (1979).
510. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 [hereinafter 1789
Declaration], reprinted in FRENCH LAw, supra note 490, at 2-3.
511. See generallyJ. IMBERT, LES DRorrS DE L'HOMME EN FRANCE 9-13, 20-21 (1985).
512. Article II provides: "The end of every political association is the preservation
of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property,
security and resistance to oppression." 1789 Declaration, art. II, reprinted in FRENCH
LAw, supra note 490, at 2-3.
513. Id. art IV. "[T]he exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits
other than those which assure to the other members of society the enjoyment of
these same rights." Id.
514. See F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 193-202. See generally C. COLLIARD,
LIBERTES PUBLI.UES 99-104 (6th ed. 1982).
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dom of movement, and the freedom to make personal choices in matters
of family life. 5 15
Numerous provisions of the Declaration of 1789 refer to equal
rights.5 16 These provisions, however, often distinguish between aliens
and citizens. For example, article 6 of the Declaration establishes equal-
ity for "citizens" in regard to admissibility to public places or public
employment. The decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel frequently
state that only persons similarly situated must be treated the same under
the law.5 17
3. The Preamble to the 1946 Constitution
While the Declaration of 1789 defines rights in terms of freedom from
governmental tyranny, the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution reflects a
more socialistic concern for ensuring social welfare.5 18 It begins by
reaffirming the Declaration of 1789:
On the morrow of the victory of the free peoples over the regimes that
attempted to enslave and degrade the human person, the French people
proclaim once more that every human being, without distinction of race,
religion or belief, possesses inalienable and sacred rights. They solemnly
reaffirm the rights and freedoms of man and of the citizen consecrated by
the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the fundamental principles recog-
nized by the laws of the Republic.
They further proclaim as most vital in our time the following polit-
ical, economic and social principles[.]519
The principles the Preamble proclaims as vital include the maintenance
of health and well-being, the provision of time for repose and leisure,
assurance of equal access to education and to opportunities for profes-
sional and cultural development, and protection of the right to work and
to strike.520 Paragraph 10 of the Preamble provides specifically for the
515. See C. COLLIARD,supra note 514, at 311,330, 385;J. IMBERTsupra note 511, at
39, 42-43, 92. It has been suggested, for example, that a law limiting the capacity of
foreigners to marry (Ordonnance of Nov. 2, 1945, No. 45-2658, art. 13, 1945 J.O.
7225), later repealed in 1981 (Law of Oct. 29, 1981, 1981 J.O. 2970), was an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of liberty. F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 195. The French
concept of personal liberty is probably broad enough to encompass the results
reached in the line of U.S. cases concerning integrity of the family from Meyer and
Pierce through Moore v. City of East Cleveland. See supra notes 331-71.
516. See, e.g., 1789 Declaration, art. I, reprinted in FRENCH LAw, supra note 490, at 2-
3 ("Men are born and remain free and equal in respect of their rights. Social distinc-
tions, therefore, may be founded only on common utility.") see also id. art. VI ("All the
citizens being equal in [the law's] sight are equally eligible to all honors, offices, and
public employments, according to their ability; and without distinction other than
those of their virtues and talents.").
517. See generally F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 202, 204.
518. J. IMBERT, supra note 511, at 28-30.
519. See Preamble of the Constitution of Oct. 27, 1946 [hereinafter 1946 Pream-
ble], reprinted in FRENCH LAw, supra note 490, at 2-6.
520. Paragraph 5 of the 1946 Preamble provides that everyone has the duty to
work and the right to obtain employment and that no one may be dismissed from
work because of his origins, opinions or beliefs. Paragraph 7 protects the right to
strike. Paragraph 11 states that the nation guarantees to all, particularly to the child
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benefit and dignity of the family: "The nation assures to the individual
and to the family the conditions necessary to their development. "5 2 1
Significantly, this provision, like many other provisions of the 1946 Pre-
amble, protects "individuals" rather than "citizens.' '522
Whether all of the social guarantees of the Preamble have constitu-
tional value is unclear.5 2 3 Thus far, the Conseil Constitutionnel has
referred to only a few of the Preamble's provisions. 52 4 These are the
right of health,5 25 the right to strike,52 6 and the right of workers to par-
ticipate in the management of the enterprises for which they work.5 27
The Conseil Constitutionnel has also implicitly recognized the constitu-
tional value of the Preamble's right to development of the family in the
context of immigration. 5 28 However, the Conseil Constitutionnel has
invalidated legislative provisions because they conflicted with a provi-
sion in the 1946 Preamble only in the case of the right to strike.5 2 9 Nev-
ertheless, the 1958 Constitution clearly invests the 1946 Preamble with
authority it generally lacked under the Fourth Republic (1946-1958). 53 0
4. A Comparison of the Mandates of the 1946 Preamble and the Declaration
of 1789
Although the 1958 Constitution affirms the provisions of both the 1946
Preamble and the Declaration of 1789, the two documents are not
totally reconcilable. The Declaration emphasizes individual freedom
from governmental interference while the Preamble emphasizes the
governmental provision of social benefits. One commentator summa-
rized the difference in this way:
On the one hand there is the goal of individual liberty, the intention to
exclude the state from the areas in which the individual exercises his initi-
ative; on the other hand there is the concern for the satisfaction of social
and the mother, and aged workers, the protection of health, economic security,
repose and leisure. Paragraph 13 guarantees the equal access of the child and the
adult to education, professional training and cultural formation, and states that the
organization of free and secular public instruction is a duty of the state. Id.
521. Id.
522. See F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 177-78.
523. See Flauss, Les Droits Sociaux dans la jurisprudence du Conseil Constitutionnel, No. 9-
10 DRorr SOCIAL 645 (1982). But see F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 177, stating that
each paragraph of the 1946 Preamble, except for the last three concerning the
French Union, have constitutional value.
524. See Flauss, supra note 523, at 646.
525. Decision ofJanuary 15, 1975, Con. const., 1975 D.S.Jur. 529 (regarding the
constitutionality of the French law liberalizing abortion).
526. Decision of July 25, 1979, Con. const., reprinted in L. FAvOREAU, supra note
507, at 435 (regarding the continuity of radio and television broadcasting during a
strike); see also Decision of July 22, 1980, Con. const., 1981 D.S. Jur. 356 (1980)
(regarding the protection of nuclear facilities).
527. Decision of July 5, 1977, Con. const., 1979 D.S. Jur. 41 (1977) (regarding
worker participation in management decision-making).
528. See infra note 570.
529. See Decision ofJuly 25, 1979, Con. const., reprinted in L. FAVOREAU, supra note
507, at 435.
530. F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 177-78; Flauss, supra note 523, at 649.
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needs, which translates necessarily into the active intervention of the state
in the lives of the citizens.5 3 1
The Conseil Constitutionnel must balance the tensions between the pro-
visions protecting individual rights and those requiring the government
to provide economic and social benefits.
Some commentators argue against applying the social welfare pro-
visions of the 1946 Preamble to require the Parliament or the adminis-
tration to affirmatively ameliorate social conditions.5 32 Protecting
family unification is consistent with this view. Although the family's
source of constitutional protection lies in what is labelled a social provi-
sion of the 1946 Preamble, protecting the family in the immigration area
does not require the government to affirmatively grant benefits. The
concern, rather, is with freedom from governmental interference.
C. Protection of the Family in European and International Law
International law can play an important role in French judicial deci-
sions. 53 3 Consequently, this section analyzes those regional and inter-
national declarations of law recognizing family rights.
Several human rights declarations recognize the right to family life.
For example, article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 recognizes a right to "found a family" and states that "[t]he family
is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the state."'5 34 Similarly, article 10 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966
provides that "[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be
accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit
of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible
for the care and education of dependent children." 53 5 Like the declara-
tions, numerous international conventions recognize the family as the
basic unit of society, entitled to protection and freedom from interfer-
ence by the state.5 36
531. J. RIvERo, LEs LIBERTES PUBLIOUES, t. 1, Les droits de l'homme, at 85 (1st ed.
1975).
532. See Flauss, supra note 523, at 646.
533. See F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 135-37, 259 et seq.
534. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 16, G.A. Res.
217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
535. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 10, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967).
536. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
23, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967) ("The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is enti-
fled to protection by society and the State."); European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 8, 12, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 (article 8 states:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a demo-
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The Treaty of Rome 53 7 is the international convention most signifi-
cant for French family and immigration policy. It established the princi-
ple of free movement of workers among member states of the Common
Market.5 38 The Treaty has a profound impact on the rules for entry and
stay of foreigners, essentially removing border barriers to nationals of
EEC nations seeking to settle in another EEC nation. The Treaty har-
monized immigration provisions of the various member states by limit-
ing the grounds for exclusion and expulsion of workers, and by
establishing certain procedural guarantees. 53 9
EEC member states also adopted regulations governing the right of
family members to join relocated workers. Among the family members
entitled to join a worker employed in another state are: 1) the spouse
and descendants less than 21 years of age who are dependent; and 2)
ascendants of the worker or of his spouse who are under their care or
who are dependent. 540 Family members not within the above definition
cratic society in the interest of national security, public safety, or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of crime or disorder, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Article 12 provides: "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry
and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this
right."); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, art. 6,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6. ("Every person has the right
to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection there-
fore."); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 17, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/SER.L/VII 23, doc. 21, rev. 2, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1 ("The family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the state."); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1314 (1975) ("The participating
States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons
who wish to be reunited with members of their family, with special attention being
given to requests of an urgent character-such as requests submitted by persons who
are ill or old.").
537. See supra note 193.
538. The Treaty of Rome provided for the "abolition of any discrimination based
on nationality between workers of the Member States in employment, remuneration
and other conditions of work and employment." Id. art. 48(2). With the addition of
Spain and Portugal in 1986, the Treaty now includes twelve member states, although
Spain and Portugal will not be subject to the freedom of movement provisions until
1991. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
539. Workers from member states may move and settle freely so long as they pos-
sess an identity card from a member state of the European Economic Community.
They may work without applying for a carte de travail, or work permit. A uniform carte
de seour, or residence permit, valid for five years and renewable automatically is avail-
able without restriction on place of residence. Restrictions on entry and stay are
limited to reasons of "public policy, public security or public health." Treaty of
Rome, supra note 193, art. 48(3). A 1964 directive establishing guidelines for inter-
preting the above provision states that the exclusion of a worker must be based on
the personal conduct of the individual concerned, not on a generalized concern for
deterrence. Economic reasons such as a high rate of unemployment do not justify
exclusion. Council Directive 64/221, Feb. 25, 1964, reprinted in C IV ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, at C12, 037-041 (1978).
540. Council Reg. No. 1612/68, Oct. 15, 1968, art. 10, 1968 O.J. No. L257, at 5.
Family members need not be member state nationals in order to be authorized to
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who, in the country of origin, were dependent upon or lived in the same
household may also be admitted. 54 1
Relatives of workers entering under the treaty must meet the
requirements of "ordre public, security, and public health." 5 42 Unlike the
French law, the EEC regulations do not impose a waiting period for fam-
ily members wishing to join the worker.5 43 The worker must, however,
provide his family with accommodations "considered as normal for the
national workers in the region where he is employed." '5 44
Various bilateral agreements also provide for family unification.
For example, the convention between France and Portugal of January
11, 1977, provides that "the French authorities favor family unification
of Portuguese workers employed in France."'5 45
The first multilateral convention to explicitly recognize a right to
family unification, however, is the European Convention on the Legal
Status of Migrant Workers, enacted in 1977 by the member states of the
Council of Europe. 54 6 Article 12 of the Convention provides a right to
"family reunion" for the spouse and minor children:
The spouse of a migrant worker who is lawfully employed in the territory
of a Contracting Party and the unmarried children thereof, as long as they
are considered minors by the relevant law of the receiving State who are
dependent on the migrant worker are authorized on conditions analogous
to those which this convention applies to the admission of migrant work-
ers and according to the admission procedures prescribed by such law or
by international agreements to join the migrant worker in the territory of
the Contracting Party provided that the latter has available for the family
housing considered as normal for national workers in the region where
the migrant worker is employed. Such Contracting Party may make the
giving of authorization conditional upon a waiting period which shall not
exceed 12 months. 54 7
Article 12 also allows a state to require the worker to show sufficient
resources to support the additional family members. 548 Thus, the Con-
accompany a worker of a member state. Even after the termination of employment, a
worker and family may remain in the country. Commission Reg. No. 1251/70, 1974
OJ. No. L142. See generally H. SMrr & P. HERZOG, supra note 194, § 48.07.
541. Council Reg. No. 1612/68, Oct. 15, 1968, arts. 10-12, 1968 OJ. No. L257, at
5.
542. Treaty of Rome, supra note 193, arts. 48, 59.
543. Council Reg. No. 1612/68, Oct. 15, 1968, art. 10(3), 1968 OJ. No. L257, at
5.
544. Id. The regulation cautions, however, that this provision must not be applied
in a manner which would "lead to discrimination between the national workers and
workers from other member states." Id.
545. See Decret No. 77-496 of May 11, 1977, 1977J.O. 2787. Similar accords were
entered into with Spain, Morocco, and Tunisia, among others. See generally Lebon, Le
droit international et les migrations de travailleurs, reprinted in LEs TRAVAILLEURS ETRANGERS
ET LE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 47, 98 (1978).
546. For the text of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant
Workers, see Decret No. 83-1205 of December 20, 1983, 1983 J.O. 88, in which
France agreed to and ratified the terms of the Convention.
547. Id. at 89.
548. Id.
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vention, ratified by France in 1983, 5 49 establishes nearly the same
parameters regarding family unification as those erected by the 1976
French decret. 5 50
The EEC provisions may serve as a catalyst for extending family
unification rights to non-EEC nationals. For instance, a circular of July
10, 1981 specified that French citizens must be accorded the same rights
to family unification as are set up by EEC regulations, whatever the
nationality of the relatives seeking admission. 55 1 Conversely, the EEC
free entry provisions might be used as a justification for closing the
doors to immigrant workers from non-EEC nations.5
52
D. French Judicial Decisions Protecting Family Unification
1. The Conseil d'Etat
In the GISTI decision of 1978, 5 53 the Conseil d'Etat held that the Pre-
amble of the 1946 Constitution protected the right of legitimate foreign
residents to lead a normal family life.55 4 The government, therefore,
could restrict the entry of a resident's spouse or minor child only to
maintain ordre public or to protect the family members. 5 55
GISTI involved a challenge to an administrative decret preventing
family members from working while in France.55 6 The Conseil d'Etat
invalidated the decret because the potential barrier established by the
"no work" provision was insufficiently related to the preservation of
ordre public or the protection of the entering family members' welfare. 55 7
Thus, the Conseil d'Etat erected a "means" test for any restrictions on
unification of immediate family members.
The Conseil d'Etat also identified this right as a general principle of
549. Law No. 83-561 ofJuly 1, 1983, 1983 J.O. 2011, authorizes approval of the
European Convention Relative to the Legal Status of Migrant Workers.
550. For the discussion of the 1976 decret, see supra notes 263-67 and accompany-
ing text.
551. Circular No. 81-50 ofJuly 10, 1981, 1981J.O. 8716 (concerning family unifi-
cation for foreign workers).
552. Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigres et Autres,
Conseil d'Etat, 1978 Lebon 493.
553. Id. The Commissaire du Gouvernement submitted an advisory brief arguing
that "the 1946 Preamble treats the family as an institution to be protected and fos-
tered and recognizes in each individual the right to lead a normal existence and a
normal family life by creating a family and living with it." See Dondoux, supra note
272, at 57, 60. The Commissaire du Gouvernement is a member of the Conseil
d'Etat, but, contrary to what the title might suggest, does not represent the govern-
ment. Rather, he conducts an independent study of the affair and presents his conclu-
sions to his colleagues actually deciding the case. See G. VEDEL, supra note 171, at 44,
633. In addition to the 1946 Preamble, the Commissaire cited two other major
sources of protection for the family, international law and the provisions of the Fam-
ily Code and Civil Code. Dondoux, supra note 272, at 58.
554. Groupe d'Information, 1978 Lebon 493.
555. Id.
556. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 274-82.
557. M. LONG, supra note 4, at 588.
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law.5 58 General principles of law are a third category of limitations (in
addition to constitutional provisions and applicable legislation) to the
administrative power of the executive. 5 59 Derived by the court from
existing written law, general principles most often function to fill gaps in
existing legislation or regulations. 5 60 They can also be substantive prin-
ciples derived from constitutional provisions. 56 1 General principles
include such broad formulations as the right to present a defense, the
principle of separation of powers, and the principle of equality of citi-
zens before the law.
56 2
Only rarely does the Conseil d'Etat recognize a general principle of
law in the area of social and economic rights. 563 Its reluctance is due to
the difficulty of putting into concrete terms the expression of abstract
ideas of socialjustice. Moreover, the law in that area is constantly evolv-
ing, and judicially setting standards for governmental conduct may have
serious financial consequences for the government.
564
2. The Conseil Constitutionnel
The Conseil Constitutionnel has rendered two major decisions concern-
ing the constitutionality of the immigration law. These decisions sug-
gest that the Conseil Constitutionnel will aggressively review the
constitutionality of legislation restricting the right to family unification.
558. See G. VEDEL, supra note 171, at 387-401.
559. General principles of law (principes generaux de droit) are non-textual laws
derived by the judge as a means of filling gaps in the existing textual law. Thus, if a
rule were so pervasive in the positive law that it indicated an intent by the legislature
to apply the principle generally, it would be extended even to situations not explicitly
covered by the text of these laws or regulations. It is not a means of discovering
natural rights, but a method of discovering rights pervasive in the existing positive
law. Exactly where general principles of law fit into the hierarchy of French law is
problematic. Some general principles have near constitutional value and are both
suprazlegislative and supra-decretal. An example is the right to continuity of public
services recognized by the Conseil Constitutionnel in its decisions of Sept. 25, 1979.
See infra notes 574-78 and accompanying text. Other principles have supra-decretal
value but may be derogated by legislative provisions. Still others are only effective in
the absence of overriding administrative text. See Dondoux, supra note 272, at 62.
560. The Conseil Constitutionnel has also derived general principles of constitu-
tional law not explicit in the Constitution or other documents to which the Preamble
refers, a technique comparable to the derivation of rights from the penumbra of the
U.S. Bill of Rights. See discussion of Griswold v. Connecticut, supra notes 346-54 and
accompanying text. For instance, the Conseil Constitutionnel has identified the con-
tinuity of public services as a general principle of law of constitutional value. See infra
notes 574-78 and accompanying text.
561. General principles of law identified by the courts have become so numerous
that a complete list would be difficult to compile. See G. VEDEL, supra note 171, at
389.
562. In a Decision ofJune 8, 1973, Conseil d'Etat, 1973 Lebon 406, a government
nurse protested her dismissal on account of her pregnancy. The Conseil d'Etat rec-
ognized a general principle of law "inspired" by the Labor Code preventing an
employer from dismissing a pregnant worker except in certain specified
circumstances.
563. See M. LONG, supra note 4, at 394-95.
564. Decision ofJan. 9, 1980, Con. const., 1980 D.S.Jur. 420; Decision of Sept. 3,
1986, Con. const., No. 86-216 (LEXIS, French Public library, Consti file).
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The Conseil will not overturn large amounts of legislation by asserting
primacy of family unification rights over other governmental interests; it
will, however, attempt to strike a balance between individual and state
interests by examining the justification and necessity for legislation
infringing upon certain important rights. These decisions also establish
that the Constitution protects not only French citizens, but also aliens, at
least in those provisions where protections are framed in the terms
"everyone" or "no one." These protections extend even to aliens who
have been ordered expelled or who have never been officially
admitted.56 5
The Conseil Constitutionnel's first immigration decision 56 6
annulled 1980 legislation authorizing the administration to detain aliens
awaiting expulsion for up to seven days prior to judicial approval.5 67 In
annulling the detention provision, the Conseil Constitutionnel relied on
article 66 of the 1958 Constitution which provides: "No one may be
arbitrarily detained. The judicial authority, guardian of individual lib-
erty, shall assure the respect for this principle under conditions deter-
mined by law."' 5 68 Although the Conseil Constitutionnel refused to
deny the government all power of detention, it overturned the seven-
day detention provision. Its compromise position held that the adminis-
tration could detain persons ordered expelled for 48 hours without judi-
cial approval. 5 69
In a more recent decision, 570 the Conseil considered the constitu-
tionality of the 1986 amendments, which narrowed the right to family
unification. While recognizing the constitutional value of the family
565. See F. LUCHAIRE, supra note 489, at 188. In the course of its Decision of Sept.
3, 1986, Con. const., No. 86-216 (LEXIS, French Public library, Consti file) the Con-
seil, while rejecting other claims on the merits, recognized that provisions providing
the right to asylum, rights to individual liberty, non retroactivity, and the right of
defense also apply to foreigners in France.
566. Decision ofJan. 9, 1980, Con. const., 1980 D.S.Jur. 420.
567. Id. The administration's detention of aliens had become a sensitive issue
after the discovery of a secret center in Marseille in 1975 used by police to confine
aliens without hearings or charges. At first, the government cited the Penal Code as
impliedly authorizing detention of aliens awaiting expulsion. It later acted by decret
to authorize detention of aliens awaiting expulsion. Vincent, supra note 223, at 369.
568. The Conseil also relied on article 9 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man of
1789 which limits arrest to situations of absolute necessity. Decision ofJan. 9, 1980,
Con. const., 1980 D.S.Jur. 420.
569. Id.; see also L. FAVOREAU, supra note 507, at 371-75. U.S. courts have had to
review similar detention policies. Since the influx of Cuban and Haitian refugees in
1981, the United States has begun routinely incarcerating aliens for indefinite peri-
ods of time without bond while they await processing. Recent decisions have consid-
ered the issue of the constitutionality of such administrative detention of aliens.
Though some lower federal court decisions have granted procedural protection lim-
iting the period of detention, others have given minimal review, deferring to the
traditional legislative role in protecting national sovereignty. Compare Fernandez v.
Wilkensen, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 645 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981),
with Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).




protection provision in the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution, the Con-
seil upheld the challenged legislative provisions.
The 1981 Amendments to the immigration law had specifically
exempted certain family members from expulsion, including family
members who violated ordre public when those violations presented a
case of less than absolute urgency.5 7 1 The 1986 legislation qualified this
family exemption by requiring that an alien married to a French citizen
demonstrate a continuing relationship of more than one year with the
French citizen, that alien parents demonstrate that they have exercised
parental responsibility for their citizen-child, and that a child whose par-
ents faced expulsion have a relative in France willing to accept responsi-
bility for her custody in order for her to remain in France.
57 2
In rejecting claims that these conditions to exemption from expul-
sion unconstitutionally infringed upon the right to family unification,
the Conseil concluded:
Considering that it is for the legislature to determine the conditions
under which the rights of the family are to be reconciled with the require-
ments of the general welfare; if the legislature may permit the authority
which is responsible for determining the expulsion of a foreigner to con-
sider all relevant factors, including when appropriate, the family situation,
the legislature violates no constitutional provision in giving precedence to
the necessities of ordre public.57 3
Thus, the Conseil Constitutionnel, like the Conseil d'Etat in its GISTI
decision, recognized that maintenance of ordre public or protection of
family members may justify limitations on family unification.
The 1986 decision leaves unresolved the scope of the legislature's
power to limit family unification. Though the decision can be read as
permitting the Parliament unfettered discretion to limit the right to fam-
ily unification contained in the 1946 Preamble, such a reading is unwar-
ranted in light of other cases outside the immigration context. The
pattern erected by these other decisions is the balancing approach famil-
iar to Americans.
Perhaps most instructive is the Conseil Constitutionnel's decision
involving the right of radio and television employees to strike.5 74 The
right to strike, like the right to a normal family life, is grounded in the
571. Law of Oct. 29, 1981, 1981 J.O. 2970.
572. Law No. 86-1025 of Sept. 9, 1986, 1986J.O. 11035. Two of the challenged
provisions of the 1986 law merely afforded the factfinder the authority to look
beyond the paper relationship to test the existence of a functional family relation-
ship. In the case of a child whose parents are deported, the ordre public concern justi-
fied the relocation of the child rather than an exemption of the parent from
expulsion. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text for discussion of the 1986
amendments.
573. Decision of Sept. 3, 1986, Con. const., No. 86-216, (LEXIS, French Public
library, Consti file).
574. Decision of July 25, 1979, Con. const., reprinted in L. FAvOREAU, supra note
507, at 433.
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1946 Preamble, but is circumscribed by national interests. 57 5 Whereas
the legislative power to limit family unification was read by the Conseil
into the family rights provision of the 1946 Preamble,57 6 the Constitu-
tion expressly authorizes the legislature to limit the right to strike.
5 7 7
In its 1979 decision the Conseil Constitutionnel held that the con-
stitutionally protected right to strike is limited by the constitutionally
protected principle of "continuity of the public services." ' 578 In deter-
mining the scope of the right to strike, the Conseil adopted a sliding
scale approach. The more important the public service affected, the
more power the legislature possesses to regulate strikes.5 79 For certain
employees involved in services indispensable to essential needs of the
nation, the right to strike may be totally prohibited. 58 0 Though the leg-
islature may regulate the right to strike in seeking a balance with other
constitutional protections, the decision makes clear that the Conseil
Constitutionnel has the final word on the appropriate conciliation of two
principles of constitutional value.
The Court's approach in reconciling competing claims resembles
substantive due process analysis under the United States Constitu-
tion. 58 1 When an important individual interest, such as the right to
strike, conflicts with an equally important governmental interest, such as
the continuity of crucial public services, the Conseil has sought a solu-
tion preserving the government's interest while minimizing the intru-
sion upon individual constitutional rights. 5 82  The Conseil
575. "The right to strike may be exercised within the framework of the laws that
govern it." Preamble of the Constitution of Oct. 27, 1946, reprinted in FRENCH LAW,
supra note 490, at 2-6.
576. Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958, art. 34, reprinted in FRENCH LAW, supra note 490,
at 2-18.
577. See supra note 575 and accompanying text.
578. Considering that under the terms of the Preamble... the right to strike
may be exercised within the framework of the laws which regulate it that in
enacting this provision the constituents intended to emphasize that the right
to strike is a principle of constitutional value, but that it has limits and author-
ized the legislature to set those limits effecting the conciliation necessary
between the protection of the interests of employees, of which the strike is a
means, and the safeguarding of the general interest which the strike may
harm that, insofar as the public services are concerned, the recognition of the
right to strike does not prevent the legislature from applying to this right the
limits necessary to assure the continuity of the public service which, just as the
right to strike, has the character of a principle of constitutional value; that
these limitations may go to the extent of prohibition of the right to strike by
agents whose presence is indispensable to assuring the functioning of ele-
ments of the service of which interruption would cause injury to essential
needs of the nation.




581. Id. at 447.
582. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship & Sexual Privacy-Balanc-
ing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MxcH. L. REV. 463, 553 (1983). The difference,
however, is that the Conseil Constitutionnel lacks the Supreme Court's extreme def-
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Constitutionnel has used this least intrusive means test in approaching
other decisions as well. 583
3. Possible Effects of the Balancing Approach
If this balancing approach were applied to immigration legislation, the
court would reconcile the right to family unification with the necessity of
preserving ordre public and the welfare of the family members seeking
unification. Such a balancing approach by the Conseil Constitutionnel
would not necessarily require deference to the judgment of Parliament
in the same way the U.S. Supreme Court defers to Congress.
Francois Luchaire, a former member of the Conseil Constitution-
nel, concludes that legislation interfering with the social guarantees of
the 1946 Preamble, including the right to family unification, would be
unconstitutional, even though holding the state affirmatively responsible
for providing specific benefits under the provisions of the 1946 Pream-
ble would be practically difficult. 58 4 Another former member of the
Conseil Constitutionnel, F. Goguel, argues instead that paragraph 10 of
the 1946 Preamble does not limit legislative action.585 A third point of
view was expressed by the Commissaire du Gouvernement in the GISTI
decision, who speculated that paragraph 10 may limit legislative inter-
ference to a greater extent for the families of citizens than for those of
foreigners.5 8 6
VII. Constitutional Protection of Family Unification
A. Quantitative Limits on Entry of Immediate Family Members
1. The Need for a Less Deferential Supreme Court
The current U.S. restrictions upon the entry of second preference cate-
erence to the legislature in questions involving national sovereignty. For example,
the Conseil has limited article 's concept of sovereignty by ruling that the election of
members to the European Assembly in a manner inconsistent with the French Con-
stitution did not infringe national sovereignty. Decision of Dec. 29-30, 1976, reprinted
in L. FAvOREAU, supra note 507, at 339.
583. See, e.g., Decision of Jan. 19-20, 1981, Con. const., reprinted in L. FAVOREAU,
supra note 507, at 486, concerning a law regulating security and liberty. There, the
Conseil Constitutionnel balanced the individual liberty interest against the proposed
restriction's necessity in protecting the general security. Id. at 506.
584. These dispositions [of the 1946 Preamble] forbid certain negative meas-
ures-including all measures tending to disassociate the family. In this
regard, a law [or a decret] tending to prohibit foreign workers [admitted to
work in France] to be joined by their spouse and their children would cer-
tainly be contrary to that paragraph of the 1946 Preamble.
L. FAVOREAU, supra note 507, at 506. Significantly, the Conseil d'Etat's decision in
GISTI did not require any affirmative steps by the government to directly provide
economic benefits to certain individuals. It merely prevented governmental interfer-
ence in family unification. The increase in the number of immigrants, however, may
necessitate increases in family allocations, health care and other benefits. Id. at 217.
585. Goguel, Objet et partee de la protection des droitsfondamentaux-Conseil Constitution-
nelfrancais, 1981 REVUE INT'L DE DROIT COMPARE 436; see also Flauss, supra note 523,
at 647.
586. Dondoux, supra note 272, at 62.
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gory immigrants (spouses and minor children of resident aliens) 58 7
implicate several constitutional issues: 1) whether treating resident
aliens less favorably than citizens constitutes an equal protection viola-
tion; 2) whether varying treatment depending upon the national origin
of the relatives seeking entry violates equal protection; and 3) whether
the delayed entry of relatives violates the substantive constitutional
rights of permanent resident aliens.
The first issue is a weak one upon which to challenge present policy.
Certainly, the Constitution protects resident aliens,58 8 and state legisla-
tion that treats aliens and citizens differently is suspect for most pur-
poses. 58 9 Federal legislation, however, has greater leeway. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "a host of constitutional and statutory provi-
sions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens
and aliens may justify attributions and benefits for one class not
accorded to the other." 590
587. For a description of the second preference category and how it fits into the
preference system, see supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
588. Aliens are "persons" within the meaning of that term in the fourteenth
amendment, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886), and in the fifth amend-
ment, Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). "The Fifth Amend-
ment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects [aliens within the jurisdiction
of the United States] from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law." Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). Even one whose presence is
unlawful is entitled to that constitutional protection. Id
589. In reviewing state classifications based on citizenship, the Court treats alien-
age as a suspect class and employs strict scrutiny. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973) (New York statute limiting civil service jobs to citizens violates equal protec-
tion and supremacy clauses); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (Ari-
zona and Pennsylvania statutes denying welfare benefits to resident aliens struck
down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause). However, the Court has used the
rational basis test when the classification relates to state governmental functions.
Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979).
590. Matthews, 426 U.S. at 78 n.12. Recently, the Court has also rejected the con-
tention that close relatives are a suspect or quasi-suspect class, noting that "they have
not been subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they are not a
minority or politically powerless." Lyng v. Castillo, 106 S. Ct. 2727, 2729 (1986). In
upholding a five year residency requirement for participation by aliens in the federal
medicare program, the Court in Matthews v. Diaz noted that Congress could decide
that the strength of a claim to benefits increases over time as an alien's ties to the
country grow stronger. Matthews, 426 U.S. at 80 ("Mhe decision to share [the
nation's] bounty with our guests may take into account the character of the relation-
ship between the alien and this country: Congress may decide that as the alien's tie
grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of that munifi-
cence."); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("Once an alien gains
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent resi-
dence, [her] constitutional status changes accordingly."). Congress might also pre-
sume that the generally weaker ties of alien residents to this country, when compared
to those of citizens, justify a distinction in treatment for purposes of family unifica-
tion. In general, aliens as a class may experience less hardship in relocating to the
country in which the relatives reside than would most citizens. Additionally, Con-
gress could decide that the easier access to family unification for citizens might serve
as an inducement to aliens to become citizens.
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Claims (2) and (3) raise more serious constitutional issues. If one
assumes, as this essay has argued, that the line of privacy and family
cases implicitly protects family unification, 5 9 1 the substantive claim in
(3) carries great weight. Similarly, the varying treatment depending
upon national origin smacks of invidious classification. 5 9 2 If resident
aliens cannot be discriminated against in the job market because of
national origin, direct state action with that result seems less defensi-
ble.5 93 Permanent resident aliens in like circumstances, but for irrele-
vant and fortuitous factors, should be treated in a like manner when
important rights are at stake.5
94
591. See supra notes 315-78.
592. As a practical matter, the immigration law affords aliens entering under the
preference categories an opportunity to be accompanied by their existing spouses
and children. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(9) provides that:
A spouse or child as defined in section l101(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), or (E)
of this title shall, if not otherwise entitled to immigrant status and the imme-
diate issuance of a visa under paragraphs (1) through (7) of this subsection,
be entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration provided
in subsection (b), if accompanying or following to join his spouse or parent.
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(9) (1982) (emphasis added).
The spouse or child who enters under this provision may do so without the neces-
sity of separate visa petitions and is given the same order of consideration as the
principal immigrant. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(4) (1987); 22 C.F.R. § 42.1 (1987). The
family members may also remain behind temporarily and join the preference immi-
grant at any time after he acquires lawful residence status. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.1
(1987). The unification problem confronts spouses or children acquired after the
grant of permanent residence to the principal alien. These relatives cannot be
regarded as accompanying or following him and thus must await the availability of
second preference visas. See 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL OF THE DEP'T OF STATE
§ 42.1 n.5, reprinted in 6 GARDEN & ROSENFIELD, supra note 153, at 32-355. Relatives
who precede the preference immigrant to the United States also cannot be regarded
as "accompanying or following to join" the principal immigrant. See Santiago v. INS,
526 F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
593. An extreme example of this would be a law allowing family unification only
for citizens of the white race. This would violate the fifth amendment both because
of the invidiousness of the classification and because of the interference with the
substantive due process liberty interest of non-white citizens and resident aliens in
living a normal life. Rosberg, The Protection ofAliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the
National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 275, 326.
Provisions favoring immigrants from particular nations present a more difficult
problem. Since 1977, France essentially has limited entry of foreign workers to
nationals of the member states of the European Economic Community. This
arrangement's impact is felt most strongly by the Arab states, and indeed is not
unconnected to sentiment against the growing Arab population in France. B. STAsI,
supra note 229, at 80. The U.S. system has also traditionally favored immigration
from European nations. This special treatment is reflected in the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, which reserves 5,000 special visas for each of the
next two years for Western European nations because of Congress's impression that
Europeans were being "squeezed out of the immigration mix." 132 CONG. REC.
H 10,598 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Donnelly in reference to Sec-
tion 314 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).
594. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). The court in Francis invalidated
on equal protection grounds a distinction which limited those who could petition for
discretionary relief from deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). While recognizing
"the power of Congress to create different standards of admission and deportation
for different groups of aliens," the court noted that "once these choices are made,
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The Court's longstanding justification for deference in this context
is unpersuasive. It simply is not true that because "any policy toward
aliens is [so] ... intricately interwoven with ... the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of
government" that "[s]uch matters are so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial
inquiry or interference." 5 95 United States v. Robe159 6 provides a counter-
point to such reasoning. In Robel, the Court held that the government
could not blanketly exclude members of the Communist Party from
work in defense plants despite the national security interests
involved. 59 7 Clearly, the government has a much greater interest in
controlling whom it allows to work in defense plants than in whom it
allows to live in the United States. Contrasting the nature of the Con-
gressional motives underlying the two forms of regulation highlights
this conclusion.
In Robel, the government asserted a real and substantial interest.
Congress prefaced the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950598 with
findings that there existed an international Communist movement which
by treachery, deceit, espionage, and sabotage sought to overthrow
existing governments; that the movement operated in this country
through Communist-action organizations under foreign domination and
control and which sought to overthrow the Government by any neces-
sary means, including force and violence; that the Communist move-
ment in the United States was made up of thousands of adherents,
rigidly disciplined, operating in secrecy, and employing espionage and
sabotage tactics. 5 99 In addition, Congress had found that many Party
members were subject to or recognized the discipline of a controlling
foreign government or organization. 60 0 Despite these findings, the gov-
ernment did not try to prohibit or severely penalize membership in such
organizations. 60 1 Instead, the government narrowly tailored its prohibi-
tion, excluding Party members only from employment in "defense
plants which Congress and the Secretary of Defense consider of critical
importance to the security of the country."'60 2
individuals within a particular group may not be subjected to disparate treatment or
criteria wholly unrelated to any legitimate government interest." Id. at 273.
595. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). For a general dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court's deference, see supra notes 439-60 and accompanying
text.
596. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
597. Id. at 262.
598. 64 Stat. 987 (1950-51) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-798 (1982)).
599. Id.
600. Id. at 988.
601. Robel, 389 U.S. at 287.
602. Id. Outside the immigration context, the Court has found that individuals'
interest in freedom sometimes outweighs the Government's security interests. See
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1964) (statute revoking Ameri-
can Communists' passports struck down); see also NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288,
307 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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In contrast, the reasons behind the structuring of the current immi-
gration law, while important, do not rise to the level asserted in Robel.
The legislative history of the 1965 Act 60 3 indicates that while Congress
believed the "reunification of families ... to be the foremost considera-
tion," it also wanted an annual quota to limit immigration "within what
is believed to be the present absorptive capacity of this country .... -604
The 1965 Act also reveals that Congress designed the annual ceilings
for preference category immigrants from each nation "to prevent an
unreasonable allocation of visa numbers to any one foreign state."'60 5
The Act limits immigration from high demand countries to avoid an
imbalance in the numbers of immigrants from a few nations. The major
objectives of the numerical limitations, therefore, are the establishment
of an overall annual limit to preference category immigration, the pre-
vention of monopolization of immigration visas by a few countries, and
promotion of the corresponding national interest in achieving cultural
diversity.
Analysis similar to that in Robel should be used to determine the
degree to which these interests justify interference with family unifica-
tion rights. One entering such constitutional terrain confronts a myriad
of tests, levels of scrutiny, requirements for tailoring, and standards for
balancing of interests. What approach the Court takes to a particular
question may depend on the right implicated, the nature of the govern-
ment's interest, and the specific factual pattern. To systematically
explore these factors, or to argue how the Court should employ them, is
beyond the scope of this Article. A couple of observations, however,
seem relevant. The Court should be willing either to balance interests
or to look for some kind of tailoring.60 6 Furthermore, the Court should
not fear fine-tuning the immigration law. Judicial recognition of a con-
stitutional right to family unification need not involve a drastic re-evalu-
ation of immigration policy. The United States can achieve its
immigration goals without infringing on the rights to family unification.
2. Issues Suggesting Congressional Action
a. Fundamental Unfairness of Present System
Regardless of its current or future constitutional status, the current
immigration system is fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with the
declared policy of Congress. Congress has recognized that family unifi-
cation should be the primary goal of immigration policy. 60 7 Indeed,
603. See supra note 113.
604. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT-AMEND-
MENTS, S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3328, 3332.
605. Id.
606. Here again, Robel provides possible guidance: "We have ruled only that the
Constitution requires that the conflict between congressional power and individual
rights be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict."
Robel, 389 U.S. at 268 n.20.
607. Id.; see supra note 604 and accompanying text.
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much of current immigration law seems crafted to promote family unifi-
cation.608 As shown in part III, however, the overall effect of current
law is discriminatory. 60 9 National origin has assumed critical impor-
tance for many immigrants, especially those from Mexico and the Philip-
pines. Immediate family of resident aliens from countries of high
demand must wait many years, while other parts of the preference sys-
tem allow immediate entry for adult brothers and sisters of citizens.
b. Further Concerns: Impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control Act
The 1986 Act potentially legalizes the status of millions of illegal aliens
in the United States.610 The legalization provisions limit neither the
number nor the national origin of potential applicants for amnesty.
Some experts estimate that several million aliens may eventually obtain
permanent resident status under the 1986 Act. These estimates increase
to as many as seventy million when those who become legalized in turn
petition for the entry of their alien relatives. 6 1' It is unlikely, however,
that all aliens eligible for legalization will come forward. One Congress-
man argued:
How many people who live in the world of the undocumented will be able
to produce the documents? And what will these be? It is a cruel joke. It
will produce a boom for those who prey on people who need help to
prove their cases; it will produce anguish to those who know they qualify
but can't prove it; and it will not end the twilight existence of those who
do not want to take the risks that are implicit with applying at all.6 12
The 1986 Act also creates injustice for those who have waited in their
countries of origin for visa availability. As another Congressman
expressed it:
608. For example, 80% of the preference quotas are set aside for various kinds of
family entry, and immediate relatives of citizens are totally exempt from quotas or
ceilings. See generally supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
609. See supra notes 128-34.
610. Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, three distinct
groups of aliens may obtain permanent resident status after a period of temporary
resident status:
(1) Aliens who resided illegally in this country since before January 1, 1982
(after eighteen months temporary resident status);
(2) Aliens who worked at least 90 days in agriculture between May 1, 1985,
and May 1, 1986 (after two years temporary resident status);
(3) Aliens who can prove they worked 90 days a year in U.S. agriculture for
the last three years (after one year temporary resident status).
See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat) 3359, 3394.
611. See 132 CONG. REC. S16,886 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (4-7 million, statement
of Sen. Gramm); id. at S16,914 (5 million, statement of Sen. Chiles); id. at S16,911 (6-
16 million, statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at S16,905 (70 million, statement of Sen.
Humphrey).




Husbands, wives, and unmarried children or immigrants from Mexico
have been waiting for over 9 years to come to America... and with one
fell swoop we are about to legalize all those who illegally crossed our
borders, who have been illegally residing here and who have preempted
the legal immigration of those who are trying to obey our laws.6 13
Conversely, the 1986 Act will allow many waiting for second prefer-
ence category visas (immediate family of resident aliens) to finally obtain
legal entry. As noted during the hearings on the 1986 Act, many alien
relatives from Mexico already reside in the United States while awaiting
the availability of a preference category visa:
[T]here is a large number in the backlog from Mexico-7 years, 6
years.... But you have to go to the consul in Mexico to see what happens
when their number comes up... they come down from the United States
to pick up their number because almost 85 percent of the people who
come up under the legal immigration number system are in the United
States. They come down to pick up their green card, their legal docu-
ments. That is the most fascinating statistic-85 percent are already here.
When their number is called, they go back to get it and come back up into
the United States.6 14
Although the percentage of such relatives who will have resided in the
United States long enough to qualify for legalization would be much
smaller than the eighty-five percent quoted as already present, the pros-
pect remains that the 1986 Act will significantly reduce the numbers
waiting for second preference category visas.
The 1986 Act, then, could affect family unification problems in sev-
eral ways. By legalizing many clandestines in the United States, it may
increase the pressure on our preference system as these regularized
aliens begin petitioning to bring in their own families. To the degree,
however, that many "waiting for entry" are already here as clandestines,
the 1986 Act may significantly reduce the backlog. The Act ignores,
however, the rights of permanent resident aliens to be joined by spouses
and children, especially those who have obeyed U.S. law by waiting
outside until a visa becomes available. These law-abiding family mem-
bers will see others reaping the rewards denied to them.
3. Proposed Reforms of Quantitative Limits on Entry
This section outlines a proposal for simplifying the visa preference sys-
tem and protecting the constitutional right of permanent resident aliens
to family unification. The full text of these proposed amendments is
attached as Appendix A.
A brief recap of the present system's mechanics will clarify my pro-
posed amendments. Currently, the United States has a six-tiered prefer-
ence system; four of these categories refer to relatives of either citizens
613. 132 CONG. REC. H10,594 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Daub).
614. 132 CONG. REC. S16,889 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Simpson).
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or resident aliens, while two refer to needed workers. 6 15 The ceiling for
preference visas is 270,000.616
The preference system exempts certain "immediate relatives" of
citizens. The children, spouses, and parents of U.S. citizens are admit-
ted without regard to any ceiling and without impinging on the general
preference system. 6 17 The exemption means that in many years a
number substantially greater than 270,000 enter.61 8 In 1984, for
instance, nearly 400,000 relatives entered. 6 19
My proposal consists of several parts. First, and most crucially, I
suggest expanding the definition of "immediate relatives" in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b) 6 2 0 to include the spouses and minor children under the age of
18 of permanent resident aliens. The amended text would read as fol-
lows (additions to be capitalized):
(b) The "immediate relatives" referred to in subsection (a) of this
section shall mean [(1)] the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of
the United States: Provided, that in the case of parents, such citizen must
be at least twenty-one years of age, AND (2) THE CHILDREN UNDER
18 YEARS OF AGE AND SPOUSES OF AN ALIEN LAWFULLY ADMIT-
TED FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE. The immediate relatives speci-
fied in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission as
immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical
limitations in this Chapter.
Some distinction, therefore, would remain between citizens and resident
aliens. Whereas the spouses, children, and parents of citizens would be
exempt from numerical restrictions, only the spouse and children under
the age of 18 of resident aliens would be exempt.
My second major proposal is to include the expanded definition of
immediate relatives in the overall quota ceiling. Instead of 270,000
preference visas, the new system would set a ceiling of 400,000, or some
other figure more representative of the number of relatives actually
entering the United States. The number of preference visas allocated in
one year would be 400,000, minus the number of immediate relative
visas issued the preceding year. For example, if more than 400,000
immediate relatives entered in one year, no preference visas would be
available the following year.6 2 1 This system gives priority to the imme-
615. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
616. See text accompanying note 117.
617. See supra note 115
618. See supra note 29
619. See id. Of the 544,000 immigrants who obtained permanent resident status in
1984, 399,000, or 73% entered through family ties, 17% (92,000) were refugees and
9% (50,000) entered as skilled or unskilled laborers. 1984 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE INS 11-14; see supra note 29 and the accompanying table for a comparison of
recent immigration by categories in France and in the United States.
620. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982).
621. See S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983), which similarly suggested
reducing the number of visas available for the preference categories by the number
of visas issued to "immediate relatives" during the prior year. The reason for using a
carry-over method from one year to the next is simply for reasons of accounting.
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diate family of resident aliens over the more distant relatives of citizens
now accorded preference. At the same time, it would maintain the total
number of family immigrants entering in any one year at approximately
current levels, thus allowing firmer administrative control over the total
number of immigrants.
A similar "deduction" system would govern the annual 20,000 ceil-
ing for preference visas allocated to each country.6 2 2 The annual ceiling
for preference visas would remain at 20,000 for each country but would
also be offset by the number of visas issued to "immediate relatives"
admitted from that country in the prior year.6 23 Thus, if more than
20,000 immediate relatives entered from a particular country, no prefer-
ence visas would be allocated the following year; that year the only
entrants would be immediate family. This system would maintain cul-
tural diversity among new entrants 6 24 and would refrain from placing
artificial limits on the number of immediate family members who can
enter in any one year from any one country. It would, therefore, elimi-
nate the injustice done to immediate family members of resident aliens
from Mexico and the Philippines.
This change would require amending 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) as follows
(additions capitalized, deletions denoted by brackets):
(a) No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discrimi-
nated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex,
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence, except as specifically pro-
vided in sections 1101(a)(27), 1151(b), and 1153 of this title, AND SEC-
TION XXX (NEW CATEGORIES FOR WORKERS): Provided, that the
total number of immigrant visas made available to natives of any single
foreign state under paragraphs (1) through [(7) of section 1153(a) of this
title shall not exceed 20,000 in any fiscal year.] (4) OF SECTION 1153(a)
SHALL BE DETERMINED BY SUBTRACTING FROM 20,000 THE
NUMBER OF "IMMEDIATE RELATIVE" VISAS ISSUED TO NATIVES
OF THE SAME FOREIGN STATE DURING THE PREVIOUS FISCAL
YEAR.
Finally, I suggest revising the preference system. 62 5 Because workers
should have a separate preference system, I would first remove the
worker categories from the current six-tier system.
In the new, four-tier preference system, the first preference cate-
gory, adult unmarried sons or daughters of citizens, would remain
unchanged. The second category would include only those unmarried
Until one year is over, the government will not know how many visas of different
categories and from different countries have been used.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Alternatively, Congress could raise the ceilings for particular countries or
regions in order to assure cultural diversity, as it did for Western Europe in the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. See Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 314, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100
Stat.) 3359, 3439.
625. For a description of the preference system, see supra notes 115-31 and accom-
panying text.
Cornell International Law Journal
sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens who do not qualify for
exempt status under the proposed amendments, i.e., those 18 years of
age or older. My proposal eliminates the current third preference cate-
gory for workers, while leaving unchanged the fourth preference cate-
gory for married sons and daughters of citizens. The fifth preference
category would be reformed. This category, for brothers and sisters of
citizens, has the greatest demand for visas. I would narrow this category
to include only the unmarried brothers and sisters of adult U.S. citi-
zens.6 26 The backlog of active petitions for this category exceeded
700,000 visas in 1983. Over half of these petitions involved the family
members of married brothers and sisters of citizens who had already
established families of their own. 6 2 7 Narrowing this category to unmar-
ried brothers and sisters, therefore, would considerably reduce the back-
log problem.
Under my proposal, Congress could adjust the percentage of visas
available to each preference category. For the sake of simplicity, the
amendments propose that 25% of visas be reserved for each category.
The amended system for the allocation of preference visas would be as
follows:
Preference Category
1. Unmarried sons and daughters
(over 21) of United States citizens.
2. Unmarried sons (over 18) and
unmarried daughters (over 18) of
permanent resident aliens.
3. Married sons and daughters of
United States citizens.
4. Unmarried brothers and sisters of
adult United States citizens and
married brothers and sisters of
United States citizens whose visa
petitions were filed before the date
of enactment.
Visa Allocations
25% of available visas plus any
unused visas from the 4th
preference category.
25% of available visas plus any
unused visas from the 1st
preference category.
25% of available visas plus any
unused visas from the 1st and 2nd
preference categories.
25% of available visas plus any
unused visas from the 1st, 2nd or
3rd preference categories
As indicated, the system recycles unused visas in each preference cate-
gory until all are consumed.
B. Qualitative Limitations on Family Unification
This section focuses upon the manner in which the recognition of a con-
stitutional right to family unification would modify the qualitative
grounds for exclusion or expulsion. The facial validity of the provisions
626. See S. REP. No. 62, supra note 621, at 16 (suggesting such an amendment).
627. Id. at 43.
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for exclusion and expulsion is assumed.6 28 In the application of these
provisions to individual cases, however, this section proposes a balance
between the national interest in excluding or expelling an immediate
family member and the interests of individuals in remaining together as
a family unit in this country. The balancing process would be affected
by whether the interested parties in this country are resident aliens or
citizens and by whether the case involves exclusion or expulsion.
Whether hardship or duration of residency should be a factor in the bal-
ancing process is also discussed. As a model for comparison, this sec-
tion examines the French approach to protection of family unification.
1. French Protection of Immediate Family Members from Exclusion and
Expulsion
a. Exclusion
The 1976 decret frames the basic conditions governing entry of immedi-
ate family members.6 29 The decret's two most significant conditions are
(1) that entering aliens present no danger to ordre public, and (2) that
their relative(s) in France provide adequate housing and sufficient
resources for their support.
The ordre public standard encompasses all activity possibly contrary
to the welfare, safety, or security of the nation.6 30 The standard, how-
ever, differs from the U.S. approach; for example, the ordre public stan-
dard applies to few forms of social deviation. Neither homosexuality
nor polygamy are considered sufficiently disruptive to justify
exclusion.6 3 1
The adequate lodging or sufficient resources standard attempts to
provide "guarantees sufficient for the orderly insertion of foreign fami-
lies into the social environment.16 3 2 These "guarantees" include vari-
ous detailed restrictions, such as the minimum floor area per person in
628. But see Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 957, 990 (1982), suggesting that the provision of section 212(28) excluding
aliens who advocate or teach the views of, or are affiliated with, either the Communist
Party or an organization opposed to organized government lacks the necessary corre-
lation between classification and purpose and is unconstitutionally overbroad under
the First Amendment. See also Silvers, The Exclusion and Expulsion of Homosexual Aliens,
15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 295, 322 (1984).
629. Decret No. 76-383 of Apr. 29, 1976, 1976 J.O. 2628, as modified by Decret No.
84-1080 of Dec. 4, 1984, 1984 J.O. 3733; see supra text accompanying notes 255 and
257.
630. See supra text acccompanying notes 171-73.
631. G.I.S.T.I., supra note 199, at 30; see also supra note 418 and accompanying text.
632. Decret No. 84-1080 of Dec. 4, 1984, 1984J.O. 3733, amending Decret No. 76-
38 of Apr. 29, 1976, 1976 J.O. 2628, requires that both the housing and resources
conditions be approved prior to entry of family members. This implies prosecution
and expulsion of those family members who enter without authorization or who
attempt to adjust their status after entry as a tourist or otherwise. In addition to the
lodging and resources requirements, entering relatives must not present a danger to
ordre public and the relative in France must have resided there at least one year.
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the family's dwelling unit.633 The resource requirements establish a
double standard for resident aliens and citizens. These requirements
are not necessary for relatives of citizens who otherwise present no dan-
ger to ordre public.6 34
The actual impact of the French exclusion provisions on family uni-
fication is difficult to assess. Although the adequate housing and
resource standard may protect the country from the adverse economic
impact of family entrants who might require state assistance, housing
market conditions may delay entry of family members. The right to fam-
ily unification becomes hollow for those not able to meet the housing
and resource standards; the French right to family unification can be
enjoyed only by those who can afford it.
b. Expulsion
As discussed in part IV, general grounds for expulsion in France have
shifted with changes in the political makeup of the government.63 5 The
1945 Ordonnance predicated expulsion upon a finding that the alien's
presence in France presented a danger to ordre public.63 6 From 1981 to
1986, the socialist government narrowed this ground, requiring that the
danger to ordre public be "grave" and that the alien facing expulsion have
been convicted of a serious criminal offense.63 7
The 1986 amendments returned in part to the less stringent pre-
1981 ordre public standard. For relatives of resident aliens, it abolished
the requirement of a criminal conviction, and restricted the exemption
633. Circular No. 7-76 ofJuly 9, 1976. If a French family lives in housing which is
judged "inadequate," it may lose the benefits of allocations for housing costs; for
foreign families, however, the sanction is the loss of the possibility to live together as
a family. See G.I.S.T.I., L'IMMIGRATION FAMILIALE DANS L'IMPASSE 10 (March 1985).
634. Some French cities have applied the "adequate lodging" provision to limit
the proportion of foreign families who might live in any one apartment complex or
area of the city. The limitation introduces the notion of a threshold of tolerance for
the number of immigrants in any one locality. The administrative tribunal for Paris,
however, determined in a 1981 decision that "the proportion of foreigners in a hous-
ing complex ... is not one of the considerations which may be legally applied to
foreign workers who wish to move in with their families." Judgment of Dec. 16,
1981, Tribunal Adm. of Paris, No. 10471/P, Mme Dames c. Ministre de l'Interieur,
reprinted in G.I.S.T.I., LA NOUVEAU DOSSIER DE L'IMMIGRATION FAMILIALE, at Annexe
VII (1984). The tribunal held instead that the character of the housing must be eval-
uated in regard to the needs of the family and not as a function of the necessities of
ordre public. Lower administrative courts have held that the family should determine
adequacy so long as minimal conditions of comfort are met. See Decision of Tribunal
Admin. de Marseille, Rezqui c. Ministre de l'Interieur, No. 81/3159Y, reprinted in
G.I.S.T.I., LA NOUVEAU DOSSIER DE L'IMMIGRATION FAMILIALE, at Annexe X (1984).
Beyond that, however, the Conseil d'Etat has upheld the validity of these provisions
for exclusion of immediate family members. In GISTI, for example, the Conseil
stated that the government must reconcile the right to lead a normal family life "with
the necessities of ordre public and the social protection of foreigners and their fami-
lies." Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigres et Antres, Con-
seil d'Etat, 1978 Lebon 493; see also M. LONG, supra note 4, at 587.
635. See supra notes 226-45, 284-302.
636. See supra note 164.
637. See supra note 236.
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to spouses who have an ongoing relationship and to parents who meet
parental responsibilities. 63 8 Minors are exempt from expulsion unless
their parents are expelled and no other guardian is available in France to
provide for them.63
9
The Conseil d'Etat has held on numerous occasions that when ordre
public is violated, family ties do not exempt an immediate relative of
either a citizen or a resident alien from exclusion. 640 For close relatives
of citizens, however, French law establishes heightened protection from
expulsion. Alien spouses of French citizens may, after one year of com-
munal life, be expelled only in cases of extreme emergency where con-
tinued presence in France would present a "particularly grave threat to
ordre public."' 64 1 Alien parents of French children are afforded the same
protection from expulsion. 64 2
Two situations elude the citizen/resident alien distinction. Spouses
of French citizens who have been married for less than one year receive
the same level of protection as spouses of resident aliens,64 3 namely, the
general ordre public standard. Conversely, if an alien is the father or
mother of a French child in France, the parent becomes entitled to the
heightened protection from expulsion afforded immediate relatives of
French citizens.644
The French ordre public standard strikes a sensible balance between
the governmental concern for protection of national interests and the
need to protect the right of family unification. An immediate family
member who poses no threat to national welfare, safety or security
should not be excluded. If, after entry, the conduct of a family member
does in fact present a danger to the nation, the government may then
resort to its expulsion powers.
Family members justifiably receive greater protection from expul-
sion than from exclusion. The resident alien facing expulsion is already
established in the country. In terms of family unification, exclusion
maintains the status quo by prolonging a situation of separation. Expul-
638. See supra note 301.
639. Law No. 86-1025 of Sept. 9, 1986, art. 9, 1981 J.O. 11035, amending Law No.
81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981, art. 25, 1981 J.O. 2970, 2971.
640. See, e.g., Ben Abdeslem, Conseil d'Etat,July 25, 1980, 1981J.C.P. II, at 19613,
note Pacteau; Boulahia, Conseil d'Etat, Nov. 20, 1981 (LEXIS, French Public library,
Conset file).
641. Law No. 86-1025 of Sept. 9, 1986, art 9, 1981 J.O. 11035, amending Law No.
81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981, art. 26, 1981 J.O. 2970, 2971.
642. Id. art. 25. "The foreign father or mother of a French child residing in
France" is exempt from expulsion "on condition that he or she exercises at least
partial parental responsibility for the child or provides adequately for the support of
the child." Id.
643. Id.
644. A child born in France to alien parents becomes a citizen automatically at age
18 if he has lived for the previous five years in France. See article 44 of the French
Code of Nationality. Technically, then, he is not "French," at least not a French
citizen, until he reaches age 18 and meets the five-year condition. If one of the par-
ents is French, then the child is French at birth if born in France. Article 17 of the
French Code of Nationality; see also supra notes 285, 301 and accompanying text.
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sion, in contrast, disrupts an existing family unit. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has noted, deportation can be "the equivalent of banishment or
exile." 64 5 Since expulsion affects normal family life more directly than
does exclusion, the government's burden to justify expelling an alien
family member should be greater than when excluding a family member.
The French distinction between the protections afforded citizens
and those afforded resident aliens is also justifiable. Citizens have
stronger ties to the country than do resident aliens. More importantly,
citizens may never be expelled,64 6 but expelling a citizen's family mem-
ber may indirectly act to expel the citizen. The citizen's only available
avenue for maintaining the integrity of the family unit would be to
accompany the expelled member.
2. American Protections of Immediate Family Members
From Exclusion and Expulsion
a. Exclusion
Although U.S. law provides numerous grounds for exclusion,64 7 it also
provides for waiver of many of these grounds for close relatives. 6 48 One
of the waiver provisions resorts to an equivalent of the ordre public stan-
dard. 649 Under this provision, aliens who are convicted criminals or
prostitutes are exempt from exclusion when their admission to join
immediate family members would not be "contrary to the national wel-
fare, safety, or security of the United States."' 65 0 This waiver provision
indicates that the exclusion provisions bar a much broader category of
aliens than those whose presence would endanger the national welfare,
safety, or security. In contrast, the French "danger to ordre public" stan-
dard is tailored to afford reasonable protection from expulsion. In
France, therefore, no special waiver provisions for family unification are
necessary.
In order to obtain waiver from exclusion, the alien must also
demonstrate that his exclusion would "result in extreme hardship" to a
relative in the United States. 65 1 Although the hardship consideration in
U.S. law appears to be a humanitarian provision, a comparison to the
645. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
646. Grounds for deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) apply only to aliens. See
Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964).
647. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
648. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
649. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1982) provides a waiver from exclusion for aliens enter-
ing to join certain close relatives in the United States when:
(A) the alien's exclusion would result in extreme hardship to the United
States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, or son or daughters of such
alien, and
(B) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary






French practice shows otherwise. French law presumes hardship; the
critical factor is the extent of danger to the national welfare or security.
Essentially, no amount of hardship to family members could outweigh
the necessity for expulsion based on "grave danger to ordre public." In
contrast, hardship is not presumed in the United States; rather, the alien
has the burden of demonstrating it.
The French policy is demonstrably superior. The government
should not assess the quality of the family's ongoing emotional ties or
the value of the economic benefits family members provide.6 52 To
determine the degree of hardship that would be caused by separation,
however, U.S. law currently requires such evaluation of private relation-
ships. If no actual danger to the national health, safety or welfare exists,
such evaluations should not be made. Individual and cultural differ-
ences make such determinations arbitrary. These determinations also
raise serious questions concerning the right to marital and familial pri-
vacy.6 53 So long as the family relationship remains intact, presuming
hardship is the preferable approach. 6 54
b. Expulsion
As with exclusion, immediate family members receive considerably less
protection in the United States from expulsion than they do in France.
652. See S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986):
The Committee was required to strike a delicate balance between the govern-
ment's need to effectively enforce our laws and protect an individual's right
to privacy. This bill provides a balanced approach by requiring an objective
and unobtrusive test. In most cases the couples should be able to satisfy the
Attorney General through documentary evidence. When an interview with
an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is necessary, ques-
tions should not probe into the intimate personal habits of the applicants.
Id. (commenting on the proposed Marriage Fraud Amendments of S.2270, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess.). Nevertheless, the exemption from expulsion would depend upon
the existence of an actual family unit. Id.
653. See, e.g., Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1978) ("INS has no
expertise in the field of predicting the stability and growth potential of marriages-if
indeed anyone has-and it surely has no business operating in that field.").
654. As originally written, article 25 of the French immigration law seemed to pro-
tect relatives from expulsion even in situations in which the actual family ties were
very weak or nonexistent. Article 25, for example, exempted from expulsion "an
alien who is the father or the mother of one or more French children who are resid-
ing in France, so long as he or she has not been definitively deprived of parental
authority .. " Ordonnance No. 45-2658 of Nov. 2, 1945, art. 25, 1945J.O. 7225,
7226.
In a 1986 decision, however, the Conseil d'Etat interpreted this provision as
requiring the parent to have fulfilled some parental responsibilities. Although the
decision left unsettled the extent to which the administration may probe the relation-
ship's quality, it made clear that a father who had "not made an effort to obtain joint
custody and who had lived apart from the mother who had exercised responsibility
for the child" could not rely upon the statutory exemption of parents from expulsion.
Ministre de l'Interieur c. Azzouzi, Jan. 24, 1986, Conseil d'Etat (LEXIS, French Pub-
lic library, Conset file). In 1986 the Parliament amended the immigration law to limit
exemption from expulsion to parents who demonstrate that they "exercise at least
partial responsibility for the child or provide adequately for the support of the child."
See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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As is also the case with exclusion, the United States treats expulsion of
immigrant family members of citizens and resident aliens in the same
manner.
6 55
Exemption from expulsion requires both a showing of continuous
residence of seven to ten years and "hardship" to the immediate relative
in the United States.6 56 The latter condition requires a case-by-case
analysis of the hardship that would result from a family member's
expulsion.
The French standard, in contrast, avoids a determination of hard-
ship to family members. In France, the sole factor determining the need
for excluding or expelling family members is the gravity of the threat to
the nation's interests. 6 5 7 The U.S. approach, by focusing upon the
hardship to the family members, ignores the seriousness of the threat to
national interests posed by such an alien.
For both nations, an alien who enters illegally and subsequently
establishes family ties poses a unique problem. In France, when an ille-
gal alien establishes family ties to a French citizen, either through mar-
riage or through birth of a French child in France, the law favors
protecting the alien from expulsion except when the danger to ordre pub-
lic amounts to an emergency. 6 58 In the United States, the law provides
relief from expulsion for illegal entry only if the alien has been present
for seven years and can prove "hardship" to his resident, immediate
family members. 6 5 9 Moreover, U.S. courts have uniformly rejected
arguments that expelling an alien spouse or an alien parent is unconsti-
tutional as a de facto deportation of the citizen spouse or the citizen
child. 66 0 Again, the United States ignores the question of whether the
deportee presents any threat as an individual to the national security,
655. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982); see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
656. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982); see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
657. See supra notes 172, 557.
658. See Ordonnance of Nov. 2, 1945, art. 25, 1945 J.O. 7225, 7226, amended by
Law No. 81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981, 1981J.O. 2970, and by Law No. 86-1025 of Sept. 9,
1986, 1986 J.O. 11035; see supra note 300 and accompanying text.
659. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
660. See, e.g., Keh Tong Chen v. Attorney General, 546 F. Supp. 1060 (D.D.C.
1982), stating:
Courts have upheld the constitutionality of INS decisions which result in "de
facto deportation" of citizens on the grounds that "de facto deportation" is
not a necessary result of government action, but rather an indirect conse-
quence of the citizen's choice between alternatives.... It follows that where
the citizen does not have available two alternatives recognized by the law, the
citizen's selection of the only available course of action is directly attributed
to government action.
Id. at 1067.
As one court has argued: "In view of the relative ease with which aliens can enter
this country and then delay their departure long enough to produce citizen children,
[allowing them to remain] would do away with the limitations imposed by Congress
on immigration." Lee v. INS, 550 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Hintopoulos
v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957); Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979);




safety, or general welfare, instead basing its policy solely on effective
enforcement of the immigration law. Even this rationale, however, has
lost much of its force with the 1986 Reform and Control Act's legaliza-
tion of the status of many illegal aliens.6 6 '
The French policy shows more respect for family unification rights
than the current U.S. approach. The Attorney General's authority to
suspend deportation after a showing of seven years' residency in the
United States and extreme hardship is far too little protection. The cut-
off of consideration of those with less than seven years residency pre-
cludes an individualized determination of the necessity for expulsion in
these cases. When fundamental rights are at stake, however, administra-
tive efficiency does not justify denying deportees and their families con-
stitutional protections.
3. Exclusion and Expulsion: A Proposal for Reform
Barring recognition of the constitutional dimension of family unification
rights by the Supreme Court, Congress should step in to remedy the
current deficiencies. It should limit exclusion or expulsion to situations
in which the entry or continued presence of the alien presents an actual
danger to the national welfare, safety, or security. This standard,
already contained in the immigration law,6 62 should constitute the mini-
mum requirement for exclusion or expulsion of family members.
For deportation of alien relatives, a stricter standard should be
required. In such instances, the state interest in deportation must be
carefully weighed against both the citizen's and the resident alien's right
to a normal family life. In France, such expulsion is permitted only in
situations of "absolute emergency... constituting an imperative neces-
sity for the security of the state or for the public safety."' 6 6 3 United
States law should be amended to exempt immediate relatives of both
citizens and resident aliens from deportation in all but the most extreme
Numerous decisions have upheld the deportation of alien parents whose children
were born in and resided in the United States. See, e.g., Lee, supra; Rubio de Cachu v.
INS, 568 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that "an alien illegally present in the
United States cannot gain a favored status merely by the birth of his citizen child").
The Immigration and Naturalization Service recently advised a Salvadoran woman
living in New York City that deportation proceedings would be initiated against her if
she did not leave the country by the next day. Departure would mean separating
from her husband and her two-year-old son (both U.S. citizens), breaking ties estab-
lished during five years of residence in New York City, and returning to an uncertain
fate in El Salvador. The INS sought her departure because she entered illegally in
the 1970s. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1985, at A18, col. 4.
661. See supra note 610.
662. See supra note 650 and accompanying text.
663. Ordonnance No. 45-2658 of Nov. 2, 1945, art. 26, 1945 J.O. 7225, 7226, as
amended by Law No. 81-973 of Oct. 29, 1981, art. 5, 1981 J.O. 2970, 2971. In 1986,
the article 26 standard for emergency expulsion of the relatives normally exempted
by article 25 was relaxed somewhat to provide for expulsion when "the presence of
the foreigner in France constitutes a danger to ordre public of an extremely serious
nature." Minors under 18 years of age, however, remain totally exempt from expul-
sion. Law No. 86-1025 of Sept. 9, 1986, art. 10, 1986J.O. 11035.
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situations. At least in expulsion, the United States should follow the
French policy, exempting from expulsion close relatives unless they
present a grave and immediate danger to the national welfare, safety, or
security. A stricter standard is necessary to protect citizens from defacto
deportation and resident aliens from unwarranted deportation.
VIII. Conclusion
This Article proposes that U.S. immigration law recognize a constitu-
tional right to family unification for members of the nuclear family.
Although the right of a country to decide which and how many people to
admit is indisputable, in terms of family reunion, immigration policy must
not be determined only by economic and political considerations. The
decisive factor in all policy involving family reunion ought to be a human-
itarian one, that is, the protection of the . . . right to a normal family
life. 664
A state choosing to admit aliens into its territory must afford them
full constitutional protection, including protection of their right to live
with their nuclear family. Implementing this right to family unification
requires removal of the numerical limitations which impede the entry of
spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens. It also
requires a case-by-case analysis of the need for excluding or expelling an
alien who has ties to legally resident family members.
Although Congress gradually has eliminated discriminatory provi-
sions based on race, sex, social class, and legitimacy from U.S. immigra-
tion law, national origin has become a critical factor in determining the
entry of immediate family members. In the absence of compelling cir-
cumstances, however, national origin is an illegitimate basis for denying
or excessively delaying family unification. While the United States
Supreme Court has allowed the legislative and executive branches
nearly unfettered discretion in controlling immigration, its decisions
protecting the family from governmental intrusions provide the basis for
recognizing a constitutional right to family unification. That right, if
explicitly recognized, would require a more exacting standard ofjudicial
review than is currently applied to immigration law. Such a right would
also protect the rights of resident aliens as well as citizens.
French immigration law recognizes that both citizens and resident
aliens possess a constitutional right to family unification. Any limitation
of that right must be justified by important state interests such as the
preservation of national security. French recognition of a constitutional
right to family unification, however, has been largely symbolic. France
did not explicitly recognize the constitutional nature of family unifica-
tion until 1978,665 four years after foreclosing the entry of worker immi-
664. U.N. DEvr. OF INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, MIGRANT WORKERS AND PERTI-
NENT LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINSTRATIVE REGULATIONS ON THE WELFARE OF MIGRANT
WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES 11 (1983).
665. See supra notes 553-54 and accompanying text.
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grants from non-EEC nations. As a result, the number of family
entrants has actually declined over the last several years. Moreover,
except for the short period in 1975 when France totally barred family
unification, the current immigration regulations have not significantly
interfered with the entry of family members. Constitutional recognition
of the right has not significantly affected existing regulations except for
invalidating the "no-work" condition in the GISTI decision. Thus,
although constitutionalizing the right to family unification in France
secured the right by removing family unification from arbitrary decision-
making by administrative officials, the practical impact has been limited.
Recognizing a constitutional right to family unification would have a
far broader impact in the United States. The numbers of entrants would
considerably increase for several reasons. First, 280,000 aliens in the
second preference category now await visas to join a spouse, parent, or
minor child in the United States. 666 Not only would their entry be accel-
erated, but spouses and minor children whose names are not currently
on the waiting list would probably request entry. Secondly, aliens who
become permanent residents through the amnesty process of the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986 would also be entitled to be
joined by their spouses and unmarried minor children after the eight-
een-month period of temporary residence.66 7 Finally, since the U.S.
preference system allows citizens to petition for the entry of a wide
range of relatives, each entry of a resident alien for family unification
purposes could, when these resident aliens later obtain citizenship, lead
to multiple petitions for entry of parents, adult brothers and sisters, and
their family members. For these reasons, the recognition of a constitu-
tional right to family unification in the United States, especially follow-
ing the 1986 amnesty provision, would significantly increase the demand
for family unification.
The amnesty provisions themselves may result in such an increased
demand for preference visas that the system will function even less effec-
tively and equitably than it does today. If so, Congress finally may be
compelled to reexamine the current system of allocating visas. In that
event, Congress should give priority to elevating protection of perma-
nent resident aliens' family unification rights. To accomodate this goal,
and to avoid the increase in family members' demands for entry of other
family members, Congress should narrow the range of relatives of citi-
zens who are now entitled to preference. Limiting the entry of citizens'
brothers and sisters to those who are unmarried would significantly
reduce demand under that preference category. Here, as in France, the
scope of relatives who qualify for entry might eventually be reduced to
those within the constitutionally-protected family-spouses, minor chil-
dren, and those who are functionally members of the nuclear family
unit.
666. 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 399 (1984).
667. See generally supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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IX. Appendix
Proposed Family Unification Amendments (With additions to the legis-
lation shown by CAPITALS and deletions shown by brackets). Chapter
1-SELECTION SYSTEM NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS
8 U.S.C. 1151(a) Exclusive of special immigrants defined in section
101(a)(27), immediate relatives specified in subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, [and] aliens who are admitted or granted asylum under section
1157 or 1158, ALIENS WHOSE STATUS IS ADJUSTED TO THAT OF
LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT UNDER THE LEGALIZATION
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 245, [1986 amendments], AND
INDEPENDENT IMMIGRANTS SPECIFIED IN SECTION XXX [NEW
CATEGORIES FOR WORKERS], the number of aliens born in any for-
eign state or dependent area who may be issued immigrant visas or who
may otherwise acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence, shall [not in any of the first three
quarters of any fiscal year exceed a total of seventy-two-thousand and
shall not in any fiscal year exceed a total of two-hundred-and-seventy-
thousand] BE LIMITED TO FAMILY UNIFICATION IMMIGRANTS
AS DEFINED IN SECTION 1153(a) IN A NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED
IN ANY FISCAL YEAR THE NUMBER EQUAL TO 400,000
REDUCED BY THE NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE RELATIVES AS
DEFINED IN SUBSECTION (b) OF THIS SECTION WHO IN THE
PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR WERE ISSUED AN IMMIGRANT VISA OR
WHO OTHERWISE ACQUIRED THE STATUS OF LAWFUL PERMA-
NENT RESIDENT.
(b) The "immediate relatives" referred to in subsection (a) of this
section shall mean (1) the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of
the United States: Provided, that in the case of parents, such citizen must
be at least twenty-one years of age, AND (2) THE CHILDREN UNDER
18 YEARS OF AGE AND SPOUSES OF AN ALIEN LAWFULLY
ADMITTED FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE. The immediate rela-
tives specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admis-
sion as immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the
numerical limitations in this Chapter.
8 U.S.C. 1152(a) No person shall receive any preference or priority
or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because
of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence, except
as specifically provided in sections 1101(a) (27), 1151(b), and 1153 of
this title, AND SECTION XXX [NEW CATEGORIES FOR WORK-
ERS]: Provided, That the total number of immigrant visas made available
to natives of any single foreign state under paragraphs (1) through [7 of
section 1153(a) shall not exceed 20,000 in any fiscal year.] (4) OF SEC-
TION 203(a) SHALL BE DETERMINED BY SUBTRACTING FROM
20,000 THE NUMBER OF "IMMEDIATE RELATIVE" VISAS ISSUED






8 U.S.C. 1153(a) Aliens who are subject to the numerical limitations
in section 1151(a) of this title shall be allotted visas as follows:
(1) Visas shall be first made available, in a number not to exceed
[20] 25 per centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this
title, PLUS ANY VISAS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE CLASS SPECI-
FIED IN PARAGRAPH (4) OF THIS SUBSECTION, to qualified immi-
grants who are the unmarried sons or daughters of citizens of the United
States.
(2) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed
[26] 25 per centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this
title, plus any visas not required for the classes specified in paragraph
(1) of this subsection, to qualified immigrants who are [the spouses,] the
unmarried sons 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OVER or the unmarried daugh-
ters 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OVER of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
[(3)] delete (provision for members of the professions transferred)
[(4)] (3) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to
exceed [10] 25 per centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of
this title, plus any visas not required for the classes specified in
paragraphs [(1) through (3),] (1) AND (2), to qualified immigrants who
are the married sons or the married daughters of citizens of the United
States.
[(5)] (4) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to
exceed [24] 25 per centum of the number specified in section 1151 (a) of
this title plus any visas not required for the classes specified in
paragraphs (1) through [(4)] (3) of this subsection, to (A) qualified immi-
grants who are the UNMARRIED brothers or sisters of citizens of the
United States provided such citizens are at least twenty-one years of age,
AND (B) QUALIFIED IMMIGRANTS WHO
(i) AS OF THE DATE OF ENACTMENT OF THIS ACT HAD
RECEIVED APPROVAL OF A PETITION MADE ON THEIR BEHALF
FOR PREFERENCE STATUS BY REASON OF THE RELATIONSHIP
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (5) OF THIS SECTION AS IN EFFECT
ON THE DAY BEFORE SUCH DATE, AND
(ii) CONTINUE TO QUALIFY UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS
ACT AS IN EFFECT ON THE DAY BEFORE SUCH DATE.
[(6)] delete. (provisions for skilled and unskilled laborers)
[(7)] delete. (provisions for issuance of unused visas to nonprefer-
ence immigrants)
[(8)] (5) A spouse or child as defined in section 101(b)(1) (A), (B),
(C), (D), or (E) of this title, shall, if not otherwise entitled to an immi-
grant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under paragraphs (1)
through [(7)] (4) of this subsection, be entitled to the same status, and
the same order of consideration provided in subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, if accompanying, or following to join, his spouse or parent.
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(b) In considering applications for immigrant visas under subsec-
tion (a) of this section consideration shall be given to applicants in the
order in which the classes of which they are members are listed in sub-
section (a) of this section.
(c) Immigrant visas issued pursuant to paragraphs (1) through
[(6)] (4) of subsection (a) shall be issued to eligible immigrants in the
order in which a petition in behalf of each such immigrant is filed with
the Attorney General as provided in section 1154 of this title.
(d) Every immigrant shall be presumed to be a nonpreference
immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer
and the immigration officer that he is entitled to a preference status
under paragraphs (1) through [(6)] (4) of subsection (a) of this section,
or to a special immigrant status under section 1101(a)(27) of this title,
or that he is an immediate relative [of a United States citizen] as speci-
fied in section 1151(b) of this title. In the case of any alien claiming in
his application for an immigrant visa to be an immediate relative [of a
United States citizen] as specified in section 1151(b) of this title or to be
entitled to preference immigrant status under paragraphs (1) through
[(6)] (4) of subsection (a) of this section, the consular officer shall not
grant such status until he has been authorized to do so as provided by
section 1154 of this title.
(e) No change.
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